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Over the past 30 years, standards based accountability reform (SBA) has taken 
hold in public education. SBA reform includes defined academic expectations, curricula 
standards, measureable assessments, and performance accountability. SBA impacts 
multiple levels of public education.  Its most recent federal codification, the No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB) Act, includes sanctions meant to influence what happens in 
classrooms. Historically, teachers have held a great deal of control over the activities in 
the classroom. Research suggests that teacher control (i.e. autonomy) over the classroom 
often resulted in uneven implementation of reform policies across schools, the 
transformation of policies to fit existing practice or the insulation of classrooms 
altogether from policy reform. To achieve its stated goals, SBA seeks to influence teacher 
and school practices, particularly where students fail to meet performance goals.  
This study examines the intersection of teacher perceptions of autonomy and SBA 
reforms, including NCLB. The study uses four waves of nationally representative 
Schools and Staffing Survey data from 1993-94 to 2007-08 to investigate changes in 
teacher autonomy over time and to examine specific school and teachers characteristics 
associated with changes in autonomy in 2007-08.  
Over-time findings reveal that teachers perceived lower classroom autonomy 
between 2003-04 and 2007-08. Across all four waves of data, the variation in teachers’ 
classroom autonomy increased, and more of this increased variation occurred between 




in elementary schools or taught tested subjects perceived lower levels of autonomy than 
did teachers in secondary schools or who taught non-tested subjects. Further analyses 
based on state application of adequate yearly progress (AYP) sanctions revealed a 
differential effect on teacher autonomy for Title I schools and for schools that failed to 
make AYP. Findings from this study suggest that although NCLB targets Title I schools, 
teachers in all schools perceive lower autonomy based on the grade level and the subject 
matter taught, and that state policies regarding NCLB may lead to uneven or unintended 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Decades of research on education reform implementation suggest that as street-
level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) educators in general and teachers in particular have had 
the ability to insulate themselves and mediate external intervention in the classroom, 
either by keeping reform from permeating the classroom or by adapting policies to fit 
established practice (Allensworth, Ponisciak, & Mazzeo, 2009; Cohen, Moffitt, & 
Goldin, 2007; Elmore, 1987; Ingersoll & May, 2010, 2011; Rowan, 1990; Spillane & 
Zeuli, 1999; Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977). Cuban (1990) discusses instruction, curriculum, 
and centralization policies as examples of recurring school reforms that illustrate the 
challenge of federal, state, and district policies “ever get[ting] past the classroom door” 
(p. 3). He points out that implementation of these policies ultimately rests with teachers 
who are decoupled from administrators and policymakers and are able to “ignore and 
modify” (p. 11) policies. Meanwhile, principals and teachers tend to operate under 
informal agreements whereby both parties maintain separate spheres of influence within 
schools with little to no interference from one another (Hanson, 2006).   
Currently, questions remain as to whether educators continue to have the ability to 
insulate their workplace given the standards-based accountability reforms (SBA) that 
have enveloped public education in the United States. The SBA reforms define academic 
expectations, curricula standards, measureable assessments, and performance 
accountability systems (Hamilton, Stecher, & Yuan, 2008). Ostensibly, SBA reforms 
outline a systemic structure for consistent and quality public education. In reality, SBA 




educators to ignore or modify externally mandated interventions at the school and 
classroom levels. Specifically, SBA reforms break the historic détente between teachers 
and other school authorities and force a rebalancing of external demands on the education 
system and internal practices of classroom teachers.   
Defining teacher autonomy 
One way of understanding SBA reforms is as an attempt to restrict teacher 
autonomy, particularly the autonomy of teachers who fail to meet performance goals or 
comply with external mandates. What constitutes teacher autonomy, however, can be 
difficult to define.  Scholars have used a variety of terms, such as curriculum control 
(Archbald & Porter, 1994) or professional capacity (Cohen, 1996), to describe teacher 
autonomy. Nonetheless, for scholars “the concept of professional autonomy is unruly and 
mired with multiple, ambiguous interpretations” (Boote, 2006, p. 462). Ingersoll (2003) 
defines teacher autonomy as a dimension of power that is “a function of the extent to 
which [teachers] influence the decisions that are most central to their work” (p. 47). He 
uses the terms power and control interchangeably when he investigates teacher autonomy 
in schools and declares teachers to be “short on power, long on responsibility” when 
describing their influence in schools (Ingersoll, 2007, p. 20). While the literature offers 
no absolute definition of teacher autonomy, the current study incorporates aspects of 
prominent definitions that draw on concepts of freedom, discretion, and power over 
academic and social aspects of schooling to define teacher autonomy in the classroom 
(Bogler & Somech, 2004; Firestone & Pennell, 1993; Ingersoll, 2003).  Specifically, I 
define teacher autonomy as the power to exercise control over key elements of work in 




I do not adopt the notion that the power to exercise control over key elements of 
work in the classroom is synonymous with power over all decisions that enter the 
classroom, or extend the definition of teacher autonomy beyond the classroom. Rather, I 
acknowledge that teacher autonomy is “situationally constrained” (Cuban, 1990, p. 11) 
through structural and administrative elements of schools that condition the exercise of 
control in specific domains. Similar to Ingersoll, authors have used a host of terms as 
indicative of or equivalent to the degree of teacher autonomy in the classroom. I do not 
attempt to disentangle this “semantic thicket” (Geary, 1992) but offer a functional 
definition of the teacher autonomy construct. In this dissertation, the study of autonomy 
is the study of the scope and degree of control that teachers have over key elements of 
their work in the classroom domain.  
Autonomy in general and teacher autonomy in particular are important constructs. 
Social psychologists document the general positive relationship between autonomy and 
job satisfaction (Deci & Ryan, 1987; Richer, Blanchard, & Vallerand, 2002). Parallel to 
social psychologists, education researchers document that teacher autonomy associates 
generally with several aspects of workplace conditions, including teacher job satisfaction, 
teacher motivation, and teacher retention (Guarino, Santibanez, & Daley, 2006; Ingersoll, 
2003; Ingersoll & May, 2011; Kim & Loadman, 1994; Pearson, 1995; Pearson & 
Moomaw, 2006). Further, teacher autonomy is a policy-amenable construct that can 
affect teachers’ working conditions depending on how policymakers and administrators 
develop, frame, and implement policy. For example, teachers may perceive policies that 
emphasize high-stakes accountability in schools as “an imposition on their professional 




perceive them as policies that enable teachers to focus on core academic areas (Guggino 
& Brint, 2010). That educators may have opposing interpretations of SBA reform reveals 
a tension between teacher autonomy and school accountability that is inherent in the 
theory of action that underlies SBA policies, especially later forms as exemplified by No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB).  
SBA theory of action  
In the most general terms, SBA seeks to set defined and measureable student 
performance goals, assess student performance in light of those goals, and engender 
classroom practices that achieve those stated goals (Elmore, 2002; Hamilton, 2003; 
Stecher et al. 2008). To that end, SBA policies rely heavily on various combinations of 
incentives and sanctions to motivate educators to comply with policy provisions and 
adopt practices that advance the stated aims of SBA reforms. SBA assumes that these 
inducements and punishments are essential and effective levers to alter the behavior of 
educators in public school systems. While the stated goals of SBA reforms are to 
strengthen standards and accountability for all schools, intervention mechanisms (e.g., 
district supports, professional development) focus on schools that fail to meet academic 
performance targets and on teachers who have not successfully improved student 
academic achievement.  
Beginning in the late 1980s, state- and district-level policymakers introduced 
SBA reform and states began to adopt SBA policies. Research on the early state-adopted 
SBA policies indicated that these policies “lead to behavioral change among teachers, 
[that] included increased scrutiny of test scores, targeted adjustments in teaching practice, 




fellow teachers to improve performance” (Hannaway & Woodroffe, 2003). Elmore 
(2002) describes how “in early stages of the accountability movement, reformers had an 
expansive view of performance that included, in addition to tests, portfolios of student’s 
work, teachers’ evaluations of their students, student-initiated projects, and formal 
exhibitions of students’ work” (p. 32). However, in the late 1990s, reforms began to shift 
toward a test-centered approach to SBA reform as policymakers linked SBA policies to 
standardized test scores (Hamilton, 2003) Over time, SBA became synonymous with test-
based accountability. 
Federal policymakers embraced the appeal of test-based accountability when they 
codified testing through the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in the 2001 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Their 
underlying  theory of action posited that the focus on education standards measured by 
test-based assessments and accompanied by sanctions for sub-par performance would 
prompt educators to adopt practices that would  improve student performance (as 
measured by standardized test scores). Presumably the Title I school specific sanctions  
triggered by low student performance would motivate teachers, principals, and parents to 
make changes both within and beyond the classroom to enhance student performance and 
achieve “adequate yearly progress” (Hamilton et al., 2007; Hammond, 2007; Sunderman, 
Tracey, Kim & Orfield, 2004). Thus, NCLB includes: a mandatory benchmark for 
student performance in the form of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP); a universal 
provision for public dissemination of a school’s AYP status (i.e., met or failed); a system-
wide requirement for annual assessments in grades 3 through 8 and in mathematics, 




supplemental education services for students who attend schools that receive federal 
funding through ESEA’s Title I program (i.e., Title I schools) and fail to make AYP two 
consecutive years; and specific actions toward school reconstitution for Title I schools 
that fail to make AYP more than two consecutive years.  
Given the theory of action in SBA, particularly as adopted by NCLB, one might 
expect teachers of the NCLB-targeted grades, subjects and schools to change their 
classroom practices. For example, teachers might alter the content they emphasize, the 
teaching techniques they employ, and the approaches they use to manage the classroom 
and to prepare students for the targeted testing by subject and grade. One might also 
expect that teachers might perceive the pressure to alter aspects of their work in 
classrooms in at least two ways: as an infringement on their autonomy in the classroom 
or as an opportunity to offer additional support to historically lower-performing student 
populations in Title I schools (Sunderman, Tracey, Kim & Orfield, 2004). It is this 
intersection between SBA policies and teacher autonomy in the classroom that is central 
to the current study. 
Relationship Between Teacher Autonomy and SBA 
Generations of sociologists, economists, organizational theorists, and political 
scientists have used an array of theoretical approaches to study broad concepts of power, 
autonomy and control in organizations (Geary, 1992; Malen & Ogawa, 1988, Winter) and 
to study tensions between autonomy and accountability in the school setting (Booher-
Jennings, 2005; Campbell, R. 1976; Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Hanushek & Raymond, 
2002; Ingersoll, 2003, 2007; Manna, 2006a; Mintrop & Sunderman, 2009; Rowan, 1990). 




where teaching is viewed as a “routinized technology” that can be managed through 
“control-based” organizational design; (b) or as a complex and non-routine technology, 
where teachers seek “authority, variety, and collegiality” in schools (Rowan, 1990); (c) as 
a matter of capacity, where through teacher education programs and professional 
development teachers are able to help students acquire knowledge and skills that lead to 
specified outcomes (Minnici, Hill, & Kober, 2007; Stecher et al., 2008); and (d) as a 
matter of profession where teachers are curricular and instructional experts charged with 
developing student intellects and citizenship (E. Campbell, 2006; Darling-Hammond, 
Berry, & Thoreson, 2001; Ingersoll, 2003). 
Using various methodological approaches (e.g., case study, survey, statistical 
modeling) scholars have found that teachers’ perceptions of their autonomy affect their 
motivation to invest in teaching, their sense of job satisfaction, their view of teaching as a 
profession, and ultimately, their retention (Ingersoll & Alsalam, 1997; Ingersoll & May, 
2011; Kim & Loadman, 1994; Pearson & Moomaw, 2005). Some scholars argue that as 
SBA implementation continues, “the distribution of power, authority, and control in 
schools is one of the most important issues in contemporary education research and 
policy” (Ingersoll & Merrill, 2011, p. 191). For example, in 2011 a study of New York 
City teachers sought to examine the relationship between contextual school 
characteristics (e.g., administrative support, school facilities) and teacher influence over 
their work and their retention. The authors found that teachers who perceived themselves 
to have low levels of autonomy had less influence over their work were more likely to 




The amount of control over the classroom that teachers share with federal, state, 
and local actors affects the nature and degree of teacher autonomy. Historically, federal 
and state policymakers have viewed teacher autonomy as necessary for, and yet at times 
contrary to, the efficient and effective operation of schools. In the early 1990s, some 
reformers attempted to increase autonomy at the school level through site-based 
management and school improvement programs in which teachers shared control over the 
classroom with other local actors (i.e., parents) (White, 1992). However, within a decade, 
reformers turned toward more centralized controls that in effect sought to decrease 
autonomy at the school level (Glazer, 2008). SBA reforms represent the turn towards 
centralized strategies that change the distribution of power in schools, which may 
influence, for good or for ill, teacher autonomy.  
Ingersoll (2003) states that “the distribution of control and influence in schools 
profoundly affects how well schools function” (p. 13). Thus, it is not surprising that the 
amount of power teachers have to control their work in the classroom is contested terrain. 
As SBA reforms take hold, policymakers have differing views of the effects SBA reforms 
may have on teacher autonomy depending on whether policymakers value high or low 
levels of control over teacher actions in the classroom. The polemic concerns at least two 
normative questions—Should teachers have power over the classroom? And if so, how 
much?—and two empirical questions—How much power do teachers have over the 




                                                 
1
 The current study does not address the normative questions; rather, the focus is on the first empirical 
question. Specifically this dissertation examines how current manifestations of SBA reform may shape 




If one accepts the hypothesis of prior research that the advent and progression of 
SBA reforms have altered the balance between school-site autonomy and system-wide 
accountability, then more work must be done to identify first, whether SBA reforms have 
in fact altered teachers’ perceptions of their autonomy; and, second, whether that change 
corresponds to the underlying assumptions of the policy.  For example, one might expect 
teachers’ sense of autonomy to correlate with the implementation of increasingly more 
consequential forms of SBA, such as NCLB.  Or, if SBA functions as it is meant to 
function, then teachers in schools that fail to meet performance standards should report 
having less autonomy than those that meet performance standards.  Moreover, the more 
severe the sanctions that are being implemented in any year, the less autonomy teachers 
should have.  In general, one would expect SBA to reduce a sense of autonomy for low-
performing teachers but have no effect, or perhaps even a positive effect, on higher-
performing teachers. 
Specifically, questions remain as to whether teacher autonomy has changed over 
time, particularly since the implementation of No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). I posit 
that teacher perceptions of autonomy have changed over time and that this change varies 
for teachers based on distinct school and teacher characteristics (e.g., those in low 
performing vs. high performing schools; and Title I schools vs. non-Title I schools). 
Further, I suggest that the school-level embodiments of SBA reform found in NCLB, 
such as adequate yearly progress (AYP) status and associated sanctions, produce 
differential effects on teacher autonomy that are potentially unrelated to teacher 
performance (e.g., tested subjects vs. non-tested subjects; and novice vs. veteran 




could lead to unintended consequences that could undermine the policy. In the next 
section I present the conceptual framework for this study. 
Conceptual Framework 
Sociologists and political scientists who study issues of power and control in 
organizations broadly and teacher autonomy in schools specifically inform the current 
study.  Specifically, I anchor this study in research by Dr. Richard Ingersoll and on 
notions of power and influence described by Dr. Robert Dahl (1984). Ingersoll is the 
preeminent scholar who uses sociological and political constructs to examine the tension 
between autonomy (i.e. the power to control) and accountability. Ingersoll has a depth of 
scholarship regarding teachers’ levels of control and power in schools and classrooms 
and has placed particular emphasis on the tension between autonomy and accountability 
(Ingersoll, 1996, 2003, 2007, 2012; Ingersoll & Merrill, 2011). Specifically, Ingersoll’s 
conceptual framework in Who Controls Teachers’ Work  (2003) and in Teachers’ 
Decision-Making Power and School Conflict (1996), in which he examined the degree of 
power teachers and administrators held over the classroom and other school domains, 
guides the current study’s focus on teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom.
2
 
The conceptual underpinnings of the study include constructs of degree, scope, 
and domain from Dahl’s (1984) power-influence model. Specifically, this study uses 
Dahl’s constructs of power and influence to develop a nuanced understanding of how 
SBA reforms affect public-school teachers’ power to exercise control over their work in 
the classroom as they experience the tension between accountability and autonomy that 
                                                 
2
 The phrase “teacher perceptions of autonomy” appears in cited works and in the current text. While it is 
the most accurate phrasing to describe the phenomenon of interest in this study, it may be tiresome to the 
reader given the length of this study. Therefore, as others have done (Moomaw, 2005), I will use the 




SBA reform brings to education.
3
 Dahl defines power as the ability of one party to 
persuade and/or to pressure another party to perform acts which the second party is not 
predisposed to do. Further, he recognizes power is a relative concept. That is, power does 
not exist in absolute terms.  
The study of power exposes who can do what to whom under what circumstances. 
Scholars provide some tools to recognize and depict the power of actors in given 
domains. In their study of state policymaking and school policy implementation, Malen 
and Muncey (2000) explain that to assess the autonomy of a given actor one must 
examine various indicators, such as “the degree of formal authority to make binding 
decisions”(p.201), the rules under which an actor operates, the actor’s ability to allocate 
resources, and “the strength of various rewards or sanctions that individual schools may 
anticipate or higher authorities may impose” (p. 201). Although the authors investigated 
school-level autonomy, researchers may adapt the same indicators to study autonomy for 
other levels of the public school system.  For example, teachers who operate in public-
school classrooms within a high-stakes SBA context may have experienced changes to 
their scope and degree of autonomy that either bolster or wither their ability to make 
“binding decisions” in the classroom. 
The answers to the questions “over what?” and “over whom?” expose those who 
have power and what they can control. Degree reflects the extent to which one party may 
influence another in the power relationship; scope defines the issue or content over which 
an individual, group, or entity may have power; and domain indicates over whom or over 
what systems actors may exercise power. Dahl’s constructs are useful to the current study 
                                                 
3
 From this point forward, I will either omit altogether or use sporadically the ‘public-school’ adjective 




because they call for interpretations of teacher autonomy that recognize gradations of 
control over the classroom relative to other actors and elements of the school system. 
Although Ingersoll does not explicitly refer to Dahl, Ingersoll’s examination of issues 
concerning teacher power in schools includes domain (e.g., school and classroom), scope 
(e.g., discipline policies and hiring decisions), and degree (e.g., level of autonomy 
measured through qualitative and quantitative methods). Thus, it is fitting to incorporate 
Dahl’s notions of power and influence explicitly in this study.  
The general conceptual framework for this dissertation (see Fig. 1) orients the 
reader to the notion that power over schools and teachers flows through a system from 
the federal, state, and local levels of government to schools and teachers. 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between standards-based reform and teacher perceptions of scope 
and degree of autonomy in the classroom domain. 
 
Scope and degree of teacher-













Arrow a  indicates that actors external to the school site (e.g. federal and state 
policymakers) initiate SBA reform that school-level actors must interpret and implement. 
For simplicity’s sake, I have combined federal, state, and district actors into one box, 
though in reality these actors may make multiple and separate demands on schools and 
teachers.  To illustrate, through NCLB federal policymakers decreed that Title I schools 
were subject to sanctions if the school failed to make AYP. However, state policymakers 
had a disparate response to the federal sanction policy such that in many states all schools 
are subject to NCLB sanctions rather than only Title I schools. This state treatment of 
federal sanctions is an example of both the flow of an accountability policy from external 
actors to school-site actors, and of the disparate demands that external actors may place 
on school actors through NCLB.  
Arrows b and c illustrate that school-level context and actors influence the scope 
and degree of teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom domain. In other words, the 
school mediates the effects of SBA on teachers’ perceptions of autonomy – either directly 
through the characteristics of schools (b) or indirectly through specific policies and 
practices that influence the influence of SBA policies on teachers’ work (c).  For 
example, teachers in different schools may experience differing perceptions of autonomy 
based in part on the school context (e.g., student poverty level measured by Title I status; 
whether the school makes AYP); schools that are more likely to be the target of sanctions 
are more likely to experience threats to autonomy.  Moreover, teachers in different 
schools may experience differing perceptions of autonomy based in part on school 
leadership.  Principals, for example, may enact polices that either exacerbate teachers’ 




negatively, schools may also mediate teachers’ perceptions of autonomy through policies 
and practices, such as leadership, that influences teachers’ work.  
Arrow d illustrates that SBA policies created at the federal, state, and local levels, 
(e.g., curricula and testing policies of NCLB) may influence teachers. Here the figure 
acknowledges the possibility of a direct influence on teachers’ perceptions of autonomy 
by external actors, one not mediated by the school. Just as specific types of schools are 
targeted, NCLB targets specific types of teachers (e.g., mathematics, reading and science 
teachers in grades three through eight). Teachers who teach tested subjects in tested 
grades may feel different levels of autonomy because the policy targets their grade and 
subject for testing while it does not target other grades and subjects. Arrow e illustrates 
that teachers themselves influence the scope and degree of teacher-perceived autonomy 
in the classroom domain based on teacher characteristics (e.g., race and experience). In 
other words, apart from school contexts, grade assignment or subjects taught, teachers 
may perceive their degree of autonomy differently based on individual characteristics. 
With others, Manna (2006a) observed that “in any policy system where actors at 
one level of government depend on other levels to help them accomplish their objectives, 
a careful combination of enforcement and persuasion is required for policy success” (p. 
473). The overarching hypothesis that guides this dissertation is that during the period of 
1993–2008, teacher perceptions of autonomy changed and SBA reform policies enacted 
at the federal, state, and local levels associate with that change. To capture the nature of 
these changes, I incorporate Dahl’s (1984) power-influence constructs. The constructs of 




school classroom. Scope is always the single construct that consists of the following six 
measures of teacher-perceived control in the classroom domain:  
1.  Textbook selection 
2.  Teaching technique selection  
3.  Content, topics, and skills selection  
4.  Student grading and evaluation  
5.  Student discipline  
6.  Homework determination 
 
The measure that captures the construct of teacher-perceived autonomy treats each of the 
six elements with equal weight; however, given the theory of action underlying SBA 
reform described in the first chapter, one might expect that teachers experience more 
change in the first three elements listed.  Specifically, federal and state SBA policies 
emphasize standardization of course materials, content and approach to teaching.  It is 
also possible, however, that SBA, as interpreted by school districts and schools, influence 
the latter three elements.  Districts, for example, may require additional evaluations and 
testing of students, and schools may require increased discipline and additional 
homework assignments as part of local strategies to improve student test performance. 
While the connections between SBA policies and selection of materials, content, and 
teaching techniques might be more direct than those between grading, discipline, and 
homework, the latter group offer insight into policies that may be local responses to SBA 
reform that subsequently affect teacher autonomy. Thus, the full measure that included all 
six elements offers a fulsome approach to the construct of teachers’ perceptions of 
autonomy. 
In contrast to scope and domain, degree takes two forms in this study. I analyze 
the average perception of degree of teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom domain 




and 2007 (i.e., 1993-94, 1999–2000, 2003-04, and 2007-08). Second, I analyze teacher 
and school effects between and within schools using an indicator of whether a school 
failed to meet AYP status, a direct measure of NCLB, the specific manifestation of SBA 
that is a focus of this study in 2007–08, and a measure of level of sanctions that a school 
has experienced (e.g., first or second year under sanctions). I examine this AYP 
relationship while controlling for specific school and teacher characteristics in the full 
2007–08 sample and in two subsamples of 2007–08 data based on sanction policies at the 
state level (i.e., whether states apply NCLB sanctions to all schools or just Title I 
schools). 
Research Questions 
Informed by scholarship that has addressed SBA reform and policy 
implementation, I hypothesize that the complex web of power relationships in the U.S. 
public school system has developed such that, for good or for ill, teacher autonomy in the 
classroom has narrowed since the adoption of SBA reform policies. I suggest that NCLB 
is the culmination of SBA reform and that whether a school makes AYP will directly 
influence teachers’ perceptions of autonomy. I hypothesize that since the adoption of 
NCLB changes in teacher-perceived autonomy are neither universal nor uniform. Rather, 
some teachers perceive diminished autonomy in the classroom while others do not, such 
as teachers who have less experience compared to those who have more; teachers in Title 
I schools compared to those in lower-poverty schools; or teachers who teach tested 
subjects compared to those who do not. I further posit that notable differences in 
autonomy exist for teachers who work in schools that did not make AYP status compared 




To explore my hypotheses I analyze four waves of SASS data and use the 
following research questions to guide the analyses: 
1. How do teachers perceive their own autonomy in the classroom? 
 
a. From 1993 to 2007, how has the degree of teacher-
perceived autonomy in the classroom changed? 
 
b. For 2007–08, what school and teacher characteristics 




2. How does SBA reform, represented by a school’s NCLB AYP status in 2007–
08, associate with teacher perceptions of autonomy in the classroom domain? 
 
a. How do teachers who work in schools that made AYP 
perceive their autonomy compared to those who work 
in schools that did not make AYP? 
 
b. How do teachers who work in schools in the first year 
of failed AYP status perceive their autonomy compared 
to those who work in schools in the second year or later 
of failed AYP status? 
 
In sum, if SBA has permeated the classroom walls, as scholars suggest, then 
variations in the trend of teacher-perceived autonomy merit examination on a national 
level to uncover whether changes are sporadic and isolated or uniform and universal. 
Changes in teacher-perceived autonomy may be limited to certain types of teachers in 
certain types of schools, or may reflect a widespread phenomenon driven by forces 
external to teachers and to schools. My study addresses the breadth and depth of such 
changes. It also examines the extent to which the potential effects on teacher autonomy 
comply with the underlying assumptions of SBA – that is, do teachers in low-performing 




Overall Design of the Study 
To answer the two multipart empirical research questions listed above, I employ a 
two-phase research design. The study uses descriptive analyses based on SASS data 
collected in four academic years (1993–94, 1999–2000, 2003–04, and 2007-08) to 
compare changes in self-reported teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom over 
time. This descriptive discussion reveals both the total variation in teacher perception of 
autonomy between 1993–94 and 2007–08, and the variation attributable specifically to 
the schools in which teachers worked. Effectively, the descriptive results offer a pattern 
of overall change in the average perception of autonomy as a context for the multilevel 
model that uses teacher and school characteristics (e.g., years of experience, subject 
matter taught, and school Title I and AYP status) to find specific school-level and 
teacher-level effects on autonomy. For the 2007–08 data, I use hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) to exploit the nested design of the NCES data. The advantage of HLM 
is that it more accurately reflects the relationship between school characteristics and 
teacher-perceived autonomy in a nested data structure compared to ordinary least squares 
regression (Luke, 2004). Further, HLM enables me to separate the school-level effects 
from teacher-level variations on perceived autonomy. This distinction is important 
because school-level characteristics, teacher characteristics, or, more likely, a 
combination of the two, may affect variation present in teachers’ perceptions of 
autonomy.  
Potential Significance 
This study adds to the conceptual and empirical scholarship on teacher-perceived 




teachers as arbiters of SBA policies allows for a nuanced examination of teacher-
perceived autonomy, which is neither static nor absolute. Empirically, the study extends 
scholarship through nationally generalizable results from over-time analyses of the 
tension between accountability and autonomy that extend to 2007–08, and from analyses 
that capture the effect of NCLB in the classroom (i.e., AYP status and different levels of 
sanctions). While I employ the same SASS variables to build the autonomy measure as 
did Ingersoll and May (2010; 2011) in their use of the 2003-04 and earlier data, I extend 
their work in four ways: 
1. use of teacher-perceived autonomy as the construct of interest rather than 
as an indicator of another phenomenon; 
 
2. use of Dahl’s power-influence constructs to examine teacher-perceived 
autonomy; 
 
3. use of SASS data from 1993–94 to 2007–08 to develop a portrait of 
change in teacher-perceived autonomy over time; 
 
4. use of SASS 2007–08 to build multiple hierarchical linear models that 
directly measure the influence of SBA reform tools on teacher-perceived 
autonomy. 
 
As evidenced by the ongoing work by Ingersoll and others, teacher-perceived 
autonomy in the classroom continues to be an important element of scholarship that 
examines a critical aspect of teachers’ working conditions in classrooms and schools. 
However, the majority of empirical research to date on teacher autonomy does not focus 
on teacher autonomy as the construct of interest. Rather, researchers tend to use teacher 
autonomy as an indicator of other teacher-centered phenomena.  Further, prior research is 




most public manifestation of the NCLB.
4
 In contrast, the hierarchical models of 
nationally representative teacher data in this study incorporate AYP status as the trigger 
for sanctions promoted by SBA reform, and incorporate state-level policies regarding 
which schools should be held accountable for AYP failure. To introduce the key elements 
of the relationship investigated in this study, in the next section I offer an historic 
overview of SBA reforms and the relationship between these reforms and teacher-
perceived autonomy. 
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 On March 9, 2011, the U.S. Secretary of Education reported to Congress that ED estimates that 82 percent 
of public schools will not meet AYP targets. (See: http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/duncan-says-82-
percent-americas-schools-could-fail-under-nclb-year.). In 2012, the Center on Education Policy updated the 




 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This literature review begins with a broad examination of research that has 
addressed the intergovernmental phenomenon of public education and the relative power 
over education held at each level of the public school system. The section continues with 
a more focused review of literature specific to the teacher level of the system: it examines 
research on teacher autonomy and, in turn, how autonomy interacts with teacher 
professionalism, job satisfaction, retention, and SBA reform.  
Historical Context of SBA Reform Development and Implementation 
The historical context of SBA reform is important to this study because it 
establishes the context of change in education policy that brought SBA reform to the fore. 
History is valuable because “what may seem like a relatively rapid process of reform is in 
fact only the final stage of a process that has been under way for an extended period” 
(Pierson, 2005, p. 40).  
Beginning in the early 1980s, public school reformers began to incorporate 
requirements for standards, assessments and accountability into education policy 
discussions (Firestone, Fuhrman, & Kirst, 1991). This package of reforms became what is 
now termed standards-based accountability reform. According to Elmore (2002), the 
National Governors Association promoted the “central theory of today’s accountability 
reforms,” (p.32) when it introduced performance-based accountability, whereby states 
sought accountability for student academic performance but would leave the decision-




DeBray (2006) and McDermott (2003) chronicle the emergence of SBA. In the 
late 1980s and 1990s states began to develop and implement standards-based 
accountability reforms. In 1989 the Charlottesville Education Summit convened and 
linked standards-based reforms to the problem of school failure (Superfine, 2005). 
According to former Secretary of Education Rod Paige (2006), the Summit was “a 
landmark event in that it brought together, for the first time, nearly every state governor 
in one forum to talk about education” (p. 464). The Summit venue allowed governors to 
create a national agenda encouraging states to adopt SBA as the ideal reform. Perhaps 
unintentionally, the national focus and symmetry of thought at the state level laid the 
foundation for a federal movement that would embrace a high-stakes standards and 
accountability reform policy (Manna, 2006a). The Summit served as a beacon that 
emphasized the importance of education on the federal agenda and widened the window 
of opportunity for entrepreneurs that would promote a prominent federal role in education 
(Heise, 1994).  
Calls for achievement and accountability began early in the decade and remain 
strong to the present day. SBA reform had a potent blend of policy tools that educators 
could not ignore (Malen & Muncey, 2000). For instance, SBA shifted the focus of 
evaluation from inputs (e.g., program expenditures) to outcomes (student assessment 
scores); declared student achievement as a proxy for teacher and principal effectiveness; 
and carried threats of school sanctions. By 1999, nearly all states had increased their 
scope of influence over education through the development of achievement standards and 




Wohlstetter, 2005; Firestone, 2001; Fuhrman, 1999; Heise, 1994; Manna, 2006a; 
Sunderman, Tracey, Kim, & Orfield, 2004).  
Although states implemented forms of SBA that were similar in purpose, state 
programs were vastly different from one another (Stecher et al., 2008). As of 1999, 14 
states offered schools monetary rewards; 16 states created a system to take over failing 
schools; and 19 states required students to pass an exit exam to graduate high school 
(Education Week, 1999). Naturally, the “complexity and comprehensiveness of state 
accountability systems var[ied]” (Rorrer, 2004, p. 253). Thus, scholars found the 
comparison of accountability systems across states to be a challenge (Goertz, 2001; 
McDonnell, 2005). Researchers sought to evaluate state programs and cited difficulty at 
the state level with standards-based reform implementation that included the lack of 
technical expertise and the lack of implementation capacity (R. F. Elmore, Abelmann, & 
Fuhrman, 1996; Goertz, Floden, & O'Day, 1995; Massell, 1998; Spillane & Zeuli, 1999).  
As many states were building reform policies and supports, the idea of direct 
federal intervention was beginning to take hold but still met with resistance (DeBray et 
al., 2005, p. 253). At the federal level any notion of a federal government involved in 
national standards, core curricula, or school choice was met with legislator concern about 
potential breach of the tenets of federalism (Superfine, 2005). Federal intervention was 
already frustrating state education leaders as state leaders tried to create accountability 
systems and comply with existing federal programs, specifically Title I. For example, 
Colorado and Arizona education commissioners commented that federal involvement in 
schools was “confusing” and led to “hazily-defined goals” with ever-increasing 




concern because during the more than 40 years of ESEA, localities nationwide had 
become reliant upon the steady flow of federal dollars and accustomed to the flexibility 
of the associated program requirements (Kantor & Lowe, 2006; Sunderman & Kim, 
2007). Simply put, state education leaders were not interested in increased federal 
intervention though they wanted and arguably needed federal revenue. 
President George H. W. Bush tried in vain to collaborate with states and pass 
America 2000 to further the legitimacy of SBA, offer resources to build capacity, and 
promote the imperative for education reform (Eisner, 1995; McDonnell, 2005). 
Subsequent to George H.W. Bush, President Clinton tried to pass a federal version of 
SBA in Goals 2000. The legislation was distinct from statutes that came before because it 
“embrace[d] a new approach – systemic reform” (Heise, 1994, p. 5). The Executive 
Branch proposed Goals 2000 as a voluntary program with the overarching goal of using 
grants to encourage states to develop standards, assessments, and accountability 
mechanisms (i.e., to embark upon systemic reform). “Together, standards, assessments, 
flexibility, and accountability were thought to be key components that could spur 
systemic reform in the American education system” (Superfine, 2005, p. 10).   
Legislators and states’ rights groups met both America 2000 and Goals 2000 with 
arguments that these policies would lead to the “federalization of…American education 
policy” (Heise, 1994, p. 345), which would equate to more power over education for the 
federal government and less power for states and localities (Manna, 2006a). Education 
scholars noted that states, not the federal government, were the “key sources for new 
ideas” such as charter schools, and that the notion of top-down education reform was 




passed, SBA advocates gained momentum for what would become a hands-on federal 
role in the daily operation of the classroom (Rorrer, 2004) 
Elements of SBA Reform Policies. SBA reform policies have many elements, 
including alignment between curricula and assessment, increase of teacher capacity 
through professional development for teachers, and use of results from standardized tests 
as a proxy for student achievement and practitioner performance (Hanushek & Raymond, 
2002; Linn, 2000). While acknowledging the value of standards because of their potential 
to bring about “improve[ed] teaching and learning for all” (Firestone et al., 1991, p. 245), 
scholars noted early on that the SBA reform, particularly from the federal government, 
had several obstacles to implementation. For example, Fuhrman et al. (1991) pointed out 
that standards would likely measure minimum rather than aspirational achievement. 
Another key element and  challenge of SBA reform is the movement from input 
measures (e.g., per pupil expenditure) to outcome measures (e.g., promotion and 
graduation rates) (Cohen-Vogel, 2005; Superfine, 2005). Ostensibly, test scores would 
signal to educators gaps in student learning and lead to changes in instructional practices 
(Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Spillane & Zeuli, 1999). Policymakers contend that student 
performance measures both student and teacher performance. Practitioners contend that 
test scores are a default measure. McDonnell (2004) explains that standardized tests are 
the chosen instrument to measure classroom outcomes “because so few of a school’s core 
activities are observable and because the operational distance between state legislatures 
and individual classrooms is huge” (p. 9). SBA reformers assume school systems can 
move away from input measures to adopt standards for outcomes that will accurately 




disconnect between policy and practice in that it relies heavily on assessments to measure 
student achievement and educator effectiveness (Goertz, 2001; Kantor & Lowe, 2006). 
Nonetheless, over the years states have produced a mix of reforms that target students 
through testing, and teachers through certification standards (Darling-Hammond & Wise, 
1985).  
As SBA reform took hold in public education, local school systems experienced 
intense pressure to increase student performance through standardized instruction and 
assessment (Goodwin, Cunningham, & Eagle, 2005). While all SBA reforms attempt to 
align curricula, instruction, standards, and assessments with student opportunities to learn 
(Clune, 1993; Loucks, 2007; McDonnell, 2004; Smith, O'Day, & Cohen, 1991; 
Superfine, 2005), the notion that testing every student and delivering sanctions or rewards 
to teachers, schools, and districts can improve the quality of public education defines 
recent SBA reforms (Loucks, 2007; Stecher & Hamilton, 2002).  
High stakes and low stakes accountability. SBA can be high- or low-stakes. 
Low-stakes accountability is for informational use only. That is, low-stakes 
accountability reform does not contain specific sanctions or rewards based on the results 
of the accountability instruments. Goals 2000 and early state SBAs are examples of low-
stakes accountability, the former by design and the latter by default (DeBray, 2006; 
Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990). Goals 2000 was built on “hortatory policies that rel[ied] on 
either information or values to motivate action consistent with the policy’s goals” 
(McDonnell, 2004, p. 20). State SBAs were low-stakes primarily because states lacked 
the capacity to help troubled schools (Fuhrman, 1999). In contrast to low-stakes 




those schools that do not comply or that underperform, and the promise of continued 
financial reward for those that succeed. But both low- and high-stakes SBA embrace the 
highly contested notion that tests are an objective measure of the intersection between 
classroom instruction and student achievement that can expose discrepancies in 
educational achievement and opportunity (Borkowski & Sneed, 2006; Clune, 1993; 
Darling-Hammond, 2004b; Diamond & Spillane, 2004; Dorn, 1998; Firestone, 
Mayrowetz, & Fairman, 1998; Linn, 2000; Mintrop, 2003; Wood, 2004).  
SBA proponents agree on accountability but disagree on high- versus low-stakes 
policies (Abrams, Pedulla, & Madaus, 2003). Firestone, Mayrowetz, and Fairman (1998) 
describe in broad terms the two sides of the SBA high-stakes versus low-stakes issue. 
High-stakes opponents claim that standards-based accountability shrinks the school 
curriculum, reduces the professionalism of teaching by “deskilling” teachers, and 
propagates anxiety among both students and teachers who face sanctions for outcomes 
that may or may not be under their direct control. High-stakes proponents claim that only 
measured results are valid and that assessment ensures compliance with a “productive 
and effective system” (Firestone et al., 1998, p. 95). The two viewpoints do not differ in 
their view that assessment-driven policies can be a “powerful lever for shaping 
instruction” (Firestone et al., 1998, p. 95); but they disagree on the shape accountability 
should take to be most effective in improving student achievement. 
The growth of the federal role in education. By 1999, nearly all states had 
developed student achievement standards and were working on assessments aligned with 
those standards (DeBray et al., 2005; Firestone, 2001; Fuhrman, 1999; Heise, 1994; 




states across the nation, policymakers at the federal level recognized an opportunity to 
leverage state actions to embolden federal influence over schools and standardize the 
uneven state-level implementation (Goertz, 2005; McDermott & Jensen, 2005; Shipps, 
2011). As mentioned briefly above, President Clinton championed a federal version of 
low-stakes SBA in Goals 2000. The legislation was distinct from statutes that came 
before because it “embrace[d] a new approach—systemic reform” (Heise, 1994, p. 5), as 
opposed to prior federal initiatives that were targeted to specific populations of students 
or specific types of schools.  
The Clinton Administration proposed Goals 2000 as a voluntary program with the 
overarching goal of using grants to encourage states to develop standards, assessments, 
and accountability mechanisms (i.e., to embark upon systemic reform). “Together, 
standards, assessments, flexibility, and accountability were thought to be key components 
that could spur systemic reform in the American education system” (Superfine, 2005, p. 
10). Goals 2000 was met with arguments that these policies would lead to the 
“federalization of. . .American education policy” (Heise, 1994, p. 345), which would 
mean the federal government would have more power and states and localities would 
have less power over public schools (Manna, 2006a). However, as the years passed, SBA 
advocates gained support at the federal level and Congress passed legislation that would 
lead to a hands-on federal role in the daily operation of the classroom (Rorrer, 2004).  
Kingdon (1995) observed that “a change of administration is probably the most 
obvious window [of opportunity]” (p. 168). The new administration of 2000 led to a sea 
change in the federal role in public education. In 2001, SBA policy entrepreneurs 




national movement. They took advantage of the new Bush administration as the 
triggering event that would lead to SBA adoption at the federal level (DeBray, 2005).  In 
2001, concerns about states’ rights and federalism gave way to political maneuvering 
needed to pass NCLB (Rudalevige, 2003). A Republican-majority Congress (many of 
whom had only six years previously voted to abolish the United States Department of 
Education) passed NCLB and applauded its call for accountability. The administration 
not only successfully shifted the focus of the largest federal education program from 
inputs to outcomes but also upset the balance of power that had historically served public 
education (Wong & Sunderman, 2007). Effectively, the legislative and executive 
branches turned away from longstanding notions of federalism and toward systemic 
reform sponsored and embraced at the federal level (DeBray, 2005; Superfine, 2005).  
Scholars describe the law as a sea change that shifts the distribution of power over 
classroom practices and student achievement away from teachers and toward other actors 
and other levels of the education system, specifically toward the federal level (Hannaway 
& Woodroffe, 2003; Hollingsworth et al., 2007; Karen, 2005; Sunderman & Orfield, 
2006). The passage of NCLB equated to a high-stakes SBA policy by the federal 
government (Brown & Cooper, 2011; Guggino & Brint, 2010) and marked the beginning 
of federal high-stakes accountability education reform. The Act implicates faculty, 
administrators, and state regulatory agencies in the failure or success of students and 
contains specific punitive actions for “failing” schools (Sunderman & Kim, 2007). 
Simply put, SBA reforms instituted classroom-level scrutiny as the basis for school 
system success or failure (O'Day, 2002). While NCLB maintains the historical ESEA 




mechanics of the law. Some have viewed the Act as a new phase in a national 
commitment to public education; others have perceived NCLB as laudable but unrealistic 
and unachievable; but still others have identified the law as a threat to federalism 
(Umpstead, 2008; Wanker & Christie, 2005). For example, Manna (2006a) posits that the 
intent of NCLB may be to increase federal control over education through accountability 
that is operationalized as student testing: 
The logic of standards and test-based accountability in education suggests 
a compelling logic of control. Why have standards and tests at all? One 
reason is so that leaders at upper levels of the policy system can compel 
actors at lower levels to produce desired results. Lacking confidence in 
state governments to guarantee high student achievement, federal officials 
have attempted to seize more control with NCLB’s prescriptive 
accountability components. (p. 474) 
 
In other words, integral to the NCLB brand of high-stakes SBA reform is the federal 
mandate of annual standardized state testing of core academic subjects (e.g., English 
language arts, mathematics, and science) that would compel state and local compliance 
with standards across the district, state, and nation and would delegate accountability to 
the federal level of the system. The cornerstone of NCLB is the measurement of student 
achievement, along with standards, assessments, and accountability (Hamilton et al., 
2007). Thus, NCLB flows through the entire public school system: the federal level 
prescribes sanctions; the state level defines assessments and reports results; and the 
district, school, and classroom levels implement curricula and the testing of students. 
 The NCLB test-centered approach is not the only manner of available assessment. 
For example, educators can use student portfolios, locally developed assessments, and/or 
cycles of testing rather than annual cumulative tests to achieve accountability and 




is an effective way to achieve reform in schools because assessments can expose 
discrepancies in educational achievement and opportunity and induce improvement 
(Borkowski & Sneed, 2006; Clune, 1993; Darling-Hammond, 2004b; Diamond & 
Spillane, 2004; Dorn, 1998; Firestone et al., 1998; Mintrop, 2003; Wood, 2004). In 
practice, testing may serve as the most effective, if not the only, link between the passage 
of the federal policy and the ability of the federal government to enforce implementation 
because test results are measureable and observable which enables them to span the 
distance between the federal level and the classroom.  
Notwithstanding the ongoing efforts by states to seek waivers from ED on aspects 
of NCLB, as passed, the most potent measure of school performance in the NCLB 
legislation is Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP).
5
 The AYP measure is the critical 
indicator of a school’s movement toward or away from academic goals. Based on NCLB 
requirements, the state education agencies (SEA) define the measure and the federal 
education agency approves or rejects the definition. Originally, NCLB requires that all 
students be proficient in language arts and mathematics by 2014 (Manna, 2006a). The 
law requires tests in reading and mathematics annually in grades three through eight and 
once again in high school. Further, the schools must test students at least once in science 
between grades three and five, six and eight, and nine and 12. Notwithstanding the 
current deadlines and sanctions, states continue to lobby the Department of Education 
(ED) for waivers and revisions of the Act. When awarded, ED is effectively exchanging 
strict adherence with the Act for state-level commitment to the Act, without removing the 
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motivation for Title I schools to focus on student outcomes as measured by standardized 
test results (Wanker & Christie, 2005). 
My dissertation embraces the definition of SBA reform as systemic alignment to 
bring about measurable improvement in student achievement, and postulates that NCLB 
is the quintessential high-stakes SBA reform policy. Two NCLB provisions, AYP status 
and AYP sanctions, are central to the current study. Again, NCLB requires each state to 
establish a definition of AYP that serves as a measure of district and school-level 
academic achievement and to report on those measures for each student subgroup rather 
than for the “average student.”
6
 Those districts and schools in which students meet 
proficiency levels make AYP (i.e., pass); those in which students do not meet proficiency 
levels fail to make AYP (i.e., fail).  
Although all schools are subject to AYP reporting under NCLB, the federal law 
stipulates sanctions only for Title I schools that fail AYP. ED delineates specific actions 
that state, district, and school actors must take when schools fail to make AYP for two 
consecutive years. Schools do not suffer sanctions following the first year of failure but 
must improve achievement scores by year two. For those schools that do fail to make 
AYP for two consecutive years, NCLB begins Year 1 of school improvement sanctions, 
which include school choice and supplemental education services (e.g., tutoring). ED 
estimated that in the 2003-04 academic year 3.9 million public-school students were 
eligible to transfer to a non-failing school in the district or to another district if all schools 
in the home district had failed to meet AYP (Bathon & Spradlin, 2007). Further, after 
three consecutive years of failed AYP status, NCLB sanctions required more than 2,800 
schools to provide supplemental education services (GAO, 2006). By 2008, 411 school 
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districts in 27 states had entered some level of NCLB sanction phase. In that year, 
California had the largest number of failed schools with schools in 97 of its districts, and 
47 districts in Kentucky failed based on school AYP status (Williams, 2008). By 2009, 
Oregon had reported that of the 500 Title I schools (which includes over 300 elementary 
schools), more than 100 faced the school choice and SES sanctions (Hammond, 2009).  
Again, NCLB prescribes sanctions only for schools that receive Title I funding. 
Some scholars argue that a single AYP measure for all students in a system where failure 
of any category of students (e.g., by race, ELL, or special needs status) results in a failed 
school and district puts a particular burden on those schools which serve primarily lower-
income and minority students (Marx & Harris, 2006). Thus, perhaps due to a confluence 
of challenges from school context, the penalties of high-stakes in NCLB will most likely 
fall on the schools and teachers that face the most challenges. Furthermore, schools and 
teachers experience additional federal pressure from the Act’s stated sanctions and from 
its ability to create uncertainty for education professionals who attempt to implement 
accountability measures in schools, districts, and states with varying capacity to enact 
change (Sunderman & Orfield, 2006).  
At the school level, high-stakes accountability policies, like NCLB, have the 
potential to further widen, rather than remedy, a bifurcated public school system based on 
student performance. For example, a 2004 case study of four Chicago schools that 
included two low-performing and two  high-performing schools found that although 
school staff in all four schools were more aware of and focused on the assessments, those 
in the low-performing schools were driven to “superficial responses based on threats” 




the high-performing schools that did not operate under the threat of sanctions felt driven 
to make changes that brought about continued and increased student achievement. The 
authors suggested that low-performing schools may experience a more frenetic or 
“Christmas tree” (Diamond & Spillane, 2004, p. 1159) pattern of reactions to NCLB that 
could result in a focus on probationary status and sanctions that influence teacher 
autonomy in the classroom differently based on the subject matter taught, the grade level 
taught, and school characteristics.  
SBA Implementation across the public school system 
To situate “coordination and control” of SBA reforms across the federal, state, 
district and school levels of the public education system, the four subsections that follow 
focus on reform activities developed at each respective level of the system.  
Federal level. Elmore and McLaughlin (1982) describe the intergovernmental 
relationship perpetuated by ESEA as a “federal-state-local division of labor…tight 
enough to establish a federal presence in local school systems but loose enough to allow 
for the play of state and local interests” (p. 163). Generally speaking, early federal 
policies promoted federal priorities through hands-off funding mechanisms—formulas 
and outright grants. The federal government declared program goals and provided 
funding; the state government elucidated program requirements and transferred funds; the 
localities developed program content and delivered services. To illustrate, during the 
Johnson Administration’s effort to bring about equity in public education, under the 
“Great Society” program, Congress and the Administration inaugurated ESEA of 1965. 
Elmore and McLaughlin (1982) explain that the federal government’s goals in 1965 were 




build capacity at the state and local levels that would allow for successful long-term 
implementation of ESEA programs; and to promote the federal agenda for a better 
society.  
Since 1965, the federal government has followed and ebb-and-flow pattern of 
influence and control over local education processes. Beginning with the 1980s and A 
Nation at Risk, to the 1990s with Goals 2000, to the 2000s with NCLB, some scholars 
believe that the federal government has shifted away from primarily an agenda-setting 
role and in addition to that role has adopted a direct school-level role that has culminated 
in standards, accountability, and NCLB (Campbell, R. 1985; Hill, 1999; Hill, Cross, & 
Kilgore, 2000; Kanstoroom & Finn, 1999; Lieberman, 1982; Manna, 2002; McDonnell, 
2005). Scholars document that since the 2001 Act, school staff have experienced the 
federal role in education more directly in four ways: first, requirements of “scientifically-
based” curricula and instruction; second, definition of core academic subjects; third, 
requirements for teacher certification; and, fourth, sanctions associated with the failure to 
meet AYP status (Mintrop & Sunderman, 2009). Table 1 lists the NCLB-prescribed 





Table 1  
AYP Sanction  
Year Label Sanction 
1 School improvement - Technical assistance by the state and/or district to include 
assistance in data analysis, professional development, and resource 
allocation  
- Public school choice: each student is eligible to transfer to another 
public school in the same district  
- Development of a two-year school improvement plan “in 
consultation with parents, school staff, the local educational 
agency, and other experts, for approval by the LEA. The plan must 
incorporate research-based strategies, a 10 % set-aside of Title I 
funds for professional development, extended learning time as 
appropriate (including school day or year), strategies to promote 
effective parental involvement and mentoring for new teachers.” 
2 School improvement - All of the above plus: 
- LEA to provide supplemental educational services to students from 
low-income families (i.e., free extra academic help, such as 
tutoring or remedial help, provided to students in subjects such as 
reading, language arts, and math.  This help can be provided before 
or after school, on weekends, or in the summer) 
3 Corrective action - All of the above plus: 
- One of the following: 
 Replace school staff responsible for the continued failure to 
make AYP;  
 Implement a new curriculum and professional development 
based on scientifically-based research;  
 Significantly decrease management authority at the school 
level;  
 Extend the school day or school year;  
 Appoint an outside expert to advise the school on its progress 
toward making AYP in accordance with its school plan; OR  
 Reorganize the school internally. 
4 Restructuring - Continue to offer public school choice and supplemental services 
- LEA must prepare a plan to carry out one of the following: 
 Reopen school as charter school  
 Replace principal and staff. 
 Contract for private management company of demonstrated 
effectiveness  
 State takeover  
 Any other major restructuring of school governance  
5 Implementation of 
Restructuring 
No later than first day of school year following Year 4 of AYP 
sanctions, the school must implement the school restructuring plan 
selected from the list above. 




Wanker and Christie (2005) point out that NCLB has two central elements that 
distinguish the law from prior iterations of ESEA: 
First, it represents a more systemic approach to achieving reform and 
improvement, tying together a variety of requirements and incentives in 
areas ranging from student testing, school safety, and reading instruction 
to professional development for teachers and technical assistance for low-
performing schools. Second, it significantly raises the stakes—for states, 
districts, and schools—for failure to make steady, demonstrable progress 
toward improving student achievement (p. 58). 
 
In concurrence with many scholars who identify NCLB as the farthest reaching federal 
education policy to date (Borkowski & Sneed, 2006; Goertz, 2001; Kantor & Lowe, 
2006; Manna, 2006a; McDermott, 2003; McDonnell, 2005; Meier & Wood, 2004; 
Rorrer, 2004; Sunderman & Kim, 2007; Sunderman & Orfield, 2006; Superfine, 2005), 
this study place NCLB at the apex of high-stakes SBA reform policies in schools. The 
distinction of NCLB as the epitome of SBA reform is important because I hypothesize 
that key aspects of the law, specifically adequate yearly progress (AYP) and associated 
sanctions, have direct associations with teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom.  
NCLB’s adoption of testing as the singular indicator of academic achievement 
“reflect a gradual but steady shift from the use of tests as measurement instruments 
designed to produce information to a reliance on tests to influence policy and instruction” 
(Hamilton, 2003, p. 28). In contrast to low-stakes accountability, the theory of action 
behind high-stakes accountability is that a threat of sanctions and punitive actions for 
those schools that do not comply or that underperform will spur improvement (Elmore, 
2002). Debate exists about the effectiveness of sanctions (Mintrop & Sunderman, 2009). 
Proponents of high-stakes accountability posit, among other things, that the high stakes 




improve teacher quality; and will enable administrators to implement targeted 
professional development for teachers (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Hamilton, 2003).   
Opponents of high-stakes accountability argue that implementation will increase 
challenges to staff and students of schools that already face difficulties (e.g., high-
poverty, high minority and ELL enrollment, and high special education enrollment) and 
will create instability in schools that already face higher-than-average teacher turnover 
rates (Mintrop & Sunderman, 2009; Olsen, 2008; Santoro, 2011). Opponents also 
contend that high-stakes reforms will demoralize teachers because of the threat of 
sanctions associated with poor results from standardized tests, and because the curricular 
and pedagogical changes will focus on test content rather than knowledge content based 
on practitioner expertise (Hamilton, 2003). 
Prior to NCLB, some states, like Florida and New York, implemented sanctions 
with mixed success. For example, Goldhaber and Hannaway (2004) studied five schools 
in Florida to identify the impact of Florida’s A+ Accountability Plan, implemented in 
1999, on three failing schools and two high-performing schools. The overarching 
mechanism of the A+ plan was to introduce competition through vouchers. Students at 
failing schools would be able to use their vouchers to go to another school including 
private and religious schools in the state. This market-driven approach is not explicit in 
NCLB but does resemble the transfer policy in NCLB that applies during the second 
consecutive year of AYP failure. A second element of the A+ plan was public awareness 
of school performance, a sanction also in NCLB, such that those schools that earned an 
“F” based on student performance on the state assessment would carry the “failing” label.  




schools retained their “A” grade, while one failing school achieved a “C”, a second 
achieved a “D”, and the third remained failing.  
Although this exploratory study does not permit generalization to a wider 
population, it can suggest possible outcomes for other teachers, schools and districts. 
Specifically, the authors noted that teachers and principals in the “A” schools felt 
tremendous pressure to retain their grade. Rather than continue doing what had originally 
earned their “A” status, they narrowed the curriculum and spent time in class on practice 
exams. One interviewee commented, “We are an A school and we hate it” (p. 601). 
Conversely, the staff in the failing schools, with student populations marked by higher 
poverty, more ELL students, and more IEP students, valued the A+ program for bringing 
higher expectations to students that educators and policy makers customarily assumed to 
be low-performers.  
In addition to punitive measures (i.e., sanctions), the federal power structure has 
programmatic elements tied to NCLB (Santoro, 2011). For example, ED describes the 
Reading First grants program as one that “focuses on putting proven methods of early 
reading instruction in classrooms.”
7
 The funding mechanism operates similarly to other 
federal programs. That is, states apply for grants, and if awarded, the federal governments 
send resources to the states that in turn send resources to the localities. “The NCLB Act 
federalized reading policy, and, along the way, debates about how best to teach reading 
moved from teacher lounges and school boards meetings to state capitols and finally to 
the White House and Congress” (Allington, 2006, p. 3). Scholars have cited schools in 
which Reading First program requirements have led to increased instructional time in 
phonemic awareness, phonics, vocabulary, fluency, and comprehension (Gamse, Jacob, 






Horst, Boulay, & Unlu, 2008) because to secure federal funding, the program prescribes 
detailed instruction techniques in addition to programmatic goals of instruction. 
Notwithstanding the flow of funds, Reading First is a departure from other ESEA 
programs because unlike prior federal initiatives, Reading First mandates specific 
instructional practices within the classroom rather than encouraging general program 
goals while leaving details on implementation to district and school staffs (McDermott & 
Jensen, 2005). 
State level. Just as intervention at the federal level must span multiple layers of 
the education system to reach the classroom, so do state policies work their way from the 
capitol to the classroom. Successful implementation of state policies depends “on 
specified procedures for implementing and monitoring policy intentions” (Darling-
Hammond & Wise, 1985, p. 315). Under earlier versions of ESEA, the state role was that 
of “monitoring, evaluating. . .and accounting” (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982, p. 163) for 
federal funds. During NCLB implementation, states needed to develop new controls to 
comply with federal policy. For example, states developed certification requirements for 
a candidate to be a Highly Qualified Teacher (HQT), defined AYP benchmarks, and 
created (or outsourced) assessments aligned with curricula (Goertz, 2005; Wanker & 
Christie, 2005).  
McDermott and Jensen (2005) described shortfalls in SEA capacity to implement 
NCLB. States would need the human and financial capital to support localities’ efforts to 
deliver standardized instruction and measure achievement, and would need data 
management systems to meet the reporting requirements of the Act. In theory, under 




districts and schools intensified. Practically, though, as states began to implement NCLB, 
state-level gaps in professional expertise with curriculum and instruction diminished 
states’ abilities to implement NCLB requirements and influence teachers in the classroom 
(Goertz, 2005; Sunderman & Orfield, 2006). For example, in 2007, Birman, LeFloch, 
Klekotka, Ludwig, Taylor et al. found state-to-state differences in HQT definitions. The 
study found that all states met the NCLB requirement that teachers have a bachelor’s 
degree and full certification in the state. However, the component of HQT that requires 
states to determine how teachers would “demonstrate adequate content knowledge in 
each subject taught” (p. 12) revealed state-level variation in the definitions of new and 
veteran teachers, the use of the Praxis exams as indicators of adequate knowledge, and 
the qualifications for veteran teachers to meet the High Objective Uniform State Standard 
of Evaluation.   
Perhaps due to issues of capacity or due to a desire to keep the federal law at bay, 
states have actively sought ED waivers regarding compliance with certain NCLB 
requirements (Sunderman, 2006). A 2006 report from the Council of Chief State School 
Officers (CCSSO) documented the number and types of waivers states requested and how 
ED responded to those requests. The study found that “between 2003 and 2005, nearly 
every state submitted at least one request to amend its [accountability] plan,” (p. 1). 
Specific to 2005–06, the authors noted that  
States asked for changes related to their academic achievement standards, linking 
of achievement standards from old tests to new ones, the use of college 
admissions or other exams in lieu of State tests at the high school level, delays in 
using the results of newly assessed grades in AYP determinations for up to three 
years, recalculation of AYP using results from subsequent administrations, 
banking of test results, changes in the attribution of scores due to shifts in a 






In other words, states sought to manage the law such that they would achieve some level 
of compliance but would “minimize the law's encroachment" (Edelman, 1992, p. 1535). 
The CSSSO study concluded that overall ED met state requests for waivers with flat 
denial or uneven response in 2006 (Forte & Erpenbach, 2006). For example, North 
Dakota and Minnesota made very similar requests to extend development of AYP 
calculations. ED approved Minnesota’s request but denied North Dakota’s.  Similarly, 
ED approved use of growth models for North Carolina and Tennessee but denied Florida.  
 More recently, the Obama Administration has engaged in state waiver 
transactions. Just as the advent of the Bush presidency in 2000 opened a policy window 
for education policymakers, the Obama presidency opened a new window in 2008. In 
August 2011, President Obama announced that in exchange for flexibility with 
“cornerstone requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act, including the 2014 deadline 
for all students to be proficient in math and reading/language arts” (McNeil & Klein, 
2011, p. 11), states would commit to promoting college and career readiness for students 
and would agree to target their efforts toward improvement of academic achievement in 
the lowest 15 percent of schools. The Obama Administration also granted the flexibility 
for the local level to design its own “intervention [i.e., sanctions] for failing schools” (p. 
20). 
The Center on Education Policy (CEP) reports that as of November 2011, 39 
states plus Puerto Rico and Washington D.C. have been engaged in the waiver 
application process, and as of February, 2012, 11 states have received waivers with the 
remaining 27 awaiting ED’s response. CEP noted that although states do include plans to 




with NCLB subgroups), none of the states plan to continue the school-choice or 
supplemental education services provisions that are the NCLB sanctions for two and 
three consecutive years of failed AYP status, respectively (Center on Education Policy, 
2012). While states continue to seek negotiated compliance through waivers, based on the 
state-specific HQT definition they also continue to exert influence over policies affecting 
teachers, such as deciding who can teach, what they teach, and how they teach. Further, 
the majority of states have extended the reach of AYP sanctions from only those schools 
that receive Title I funding to any school in the state that fails AYP status. As of the 
2009–10 academic year, NCES reported that 32 states applied sanctions to all schools 
that failed AYP status.   
District level. Historically, school districts have epitomized local control of 
public education (Campbell, Cunningham, Nystrand, Usdan, 1990). According to Meier 
and Wood (2004), in 1930 about 200,000 local school boards existed in the United States. 
In contrast, in 2004 “with twice as many citizens and three times as many students in our 
public schools, we ha[d] only 15,000 [districts]. . .once one of every 500 citizens sat on a 
school board; today it's one out of nearly 20,000” (p. 66). Scholars have noted that school 
boards are “less vital policy actors than they were in decades before 1980. . .having been 
replaced by policy elites” (Shipps, 2011, p. 259). Just as the change in value of a 
company’s stock can signal strategic or organizational change in the firm, changes in 
school districts can be a bellwether for shifts in the pattern of power over levels of the 
public education system (Campbell et al., 1990). For example, under IASA (the version 
of ESEA just prior to NCLB) districts had the power to design corrective action programs 




lost some of this scope of power because the federal policy dictates the corrective actions 
(Goertz, 2005).  
Nonetheless, districts are important to the successful implementation of SBA 
reforms. While states adopt standardized curricula, districts are the link between adoption 
and implementation. District staff may deflect and defer reform through symbolic 
gestures or they may assist and enable implementation through substantive change 
(Ogawa, Haymore Sandholz, Martinez-Flores, & Paredes Scribner, 2003). Literature on 
the district role in SBA reform is most often technical and attends to professional 
development for teachers or creation of standardized materials for classrooms that reflect 
state standards.
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 In fact, Goertz (2001) points out that districts are often overlooked in the 
SBA discussion because under SBA states have the responsibility to take over schools 
and do not need assistance or permission from districts to do so. In a longitudinal study 
that investigated the relationship between school district implementation of high-stakes 
accountability reform and its effect on student outcomes, Opfer, Henry and Mashburn 
(2008) observed that “responses to accountability mandates are generally believed to 
occur at three levels:  
1. changes in teachers’ behaviors directed toward improving their teaching,  
2. changes in school level support for improving student outcomes, or  
3. changes in school district support for improving student outcomes” (2008, p. 
301).  
 
The research team examined school districts in six southern states:  Georgia, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The team developed “a 
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straightforward line of reasoning” to anticipate the school district theory of action 
surrounding high-stakes SBA implementation: 
Districts are compelled to develop coherent instructional policies, including 
professional development opportunities; these policies focus teacher attention on 
instructional improvement; and this instructional focus results in improved 
teaching and learning. (Opfer et al., 2008, p. 301)  
 
That is, the researchers recognized a pattern of school district involvement and SBA 
reforms also documented by McLaughlin and Talbert (2003) in which districts that 
develop highly evolved and systemic focus on instructional improvement, professional 
development, and data-driven accountability become more involved in teaching and 
student achievement.  In other words, a district with technical capabilities would have 
greater opportunity to control schools that operate under NCLB. 
School level. SBA reforms have brought terms such as “reconstituted,” “low-
performing,” “failing,” and “in need of improvement” to schools. Historically, schools 
have been symbols that reflect the status of the neighborhood, the achievement level of 
the local population, and the quality of the resident teaching force (Airasian, 1988).  
Under SBA, schools face challenges not only to their programmatic offerings but also to 
their symbolic meaning to the community and to those who work in schools. Although a 
variety of personnel operate schools, this section discusses school leaders, that is, 
principals.  
The role of the principal has evolved in tandem with the role of schools as the 
primary providers of education. Goodwin, Cunningham, and Eagle (2005) offer a 
historical portrayal of the principalship. During the 1950s principals were central to the 
school-wide management of external demands related to desegregation and curricular 




developing discipline policies.  During the 1960s and 1970s, principals became arbiters 
of teacher union contracts, enforcers of civil rights legislation, and overseers of federal 
programs (Davis, Darling-Hammond, LaPointe, & Meyerson, 2005). During the 1980s, 
however, principals’ attention turned toward increasing student achievement and 
managing the stated goals of site-based management to include teachers, parents, and 
community leaders in school policies.  
Firestone and Wilson (as cited in Hanson, 2006) describe how teachers used to be 
selective and specific about what they wanted from principals. They wanted principals to 
provide order in the school and protection from parents and community members so that 
they, the teachers, would be able to have “autonomy to teach the way they want[ed] and 
often what they want[ed]” (p. 95). As teachers protected their classroom from outsiders, 
principals focused on school-wide program management. Some teachers operated in 
isolation, while others turned to their peers for feedback on how to organize and deliver 
instructions.  
Through the 1980s and early 1990s, principals opted not to breach the classroom 
door because they did not want to risk disturbing the peaceful coexistence with teachers 
(Hanson, 2006). However, during the mid-1990s, school-level accountability for student 
achievement brought new pressures and responsibilities to the principal (Kafka, 2009). 
Ingersoll (2003) points out that this power differential between teachers and principals 
comes with increased pressure for principals to increase schoolwide academic 
performance. Other scholars found that district leaders  pressure principals in areas of 
student performance and hold them  accountable for low achievement while at the same 




Diamond and Spillane (2004) document how principals have broken the informal 
agreements under which teachers and principals had operated prior to SBA. Noted earlier, 
the team conducted a study of probationary schools in Chicago and found that principals 
in those schools used the accountability policy to legitimize their own role as school 
leaders and to push reforms that teacher may otherwise have resisted. The researchers 
stated that in one school,  
“Dr. Smith [principal] used the accountability policy to get teachers’ 
attention and motivate them to change. Her first year at the school, she 
used accountability policy as a way to legitimize her push for teachers to 
improve their practice. She reminded teachers that she could and would 
replace those who were not pulling their weight” (p. 1156).  
 
The case study indicated that in the two schools that failed to make AYP, principals had 
greater need to focus teacher attention on student achievement and had greater ability to 
do so because of the sanctions associated with AYP status.  
Conversely, in high-performing schools, Diamond and Spillane (2004) found that 
school leaders used rewards more than sanctions to motivate teachers.  For example, 
principals would incorporate praise for teachers whose students excelled on schoolwide 
assessments into professional development programs and would publicize the student 
performance to the community at large. Principals in the two high-performing schools 
tried to energize teachers to maintain high performance through comparisons to other 
schools in the community.  
The authors concluded that in all four schools, principals were able to focus 
teacher attention on student achievement because of the performance requirements in 
NCLB. Nonetheless, the scope of principal influence appears narrowed due to the trickle-




requirement for a highly qualified teacher has led some principals to perceive that they no 
longer have power over hiring decisions at the school (Rice, Roellke, Sparks, & Kolbe, 
2006). Although principals were able to push reform in Chicago, ultimately it was not 
their reform — they were agents of the federal, state, and district policies.  
Research on Teacher Autonomy 
Pearson and Moomaw (2006) stated “autonomy is difficult to isolate” (p. 44) 
because of the confluence of autonomy with other constructs, such as teacher job 
satisfaction, teacher professionalism, and teacher motivation. Research shows that 
teachers have an array of preferences in the workplace that statistically associates with 
autonomy and that these preferences for characteristics of the workplace vary across 
schools (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006). Principal among the non-pecuniary 
workplace dimensions are school leadership, class size, school climate, school location, 
student demographics, and parental behavior (Beteille, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2009; Boyd 
et al., 2011; Rice et al., 2006). Academic achievement and accountability measures, such 
as AYP status, also mediate teacher preferences regarding which schools they would 
select as their workplace and have the potential to affect teacher perception of autonomy 
(Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2010).  
Although in this study I explore teacher-perceived autonomy as a construct 
distinct from other workplace conditions, scholars tend to study teacher autonomy as a 
function of, or relative to, other conditions. For example, Pearson and Moomaw (2006) 
described teacher autonomy as “a common link that appears when examining teacher 
motivation, job satisfaction, stress (burnout), professionalism, and empowerment” (2006, 




an indicator of another phenomenon, I present literature in three sub-sections: teacher 
autonomy and professionalism; teacher autonomy and job satisfaction; teacher autonomy 
and retention. I then present a fourth subsection focused on research that has examined 
the relationship between teacher autonomy and SBA reform.  
Teacher autonomy and professionalism. Sociologists reference a “professional 
model” for occupations that typically includes the following three elements: technical 
knowledge gained through education and training, service ethic toward client, and an 
occupation-wide enforcement of standards (Burbules & Densmore, 1991a; Downie, 
1990; Guggino & Brint, 2010; Sykes, 1999). Ingersoll (2003) adds that “one of the most 
important criteria distinguishing the degree of professionalization and the status of an 
occupation is the degree of power and control practitioners hold over workplace 
decisions” (pg. 224). Teachers have sought professional status to legitimize their 
authority as educators; however, the lack of control over higher-level organizational 
resources, such as funding, curriculum choice, and discipline policies, impedes teacher 
claim on professionalism (Conley, 1991; Ingersoll, 2003).  
Thus, it should be no surprise that the professional status of teachers has been a 
longstanding debate among scholars, including historians, philosophers, sociologists, and 
organizational theorists (Burbules & Densmore, 1991b; Firestone & Bader, 1991; Palmer, 
1953; Strike, 1990; Sykes, 1999; Talbert & McLaughlin, 1994). Ingersoll and Merrill 
(2011) delineated three aspects of the polemic surrounding teachers as professionals: 
To some, the essence of a profession is advanced training and, hence, the way to 
best professionalize teaching is to upgrade teachers’ knowledge and skills 
through professional development. For others, the essence of a profession lies in 
the attitudes individual practitioners hold toward their work. In this view the best 
way to professionalize teaching is to instill an ethos of public service and high 
standards—a sense of professionalism—among teachers. For even others, the 




the best way to professionalize teaching is to improve teachers’ working 
conditions. (p. 185) 
 
These three positions illustrate that research presents differing views of whether and how 
teaching could be declared a profession, depending on the goal of the professional status 
– to signal technical expertise, to model a value system, or to create appealing work 
environments.  
A concept related to professional is professionalism. Over the last few decades, 
scholars have documented a shift in teaching away from the notion of a profession and 
toward a notion of professionalism. Based on the theoretical foundation of teachers as 
professionals and teacher professionalism, scholars have conducted empirical studies to 
try to capture the relationship between teacher autonomy and professionalism. For 
example, Pearson and Moomaw (2005) used a Teacher Autonomy Scale (TAS) that they 
had developed in the 1990s (described in more detail in the teacher autonomy and SBA 
reform subsection) to investigate the hypothesis that “autonomous teachers would 
demonstrate less on-the-job stress, greater work satisfaction, perceived empowerment, 
and a high degree of professionalism” (p. 42). The researchers considered curriculum 
autonomy (items related to the selection of class materials and instructional planning) and 
general teaching autonomy (items related to classroom standards of conduct and 
decision-making ability) as distinct measures. Based on 171 respondents who worked in 
primary and secondary schools across three school districts in Florida, the authors used 
multivariate analysis of variance to determine that higher levels of curricular autonomy 
are associated with lower levels of on-the-job stress, and that as general teaching 




Effectively, teachers who perceived themselves as autonomous also perceived themselves 
as professionals.  
More recently, in spring 2007, Guggino and Brint (2010) surveyed over 700 
California teachers. This study highlights three points relevant to the current study. First, 
autonomy and professionalism are related constructs in teaching. Second, though related, 
the two constructs are distinct and one can investigate them as such. Third, teachers value 
autonomy and perceive themselves to be professionals. The goal of the study was to 
“determine how highly accomplished teachers perceived the No Child Left Behind Act’s 
impact on their practices in the classroom and their status as professionals” (p. 3). The 
researchers focused on National Board Certified teachers because they perceived these 
teachers to be the most highly skilled, and therefore, the best representatives of teachers 
as professionals. The authors stated that overall, 84 percent of the surveyed teachers 
perceived NCLB unfavorably.
9
 Although teachers described some benefits from NCLB 
policies in the classroom, such as an increase in teacher expectations of student learning, 
they also expressed concern about the costs, such as a narrowed curriculum. The authors 
concluded that of the teachers who had an unfavorable opinion of NCLB, chief among 
their concerns was the policy’s “lack of understanding and respect for the skills and 
experiences of teachers” (p. 6). In other words, these teachers perceived NCLB as a threat 
to their professional status and, as an extension, a threat to their job satisfaction, 
discussed in the next section.  
Teacher autonomy and job satisfaction. Research indicates that teachers derive 
satisfaction in their work from many sources, including student achievement, professional 
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California because of sampling design limitations and resulting oversampling of teachers from schools with 




development, and autonomy in the classroom. Using varying methods of investigation, 
the studies cited in this subsection focus on the intersection of teacher autonomy as it 
relates to job satisfaction. Consistently, scholars find that autonomy defined as control in 
the classroom can lead to increased job satisfaction and commitment to the workplace. 
For example, in a case study based on comparisons of teacher-reported perceptions of 
autonomy and job satisfaction across 12 high schools in six urban school districts in 
California, Florida, and New York, Archbald and Porter (1994) found that on average, 
teachers reported a higher perception of control in more decentralized environments and 
reported a high perception of pedagogy control regardless of whether their environment 
(i.e., departments, schools, districts, and states) was centralized or decentralized. The 
authors’ overarching conclusion was one of caution. They contended that although in 
their study, teachers held a great deal of autonomy over classroom practice, future 
policies (e.g., NCLB) that might seek to “shape day-to-day content decisions” might 
indeed reduce teacher autonomy and, in turn, teacher job satisfaction.  
Archbald and Porter (1994) used the “shrinking autonomy” construct to frame 
their study on the relationship between teacher autonomy and job satisfaction. According 
to the authors, proponents of local control assume that teachers and local authorities 
would readily and consistently strive for improved student achievement through better 
decisions than those presented by state and federal actors. In contrast, proponents of 
central control view the disparate nature of local control as anathema to academic 
standards and accountability. Characterized as having high, medium, or low curriculum 
control, teachers from each school reported on how their scope of influence over the 




district tests, textbooks, instruction, and departments. The study found that effectively, 
teachers vary in their perception of control over what content is taught but share a strong 
perception of control over how content is taught.   
A second 1994 study found that “satisfied teachers report having more 
professional autonomy and challenge” (p. 10) and concluded that autonomy can be an 
important inducement for teacher recruitment and retention. Specifically, Kim and 
Loadman (1994) performed secondary data analysis on survey data from over 2,000 
teachers to identify predictors of teacher job satisfaction. The authors used step-wise 
multiple regression and found that seven job satisfaction-related variables explained 
nearly 75 percent of the variance in perceived teacher job satisfaction. They grouped the 
indicators into extrinsic and intrinsic reward categories and found that an important 
intrinsic reward was autonomy in the classroom. Similarly, Brunetti (2001) surveyed 169 
California high school teachers and documented the importance of teacher autonomy and 
its role in job satisfaction and, based on his research, speculated that a “deleterious effect 
on [teachers’] perception of professional autonomy” (p. 65) would result from 
standardized testing and curricula, thereby decreasing teacher job satisfaction. A 
quantitative study of nationally representative SASS data from the 1990–91 academic 
year underscored the importance of professional autonomy. The study found that among 
public school teachers, higher levels of perceived autonomy and influence were 
associated with high levels of commitment to teaching (Ingersoll & Alsalam, 1997). This 
finding held at the school level as well. That is, schools with higher percentages of 




More recently, a case study of 39 elementary teachers found that 46 percent of 
teachers felt that NCLB had negatively influenced their morale specifically, with 80 
percent of the teachers commenting that they had considered leaving the profession based 
on changes brought about by the Act (Deniston & Gerrity, 2010). However, the authors 
noted significant differences in the findings based on teachers’ years of experience. 
Specifically, the teachers from the first elementary school who had the lower overall 
impression of NCLB had more years of experience in teaching than those in the second 
elementary school. Further, Deniston and Gerrity (2010) found that as years of teaching 
experience increase, a teacher’s overall impression of NCLB decreased. In sum, the 
above studies highlight the potential for SBA reform, specifically NCLB, to affect 
teachers differently based on school context and teacher characteristics.  
Teacher autonomy and retention. Extensive scholarship examines how teacher 
labor markets function, specifically with regard to teacher attrition and mobility (see for 
example, Margolis, J. (2008) and Guarino, C., Santibanez, L. and Daley, G. (2006)). 
Scholars identify an array of inputs that teachers consider as they make retention 
decisions. Principal among these inputs are economic incentives, professional 
development opportunities, workplace conditions, and societal perceptions of teaching 
(Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Ingersoll, 2004; Johnson, 2006). Empirical studies that 
include autonomy as a condition of the workplace offer insight into the specific role that 
teacher autonomy plays in teacher retention. In their review of retention literature on “in-
service policies,” Guarino et al. (2006) cited that in addition to administrative support, 




appeared to play a prominent role in teachers’ decisions to quit or remain on the job” (p. 
183).  
Findings discussed in this section permit three key generalizations. First, it seems 
that teachers who seek autonomy in their work are more likely to leave the profession if 
they do not find it. Second, teachers perceive autonomy and its relationship to other 
workplace conditions differently based on their own characteristics and those of the 
organization in which they work. Third, SASS informed much of the recent empirical 
research on teacher autonomy and retention.  For example, using SASS data, Weiss 
(1999) concluded that first-year teachers “who experience autonomy and discretion are 
those who feel they have a say in developing curriculum, in selecting texts, content, 
teaching techniques, or discipline methods” (p. 865). More recently, and also using 
SASS, Ingersoll (2003) found that nearly half of the 50 percent of teachers who left the 
profession in the first six years cited exclusion from decision-making as a point of 
dissatisfaction. Ingersoll (2003) reported that the variables associated most strongly with 
commitment were perceived school leadership and teacher autonomy.  
Scholars found similar findings from other data sources as well (Allensworth et 
al., 2009). Using data from teacher personnel records from 2002–03 to 2006–07, and data 
from principal, teacher, and student surveys, the Consortium on Chicago School Research 
(CCSR) analyzed teacher retention in Chicago Public Schools (CPS) during the spring 
semesters of 2001, 2003, and 2005. The authors state that, similar to the national rate of 
84 percent, about 80 percent of CPS teachers return in the fall to the school where they 
had worked the previous spring. However, the authors point out that single-year rates do 




typical CPS school may lose more than 50 percent of its teaching force. Allensworth et 
al. (2009), the CCSR researchers, found that novice teachers left their teaching 
assignments at higher rates than did veteran teachers, and that this exit of novices from 
elementary schools was more pronounced than the exit from secondary schools. 
Specifically, in 2006-07, 67 percent of novice teachers stayed in their schools compared 
to 82 percent of veteran teachers, but at secondary schools about 75 percent of novice 
teachers compared to 80 percent of veteran teachers returned. Over the five-year period 
from 2002 to 2007, about 33 percent of novice teachers stayed in their schools.  
In a hierarchical logistic regression of teacher survey data, the CCSR team 
established a link between “teacher influence” and retention. In the study, the measure of 
teacher influence over the selection of instructional materials and techniques overlaps 
with the measure of teacher-perceived autonomy used in this dissertation. The teacher 
influence measure varies because the measure also includes other indicators of influence 
over in-service program planning and teacher hiring. Regardless, the study found that 
“most important for teacher stability is the degree to which teachers feel they have 
influence over school decisions. In both elementary and high schools, stability rates were 
at least five percentage points higher in schools with substantial teacher influence, 
compared to schools where teachers had little influence over their work environment” (p. 
26). Further, the study identified a strong relationship between teacher retention and 
school leadership such that teachers were more likely to stay in schools with “inclusive 
leadership,” defined as teachers having influence over working environment and having 
trust in their principal’s capabilities to lead the organization. In sum, the CPS study 




influence over their work has a role in teacher retention, and that an association exists 
between teacher impressions of their principals and both autonomy and retention.  
   In contrast to the findings for novice teachers from the CPS study—an earlier 
study that investigated the link between school reform, teacher retention, and teacher 
perception of autonomy—found that perceived autonomy was more closely linked to 
work-related variables than to academic and training experiences, years as a teacher, or 
age and gender (Pearson, 1995). Pearson (1995) used blockwise (or stepwise) multiple 
regression to predict teacher autonomy from three groups of predictor variables: work-
related variables (e.g., instructional load, job stress, satisfaction with salary), attitudinal 
variables (e.g., perception of parental involvement, perception of administrative support, 
and perception of students), and teaching level (elementary and secondary). The scholar 
found that job satisfaction, perceived paperwork load, positive attitude towards students, 
and teaching level are associated with autonomy. Similar to the CPS study, Pearson 
(1995) found differences based on grade level taught. Specifically, teachers in secondary 
schools reported a higher perception of autonomy than teachers in lower grades.  
More recently, Boyd, Grossman, Ing, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2011) 
studied teacher retention in New York City schools and built a statistical model that 
included a factor of teacher influence over their work as an independent variable in the 
model to predict teacher retention. The key finding from this study concerned 
administrative support as a significant and critical element of teacher mobility decisions.  
Although this study did not find teacher autonomy to be the biggest driver of retention 
decisions, the authors recognized a need for studies that do investigate teacher autonomy, 




school leaders foster or inhibit teacher autonomy in the classroom. Consequently, this 
research offers two critical contributions to the proposed study. First, the authors modeled 
their factor of teacher influence using five of the six questions from the SASS teacher 
questionnaire that I propose to use in my study and set a precedent for these measures as 
a proxy for teacher autonomy in the classroom. Second, the authors cite the advantage of 
SASS data as nationally representative and as a useful data source for teacher research.
10
  
Ingersoll and May (2010; 2011) published two recent studies that examined the 
specific relationship between teacher autonomy and retention. In 2010, the research team 
investigated the teacher- and school-level factors that led to the turnover of mathematics 
and science teachers. Ingersoll and May (2010) used five waves of SASS and TFS data to 
create a descriptive analysis and used 2003–04 SASS and 2004–05 Teacher Follow-up 
Survey (TFS) data to create their multilevel logistic regression models. The dependent 
variable was a dichotomous variable that indicated whether the teacher had remained in 
the same school as in the prior year. The authors used factor analysis to create a 
“Classroom Teacher Autonomy” variable that they included as part of the organizational 
characteristics of schools. Specifically, Ingersoll and May (2010) used SASS questions 
about teacher perception of control in their classrooms across six areas to build the 
teacher autonomy measure: textbook and classroom materials selection; content, topics, 
and skills to be taught; teaching technique selection; grade assignment and evaluation of 
students; homework assignment; and student discipline.   
                                                 
10
 The authors state that their study is not suited to SASS data because of the potential for common-source 
bias that may occur in a study on teacher retention that uses both SASS and Teacher Follow-up Survey 
(TFS) data because the same teachers respond to SASS and TFS. This common-source bias is not a concern 




The study found mixed results for autonomy and turnover. The authors stated that 
“by far the strongest predictor for mathematics teachers was the degree of individual 
classroom autonomy held by teachers; in contrast for science teachers classroom 
autonomy was a non-factor” (p. 44). It is worth noting that this study occurred prior to the 
science proficiency requirements of NCLB that begin in 2014.  Nonetheless, this 
contrasting finding by subject indicates that not only do different teachers perceive 
autonomy differently, but also that subject matter taught may be an important factor to 
consider when examining teacher perception of autonomy.  
In a similar study, Ingersoll and May (2011) sought to explain recruitment, 
employment and retention patterns of minority teachers. Again, the authors used data 
from multiple waves of SASS data to describe the trend of minority teacher turnover and 
used the 2003–04 SASS and 2004–05 TFS wave of data to identify predictors of minority 
teacher turnover. The authors created the teacher autonomy constructs in the same 
manner as the 2010 study. In this study, the authors described a more uniform finding in 
that “schools with higher average levels of individual teacher’s classroom autonomy had 
lower levels of turnover” (p. 35).  
The Ingersoll and May (2011, 2010) studies inform this dissertation in several 
ways. First, the authors emphasize the utility of SASS as valuable data from which to 
glean nationally representative findings about teachers and their working conditions—of 
which autonomy is a key element. Second, the authors performed their analyses using 
statistical procedures that account for the nested, or multilevel, structure of the data, as I 
intend to do. Third, the authors used responses to the six measures of teacher classroom 




of teacher autonomy in the classroom. Fourth, the authors demonstrate that retention and 
autonomy relate in a statistically significant manner, and conclude that autonomy is a 





Teacher autonomy and SBA reform. As detailed earlier, the 1980s marked a 
different era of control over the classroom as a result of SBA reform (DeBray, 2006; 
Eisner, 1995; Jennings & Rentner, 2006; McDonnell, 2004; Sunderman & Kim, 2007; 
Superfine, 2005). As early as 1981, scholars identified a tension between teacher 
autonomy and accountability policies enacted at the school level. For example, Leiter 
(1981) examined the relationship between teacher autonomy and accountability through a 
lens of “competition on claims of school goals” (p. 236) to identify the variation in 
teacher autonomy across three school settings—rural, suburban, and urban. In his case 
study, Leiter (1981) found that the competition of claims over the suburban school was 
lower than it was in rural and city schools. In the suburban schools the principals held 
influence over teachers in terms of attendance, punctuality, and personal behavior (i.e., 
behavior outside of the classroom that reflected moral values consistent with those of the 
principal), but did not interfere with day-to-day classroom instruction. Conversely, in the 
rural schools, the principals had an “upward flow” of information on teacher practices in 
the classroom. This unidirectional flow of information created uncertainty among 
teachers who did not know what information the principal had or how the information 
would be used and diminished teacher sense of efficacy and, in turn, autonomy in the 
classroom.  
In the city schools the principals focused more on managing external demands of 
federal and state accountability related to equity and accountability programs and did not 
interfere with instruction. Leiter (1981) found that in the city schools, teacher perceptions 
of their own autonomy reflected their perception that the principal lacked autonomy and 




be powerless over the school and ineffective in his leadership role. In turn, teachers 
perceived themselves to be unable to achieve change or progress in the classroom, which 
resulted in low perceptions of teacher autonomy. Leiter (1981) concluded that 
competitive claims on school goals diminish principal and teacher autonomy in schools 
and classrooms because when teachers perceive principals as having low autonomy and 
efficacy, they appear more likely to perceive low autonomy for themselves. 
More recently, other researchers have documented the pattern of decreased 
teacher autonomy in the classroom associated with increased claims on school goals. 
Russell and McCombs (2006) conducted a study of over 3,000 teachers in California, 
Georgia, and Pennsylvania. The authors investigated school administrator and teacher 
perceptions of standards, assessments, and state accountability systems. The study found 
that teachers in California and Pennsylvania who taught in Title I schools
11
 were more apt 
than those in non-Title I schools to focus on student achievement because of the 
incentives and sanctions of AYP status.
12  
They also found that over 40 percent of 
teachers in California and Georgia, and over 60 percent of teachers in Pennsylvania 
reported a negative effect from the reforms because they needed to “teach to the test” and 
because teachers would carry the blame if the school failed to meet adequate yearly 
progress (AYP). 
In the early 1980s, very large urban districts and some states became more 
directly involved in curriculum in efforts to achieve some level of alignment between 
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 Title I schools are those that receive federal funding based on the percentage of students in the school 
considered to be from impoverished families. These schools received federal funds based on an allocation 
formula and are subject to all NCLB requirements and sanctions.  
12
 Teachers in Georgia also focused on student achievement because state policy calls for sanctions and 
rewards based on AYP status for non-Title I schools as well as Title I schools. Thus, findings show that, 




standards and curricula. Rowan (1990) describes educator reaction to curriculum 
alignment as a burgeoning shift in curricular control that “undermined professional 
autonomy of teachers (p. 353).  According to Rowan, the theory of action behind 
standards was that “education ‘technology’ was amenable to routinization” (p. 356) and 
that districts and state-level actors could script for teachers.  A 2007 study of novice 
teachers
13
 who work in New York City Public Schools confirms Rowan’s statements. 
Crocco and Costigan (2007) spent more than five years interviewing novice English and 
social studies teachers. The authors reported that across the sample, teachers described 
“shrinking space for their classroom-based decisions making” (p. 521) due to scripted 
lessons. The effect was particularly acute for middle-school teachers and those with the 
strongest credentials.  
The authors are careful to point out that novice teachers sought autonomy in 
concert with support from mentors and school administrators. Nonetheless, Crocco and 
Costigan (2007) concluded that novice teachers perceive NCLB as reducing their ability 
to exercise control over the classroom and suggest that 
the problems [novice teachers] prescribe are pervasive, and the themes 
articulated around issue of autonomy, lack of proper support, and 
frustration with the narrowing of curricular and pedagogical options so 
widely shared that we do not believe them to be idiosyncratic symptoms of 
underprepared or immature new teachers. Instead we believe that the 
problems reflect a system that has been established to make schooling 
‘teacher proof’ in a misguided effort to increase student achievement on 
high-stakes tests. (p. 528) 
 
Put another way, the authors contend that novice teachers may be the voices in 
this case study of the relationship between SBA reform and teacher autonomy, but 
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 In this study the authors define novice teachers as those who have at least several months but no more 




given the systemic approach to SBA reform, it is likely that more-experienced 
teachers would echo the novice teacher sentiments.  
On another front, early scholars of SBA reform sought to specifically define and 
quantify teacher autonomy, and ultimately developed the Teacher Autonomy Scale 
(TAS) to measure general teacher autonomy and curricular teacher autonomy. 
Effectively, through TAS two studies from 1993 began the quantitative study of the 
relationship between teacher autonomy and education reform policies. The main 
contribution of Pearson and Hall (1993) was their rigorous approach to the development 
of an autonomy construct through factor analysis. These authors were able to establish 
autonomy as a latent construct based on observable items. Specifically, Pearson and Hall 
(1993) conducted two studies to build a measurable construct for teacher autonomy called 
the Teacher Autonomy Scale (TAS). The authors cited “restructuring school” reforms as 
a mechanism that elevated teacher autonomy on the policy landscape and recognized that 
quantitative measures for teacher-perceived autonomy were in their nascent stages in the 
early 1990s.  
Pearson and Hall (1993) sought to “validate an appropriate instrument for 
measuring teacher autonomy” to measure “perceptions that teachers have regarding 
whether they can control their work environment” (p. 173). The goal of the first study 
was to refine a 35-item scale and develop a “psychometrically sound” (p.173) instrument 
that could be administered in the second study as a basis for examining relationships 
between teacher perception of autonomy and various demographic characteristics of 
teachers. The result from the first study was a 20-item instrument intended to measure 




 Selection of activities and materials 
 Classroom standards of conduct 
 Instructional planning and sequencing 
 Personal on-the-job decision-making. 
 
The new Teacher Autonomy Scale (TAS) had both negative and positive items and was 
internally consistent with strong item-total correlations.
14
 In other words, the scale 
captured the construct of autonomy.  
The goal of the second study was to administer the TAS to a sample of public 
elementary, middle, and high school teachers and draw some empirically based 
conclusions about teacher autonomy.  The authors determined that teacher autonomy was 
not a signal construct, but had two distinct dimensions—general teaching autonomy and 
curricular autonomy. Perhaps contrary to what one might expect, the findings of this 
study suggested that teachers did not vary on their perception of autonomy by gender or 
education level. Teachers did differ by grade-level taught. Those in middle schools 
perceived higher levels of autonomy than did those in elementary or secondary schools. 
This early study offered a starting point from which to advance the study of teacher 
autonomy through a quantifiable autonomy construct.  
Since the 1990s and because of the progression of SBA reform, teacher 
perceptions of autonomy in the workplace have gained prominence as an area of study. 
For SBA reforms generally and NCLB specifically, scholars have found that teachers’ 
scope of influence has narrowed while their scope of responsibility has widened 
(Burbules & Densmore, 1991a; Grant, 1983; Ingersoll, 2007).  For example, a 2002 
exploratory study of four science teachers in urban schools in Alabama and Ohio offers 
anecdotal and suggestive findings regarding assessment and accountability.  The four 
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teachers stated their frustration with the inability to exercise the professional judgment 
they had acquired through their teacher education programs. They commented that the 
state test dictated the content of their lessons, in part because of the focus on the 
assessment and in part because of faulty alignment between state exams and on-site 
curriculum.   
Like other SBA reforms, NCLB’s implementation process uses external controls 
(e.g., state-mandated curricula and assessments) to hold teachers accountable for 
educational reform and increased student achievement (Finnigan & Gross, 2007). 
Teachers face an ever-increasing set of demands in the classroom, from HQT 
requirements to adoption of “scientifically based” curriculum to prescribed instructional 
methods, (McDonnell, 2004; O'Day, 2002; Sunderman & Kim, 2007). Thus, as NCLB 
implementation stands today, it is not surprising that research on teacher perception of 
control and influence over the classroom reveals a tension between policy goals and 
teacher practices in the classroom. For example, Pearson and Moomaw (2005; 2006) 
conducted two studies that looked at autonomy as dependent on measures such as 
workplace conditions and teaching level. Specific to autonomy, the authors found that 
teacher perceptions of autonomy related to working conditions more than to pre-service 
training, demographic characteristics, or years of experience.  
Researchers have also found that NCLB has centralized decision-making about 
daily activities in the classroom, specifically the content and the pedagogy (Santoro, 
2011; Sunderman et al., 2004; Valli, Croninger, Chambliss, Graeber, & Buese, 2008). For 
example, over a four-year period, Valli and Buese (2007) examined elementary teachers 




changes, if any, in classroom practice may be attributed to NCLB. The authors used 
differentiated instruction as an indicator for change in the classroom. After examining 
math and reading instruction, the authors concluded that teachers’ tasks increased in 
number and scope, but their autonomy decreased.  Teachers had become “more 
hierarchically controlled” (p. 551).  
The authors also offered an example of change regarding teacher collaboration. 
During the first year of the study, researchers observed that teachers collaborated with 
peers on how best to differentiate their students for improved learning outcomes. By 
2004–05 researchers noted the teachers focused collaboration on how to differentiate 
instruction for testing strategies more so than to differentiate for specific education 
outcomes or learning goals. Further, “teachers were too busy learning how to read data to 
regroup and re-teach students. . .to engage in ‘rich deliberations’ about the substance of 
their teaching” (p. 552). The authors’ observations suggest a shift in teacher perception of 
autonomy both for instructional practice and for peer-group interactions because in some 
instances teachers changed practice not based on teacher beliefs or professional expertise 
but on testing policies.  
Mathison and Freeman (2003) conducted an ethnographic study of elementary 
school teachers in two New York City schools during the 2001–02 school year to explore 
teacher responses to the New York State testing regime. The authors described teachers 
as perpetually conflicted actors caught between the desire to administer what they 
perceived as appropriate instruction and what they perceived as teaching to the test. The 
authors stated, 
Teachers must often do the wrong thing in order to do the right thing, sort of. The 
means are approaches to teaching and content that teachers might not chose—




(high test scores) are a poor but powerful proxy for the teachers’ desired ends 
(the contextually appropriate success of every child). (p. 18) 
 
Further, the authors declared that these two sets of teachers neither sought “complete 
autonomy” nor disagreed with centralization of some aspects of teaching. However, 
teachers did have the impression that they needed to turn away from their training to 
achieve the stated goals of state-mandated and school-implemented testing. Although the 
authors do not draw causal conclusions from this ethnography, it appears that the testing 
policies negatively influenced teacher perception of autonomy in the classroom.  
Specific to the AYP element of NCLB, a recent study of teachers in South 
Carolina found that working conditions, including teacher empowerment (indicated by 
their level of  participation in decision-making regarding matters that affected students), 
predicted AYP status (Hirsch, 2005).
15
 The authors found that the more empowered the 
teachers, the greater the likelihood of meeting AYP goals. Though not specific to 
autonomy, recent studies have begun to uncover how AYP status can affect teacher 
perceptions of the workplace. For example, Sunderman, Tracy, Kim, and Orfield (2004) 
conducted a study that divided responses along AYP status lines—schools that met 
adequate yearly progress and schools that were in need of improvement for one, two, or 
three years. The researchers surveyed nearly 1,500 teachers from two school districts 
across two states (80 schools in Fresno, California and 49 schools in Richmond, 
Virginia). All schools had at least three grades that required testing by NCLB. To capture 
perspectives across levels of AYP status, the sample included teachers from schools that 
were in their first, second, or third year of improvement status, or that had met adequate 
yearly progress. 
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In the study, student characteristics of the schools matched the overall district 
population with two important exceptions along racial and economic lines. First, 
compared to the district wide average, a higher percentage of students in the schools in 
need of improvement in Richmond were black (89.5 percent vs. 95.7 percent, 
respectively) and a lower percentage were white (7.4 percent vs. 2.1 percent, 
respectively). Second, a higher percentage of students in the schools in need of 
improvement were low-poverty (95 percent vs. 81.2 percent, respectively). The authors 
found that teachers in both types of schools (i.e., in need of improvement and adequate 
progress met) had a similar distribution of views across the 5-point Likert-scaled 
questions. However, two areas of difference were teachers’ perceptions of themselves 
and of their students. When asked their perceptions regarding teacher commitment to 
improving student achievement and to providing high quality instruction, more teachers 
in schools that met AYP reported they “strongly agreed” with the statements. The 
differences were between 10 to 20 percentages points. While not nationally generalizable, 
this study does support the notion that teachers differ across school contexts (i.e., AYP 
status) in their perceptions of and, perhaps their experiences with, autonomy in the 
classroom. 
Similarly, Olson (2008) conducted a case study of six English teachers in their 
first year of teaching during the 2005–06 academic year to investigate novice teacher 
identity. In addition to finding that the six teachers’ identities changed depending on their 
students, their school environment, and their personal expectations, Olson (2008) found 
that 
the administrative tendency to give new teachers academically low-tracked 
courses, and these teachers’ own social justice desires to find communities where 




English the way they expected. . . . Their apprenticeship of observation about 
what it meant to be a teacher (occurring before No Child Left Behind) very likely 
did not include top-down policy mandates, prescriptive curricula, and strict 
teacher accountability measures. They had expected to have autonomy and 
control in their classrooms and had been professionally prepared to teach as they 
thought best. (p. 33) 
 
In contrast, Goldstein’s (2008) case study of four kindergarten teachers from two 
suburban high-performing elementary schools in Texas documented the transformation 
that kindergarten teachers experienced regarding SBA reform and autonomy in the 
classroom. Perhaps unexpectedly, the kindergarten teachers were able to maintain some 
level of decision- making about how to teach the state-mandated curriculum. All four 
teachers (with teaching experience ranging from five to 28 years) stated they were 
accustomed to standards-based “curricular constraints” (p. 458). The author found her 
participants were able to maintain some degree of street-level policymaking because they 
were able to shape state-mandated curriculum such that “every policy decision was 
unique and deliberate and reflected attention to obligations, desire for autonomy, and the 
issue of professional discretion” (p. 473).   
Goldstein (2008) noted that the teachers’ ability to maintain their perceived 
autonomy may not be the case in low-performing schools and suggested that, based on 
evidence in this case study, teachers in low-performing schools would have less 
“decision-making autonomy” than the four teachers in the case study. Again, research 
indicates that teachers in a standards-based classroom perceive autonomy differently 
based on their levels of experience, perceptions of their leader, school context, and 
student characteristics. The gap that remains in the research is how much AYP status 
might directly explain these differences and how much the most recent wave of SASS 




Implications of Literature on Teacher Autonomy for the Present Study 
Autonomy in general and teacher autonomy in particular are complex and much-
debated constructs (Burbules & Densmore, 1991a; Campbell, E. 2006; Elmore, R. F., 
2002; Ingersoll, 2007; L. M. McNeil, 1988). Scholars understand that autonomy runs on a 
“continuum spanning from complete constraint to total freedom” (Gawlik, 2007, p. 526). 
The absence of autonomy may strangle teacher motivation and creativity, but complete 
autonomy could make for inconsistent learning opportunities for students and unruly 
governance of the education system. Further, components of the public school system, 
such as professional associations and bureaucratic structures, serve as systemic checks on 
the autonomy of public-school teachers (Glazer, 2008; Leiter, 1981; Retsinas, 1982). 
Notwithstanding the debate over how much teacher autonomy is appropriate in the 
classroom, the research documented above establishes that teachers value and expect 
autonomy in the classroom.  Scholarship further establishes that teachers perceive the 
effects of SBA reform on their autonomy in the classroom differently based on teacher-
level and school-level characteristics, such as 
 teachers who teach in  high-poverty schools versus lower poverty 
(Diamond & Spillane, 2004; Goldstein, 2008; Santoro, 2011); 
  teachers who instruct math or science versus other subjects (Ingersoll & 
May, 2010; Settlage & Meadows, 2002);  
 teachers who instruct elementary versus middle versus secondary schools 
(Pearson & Hall, 1993); and  
 teachers who are new to the profession versus those who are veterans 




The studies cited in this literature review offer six key takeaways that inform the 
present proposal. First, teacher-perceived autonomy varies based on teacher 
characteristics and school context. Second, some studies used the construct of autonomy 
as a dependent or outcome variable, and others used it as predictor variable. Regardless, 
where applicable, the studies indicated that autonomy is important to teachers. Third, 
reminiscent of Dahl’s (1984) power-influence model, teachers’ perception of autonomy 
varies based the domain under scrutiny, as well as the comparative power held by other 
players on the field. That is, teachers do not perceive their control in a vacuum – or 
behind a closed door. They operate within a larger set of power structures that inform 
their perceptions of autonomy. Fourth, SASS is an established and relied-upon source of 
data to use when exploring questions of teacher autonomy. Fifth, the distinction between 
different levels of data, such as school and teacher, is an essential methodological step to 
capture teacher-perceived autonomy because scholars have established that different 
levels within the school system influence teacher autonomy differently. Finally, the 
findings from the studies reviewed here are helpful because they establish a baseline for 
teacher-perceived autonomy and expose the factors that influence those perceptions, such 
as school leadership, student demographics, and AYP status. Informed by the prior 
research reviewed in this chapter, the next chapter details the two empirical frameworks 





Chapter 3: Methods 
This chapter has five sections. The first section discusses the details of the data 
and the data collection process for the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS). The second 
section presents the two empirical frameworks of the study. The third and fourth sections 
detail the analytic samples and variables, respectively. The fifth section presents the 
statistical procedures of the study.  
Description of Data Source  
Since the 1980s, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) has 
collected data on elementary and secondary school systems through the Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS). Originally, the surveys focused on “teacher demand and 
shortage, teacher and administrator characteristics, school programs, and general 
conditions in schools” (http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass). As the survey program has 
matured, NCES has added other areas, including teacher perceptions of the workplace 
and overall school performance. In broad terms, NCES intends SASS to offer researchers 
robust data to use to investigate an array of issues concerning U.S. elementary and 
secondary schooling. As of 2007–08, SASS consisted of five surveys: School district, 
School, Principal, Teacher, Library/Media center.
16
  
One advantage of SASS is that it allows multiple collection points over time. 
NCES states that since the surveys repeat questions across administrations, researchers 
can use the data to examine trends over time for policy areas of interest 
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Records” was administered. Beginning in 1999–2000, NCES changed the “Teacher Demand and Shortage” 




(http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/issues.asp).  To that end, the proposed dissertation 
examines data from four administrations of SASS across three surveys:  
 SASS 1993–1994, 1999–2000, 2003–04 : Teacher and school files 
 SASS 2007–2008: Teacher, school, and principal files 
Descriptions of all data sources come primarily from their respective documentation (ED, 
1996, 2004, 2007, 2010).  SASS uses schools as the primary sampling unit. The Common 
Core of Data (CCD) is the sampling frame from which NCES choose public schools for 
participation. The sampling design for SASS is a stratified probability proportionate to 
size sample. That is, initially NCES identifies a sampling frame of schools based on 
school type (e.g., charter school, high Alaskan Native population). To ensure support of 
statistical outcomes based on characteristics of interest, the sample draws from some 
schools at a higher rate than others if their particular characteristic is uncommon across 
the population. For example, SASS includes all schools funded by the Bureau of Indian 
Education (BIE) in the sampling frame because there are so few BIE schools relative to 
the universe of publicly funded schools. Once the school sampling frame is complete, 
NCES identifies a sample of teachers and all principals and all school districts associated 
with the school sampling frame for inclusion in the SASS data collection.
17
   
NCES has made changes to SASS with each administration; however, similar 
structure and data collection techniques undergird the four administrations discussed 
here. The most obvious change is the sample size, which has decreased since the 1993 
administration. Nonetheless, each data set supports state and national estimates for public 
elementary and secondary schools, teachers, and principals. Table 2 displays the sample 
                                                 





sizes for schools, teachers, and principals
18
 for each administration and the associated 
unweighted response rates.
19
 NCES conducted non-response bias analyses for all SASS 























            
8,770  
             
92.0  
           
8,430  
             
88.5  
           
7,990  
             
81.9  
           
7,570  
             
80.5  
Teacher 
         
47,100  
             
88.9  
         
42,090  
             
81.2  
         
43,240  
             
84.0  
         
38,240  
             
84.0  
Principal n/a n/a n/a 
           
7,460  
             
79.5  
 
1999–2000, and 2003–04, NCES indicated that the non-response rates did not pose a 
substantial bias in SASS estimates. In 2007–08, NCES indicated that “potential bias 
remains” for secondary schools in Nebraska and for the “central city” schools, but that 
the final 2007-08 weights reduce this potential bias.  
SASS data files are fully imputed datasets built from the responses to SASS 
questionnaires.
20
 Data collection runs from October through June of the specified school 
year and incorporates both pen and paper questionnaires as well as telephone and in-
person follow-up interviews. Descriptions of the surveys relevant to the dissertation 
proposal are below. 
                                                 
18 The proposed dissertation will use the principal file from 2007–08, thus principal counts for other years 
are not shown.  
19
 To comply with NCES standards for restricted-use data, I have rounded all sample sizes to the nearest 10. 
20
 According to NCES, the imputation process for all SASS datasets involves a two-step process. In the first 
stage, NCES staff interpolates responses based on actual responses to related items in the same 
questionnaire or related items from other questionnaires that were completed by the same respondent. The 
second stage of imputation may involve imputing data based on the mean or mode calculated from 
responses of similar respondents. Subsequent to the imputation procedure(s), a Census Bureau analyst 




School file. NCES collects school data through the SASS school questionnaire. 
This survey is unique in that several school administrators or staff may respond to parts 
of the survey depending on the question. The principal, or designee, may answer the 
majority of questions but seek responses from other administrative personnel (e.g., school 
counselor) on such topics as enrollment, school programs, staffing, and Title I status.  
Principal file. Concurrent with the school data collection, SASS collects principal 
data through the principal questionnaire. NCES contacts every principal contained in the 
school sample. This survey collects information specific to the school leader, such as 
training and experience, and information regarding the school as a whole, such as 
academic performance.   
Teacher file. NCES draws a sample of teachers from the schools in the sampling 
frame. The teacher survey contains questions about teaching position (e.g., full-time, 
part-time, grades and subject matter taught), number of students taught, working 
conditions, attitudes and perceptions of the workplace, and various demographic 
characteristics (e.g., educational background, employment background).  
Empirical Frameworks 
The hypotheses that drive my empirical models are that teacher perceptions of 
autonomy have changed over time and that SBA reforms are associated with that change. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that for 2007–08 particular teacher and school characteristics 
affected teacher perceptions of autonomy, such as grade level and subject matter taught, 
perception of the school leader, years of experience, school level, and Title I status. More 
specifically, I posit that AYP status, as the direct measure of accountability, negatively 




schools that do not meet AYP have lower or more varied perceptions of autonomy 
compared to their peers who work in schools that made AYP. I further posit that teacher 
perceptions vary in schools that face sanctions because of their Title I status, or in schools 
that operate in states that apply sanctions to any school that has failed AYP regardless of 
Title I status.  
Prior to the investigation of specific teacher and school characteristics in 2007–
08, I investigate any change in the degree of teacher-perceived autonomy in the 
classroom over time. Figure 2 illustrates the relationships I explore using each of the four 
SASS administrations. The domain and scope of teacher-perceived autonomy remain 
constant over time. Again, the domain is the classroom and the scope consists of six 
SASS questions related to classroom control as perceived by teachers:  textbook 
selection; teaching technique selection; content, topics, and skills selection; student 
grading and evaluation; student discipline; and homework determination.  In contrast, the 
degree of autonomy fluctuates based on responses to those six questions as measured 
with the autonomy scale (i.e., the dependent variable that I describe in detail later in this 
chapter). The descriptive analyses produce a portrait of the degree of teacher-perceived 
classroom autonomy vis-a-vis the central tendency (mean), total variation (CV), and 
source of variation (ICC) in the degree of teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom 
domain.  
As described in the discussion of the conceptual framework, arrows a and b 
represent the relationship between the SBA reform policies that emanate from the federal, 
state, and district levels of the education system and the teacher and school levels. 




relationships exist in the system, I am not able to capture their effects in the empirical 
analyses based on the data available for the current study. Arrow c represents the direct 
effect that school characteristics have on teacher-perceived autonomy (e.g., school 
performance, Title I status, school leader). Arrow d represents the indirect effect that 
schools exert over teacher-perceived autonomy through administrative actions that 
impinge on the teachers themselves, such as scheduling, room assignment, accountability 
programs, and any number of organizational factors that affect teachers’ workplaces, as 
previously discussed in the literature review section of this dissertation. Arrow e 
represents the relationships between teacher characteristics and their perceived autonomy. 
The over-time descriptive models do not include any specific characteristics at either 
level because the focus is to identify any pattern or trend in autonomy values from 1993–
04 to 2007–08. The descriptive analyses include calculation and comparison of means, 
coefficients of variation (CV), and intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) for the 
autonomy scale without any mediating variables and serve to set the context for the 
2007–08 HLM analyses. The descriptive statistics enable me to identify overall changes 
in autonomy, in terms of mean values of the autonomy scale, as well as total variation in 
the scale and changes in the sources of that variation—between school (level 2) and 





Figure 2. Empirical model of change in degree of teacher-perceived autonomy in the 
classroom domain: 1993—2007. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationships that I explore through multilevel regression 
analyses techniques on 2007–08 data (HLM). Unlike the second empirical model, the 
model in Figure 3 is specific to a point-in-time and includes specific indicator and control 
variables (i.e., school and teacher characteristics) to model the relationships. Consistent 
with the conceptual model, this model illustrates the relationship between teacher and 
school characteristics and the scope and degree of teacher-perceived autonomy in the 
classroom domain. I have added a relationship to this empirical model (arrow f) to 
illustrate that school-level characteristics may influence the relationship between teacher 
characteristics and teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom. That is, the  
Change in degree of 
teacher-perceived 
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Figure 3. Empirical model of the relationships between SBA reform, school and teacher 
characteristics, and the degree of teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom 
domain. 
 
relationships between teacher characteristics and perceived autonomy may differ based 
on the type of schools in which teachers work. It is only through multilevel modeling that 
I am able to isolate the degree and the direction of influence that schools have on teacher-
perceived autonomy.  
Multilevel modeling allows me to measure how much schools influence teacher 
perceptions of autonomy over time (descriptively by examining change in the ICC 
values), and specifically how schools influence teacher-perceived autonomy using the 
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teacher indicators, with particular attention to AYP status as a measure of SBA reform at 
the school level and the state’s policy on sanctions as a measure of specific SBA reform 
at the state level. Unlike the other characteristics in Figure 3, I list AYP as external to 
schools and teachers, as well as list AYP status as a school characteristic. I include AYP 
status in the federal, state, and district boxes and the school box because other levels of 
the public school system impose AYP status as an indicator of accountability, but schools 
implement action to achieve AYP.  Thus, I consider AYP status as integral to multiple 
levels of the system. The remaining school and teacher characteristics are compositional 
in nature. Again, in model 3 the scope of autonomy is the standardized scale of autonomy 
based on teacher responses to six SASS items that elicited teacher perceptions of 
“complete control” to “no control” in the classroom. 
  My statistical analyses use the SASS data to investigate my research questions. 
My overriding interest is teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom. However, 
teacher-perceived autonomy is a latent construct not directly captured in SASS. This 
construct presents some measurement challenges for the analyses that I detail below. A 
particular measurement challenge for these analyses is comparing average autonomy 
across years in a meaningful way. For example, initial descriptive analyses indicate that 
across all four SASS administrations teachers perceive high average levels of autonomy. 
Thus, my analyses will focus on the variation in the outcome variable over time. To 
illustrate, on a scale from 1 to 4 of autonomy (4 being high of autonomy), if teachers 
hover on average at 3.5, that would indicate a high level of autonomy and, more 
technically, a skewed outcome variable. Notwithstanding the 3.5 mean value, if over time 




agreement among teachers on how they perceive autonomy. Simply put, more variation 
in the outcome measure equates to less agreement among teachers about perceptions of 
autonomy. This variation in perception may indicate a differential effect of SBA reform 
on teacher-perceived autonomy based on school context or teacher characteristics. For 
instance, teacher perceptions may vary for teachers in Title I schools more so than they 
do for those in non-Title I schools; they may vary based on the novice status of teachers 
who might have different expectations of their profession compared to veteran teachers 
who are unaccustomed to classroom practices based on NCLB accountability models of 
reform.  In the paragraphs that follow, I describe the analytic samples, and the attributes 
of the dependent, indicator, and control variables in this study that enable me to 
investigate sources of variation.  
Analytic Samples 
Table 3 lists the analytic sample sizes for SASS by year and data file.
21
 The 
analytic samples do not contain the full complement of observations for several reasons. I 
limited the analytic sample in 1993–94, 1999–2000, and 2003–04 to schools with 
responding teachers. Thus, the samples do not contain schools without teacher-level data, 
nor do they contain teachers without corresponding school-level data. This limitation 
reduced the school samples by 3.2 percent 5.5 percent, and 2.2 percent, respectively and 
the teacher samples by 6.5 percent, 8.8 percent, and 6.8 percent, respectively. I did not 
perform missing data analysis on these samples because the final teacher weights in each 
of the three years account for bias that may result from school and teacher non response. 
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Table 3  
Unweighted Analytic Sample Sizes by Year 
  1993-94 1999-00 2003-04  2007-08 
School-level 8,480 7,970 7,820 6,580 
Teacher-level 44,040 38,740 40,280 33,110 
     
     
 For 2007–08 analyses, I made three changes to the sample. First, I limited the 
school-level data to schools with at least 75 enrollees, which reduced the available 
school-level sample by 4.7 percent to 7,220 schools. Therefore, the results of my analyses 
do not represent schools with fewer than 75 students. Second, I limited the school-level 
sample to those schools with corresponding principal reports on AYP status, which 
eliminated an additional 4.9 percent to yield 6,860 schools. At this point I performed 
missing data analysis on school-level data between the base sample of 7,220 schools with 
at least 75 students, the level-2 sample of 6,860 after limiting for principal response, and 
the 360 excluded cases from the principal sample. Table 4 details the results of the 
analysis. 
At a p-value of 0.05, independent t tests yielded three statistically significant 
differences between the level-2 and the principal samples. The level-2 sample has lower 
percentages of minority students and students who qualify for free- and reduced-price 
lunch, as well as lower average total enrollment. However, no differences are statistically 
significant between the base sample of 7,220 and the level-2 sample of 6,860. Thus, prior 
to merge with the level-1 data, weighted results from the level-2 sample represent the 
population of schools with greater than 75 students. Upon the school-level merge with the 




The cause of this change is teacher nonresponse. Again, the final teacher weight accounts 
for school- and teacher-level nonresponse. Thus, I did not perform missing data analysis. 
Table 4  
School-Level Missing Data Analysis 
 Sample 
 
Base  Level 2 Principal 
(N=7,220) (N=6,860) (N=360) 
School characteristics Mean se Mean se Mean se 
Enrollment (number of students) 567.90 7.08 564.02 7.13 647.97 31.27 
Minority student population 39.48 0.70 38.71 0.69 55.26 3.41 
Free- and reduced-price lunch population 45.96 0.64 45.55 0.63 54.52 2.83 
 
Teacher-level changes occurred as a result of the school-level sample 
modifications. First, the sample dropped by 9.4 percent to 34,630 teachers as a result of 
the restriction to schools with at least 75 students. Second, I merged the teacher sample 
with the principal sample to identify how many teacher observations would be lost based 
on principal nonresponse. The result of the merge was a loss of 1 percent of teacher 
observations to 34,190 teachers. Although the loss in some cases was due to principal 
nonresponse, for which the final teacher weight does not account, I did not perform 
missing data analysis because of the relatively small change. Finally, due to teacher 
nonresponse the teacher sample lost an additional 3 percent of cases when merged with 
the school-level data (principal and school data included only schools and principals with 
corresponding data). Again, the final teacher weight accounts for teacher nonresponse so 
I did not perform any missing data analysis. The 2007–08 analytic samples contain 
33,110 teachers and 6,580 schools.
22
 In the next few pages, I describe four types of 
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variables for this proposed study: outcome variable, independent variables, control 
variables, and weighting variables.  
Outcome variable. The outcome, or dependent variable, is teacher-perceived 
autonomy. The empirical studies reviewed above often employed data reduction 
techniques to capture the construct of teacher-perceived autonomy. One purpose of data 
reduction techniques is to discover latent constructs in data that other statistical methods 
cannot measure directly. To that end, I created a factor and summative scale to represent 
teacher-perceived autonomy from responses to the six-part SASS question “How much 
control do you feel you have IN YOUR CLASSROOM over each of the following areas 
of your planning and teaching: selecting textbooks and other instructional materials; 
selecting content, topics, and skills to be taught; selecting teaching techniques; evaluating 
and grading students; disciplining students; determining the amount of homework to be 
assigned.”
23
 Each of the four waves of SASS data included this question with no 
variation in the wording or order of the question. Respondents indicated their level of 
agreement with each statement using a Likert scale ranging from “No Control” to 
“Complete Control.” Table 5 lists the descriptive statistics for each of the six variables 
over time.  
Based on changes in the SASS instruments from one administration to the next, 
the structure of the underlying measures required manipulation prior to incorporation into 
the outcome variable. Although the wording of the items did not change, the response 
options for the items did change.  Specifically, the Likert scale used in years 1993–94 and 
1999–2000 differed from one another and from those used in 2003–04 and 2007–08. In 
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1993–94 the scale was 0 to 5; in 1999–2000 it was 1 to 5; in both 2003–04 and 2007–08 
it was 1 to 4. 
 
Table 5  
Variables Included in Teacher Autonomy Construct 
  
1993               
(N=44040) 
1999               
(N=38740) 
2003         
(N=40280) 



















select text 2.99 0.863 2.84 0.890 2.83 0.993 2.72 1.049 
select content to be 
taught 3.10 0.793 2.89 0.866 2.95 0.938 2.70 1.043 
teaching technique
a
 3.60 0.533 3.52 0.593 3.64 0.573 3.64 0.573 
evaluate/grade 
students 3.61 0.522 3.57 0.548 3.69 0.530 3.55 0.624 
decide discipline 3.29 0.697 3.22 0.725 3.51 0.530 3.47 0.664 
assign homework 3.64 0.552 3.58 0.590 3.69 0.671 3.65 0.597 
a
 2003 and 2007 unrounded mean values are 3.6402102 and 3.6444187, respectively; unrounded standard 
deviation values are 0.5728461and 0.5729188, respectively.  
 
I used a two-step process to rescale the responses from the first two SASS waves such 
that all four waves had a common Likert scale. First, I added a constant (1) to the scale 
used in 1993–94 to avoid complications that may arise from having a score of zero. Next, 
I converted the scales in 1993–94 and 1999–2000 to range from 1 to 4. I did not collapse 
the values but maintained the distinction of six and five data points, respectively, to 
represent the data within each year.  
The cost of this transformation is that the scales’ intervals differ, such that the 
difference between one response and the next (for example, a 1 compared to a 2) are not 
uniform across years. To illustrate, any teacher who responded 4 in 1993, with the intent 
of selecting one full unit lower than the “complete control” category, converted to a value 




responded 4 in 1999–00, converted to a value of 3.2; whereas, a teacher who responded 4 
in 2003–04 or 2007–08 continued with a value of 4. Thus, any direct comparisons of 
values from 1993-94, 1999-2000, and 2003-04 require cautious interpretation; whereas, 
direct comparisons are possible between 2003-04 and 2007-08. However, given the 
sample size available through SASS, such as the coefficient of variation, are robust to the 
metric of the six variables that form the outcome variable in this study, and are useful to 
identify patterns that exist across data points. Subsequent to the Likert-range 
transformation, for each year of data I used data reduction techniques to create 
standardized summative scales and factor scores, discussed in turn below.  
Scale. A summative scale is just that – a nonweighted sum of the scores on the 
constituent measures that create a continuous variable. The basic assumption with this 
form of scale creation is that the aggregation of the elements included in the scale 
approximate a linear relationship with a latent construct.  In this study, the scale produces 
a score for an individual teacher that is the sum of the teacher’s scores on each of the six 
items.  For instance, the scale returns a score of 6 for a teacher that selected a 1 (or its 
equivalent, given rescale from 0 to 1 for 1993–94 data) on all six questions. Conversely, a 
teacher that selected a 4 or its equivalent, for every item would receive a score of 24.  
Statisticians often evaluate composite scales using Cronbach’s alpha to indicate 
the reliability or internal consistency of the scale. Effectively, the alpha adds to the 
validity of an interpretation of the scale as a proxy for the construct in question. What 
constitutes a “good” Cronbach alpha value depends on the use of the scale.  A generally 
accepted rule is that an alpha above 0.70 signifies a scale that is appropriate for analysis, 




presents the alphas for each of the autonomy scales. The alphas range from 0.79 to 0.75, 





Table 6  
Cronbach alphas 
Autonomy Scale   
1993  
(N=44040)                 
1999               
(N=38740)   
2003         
(N=40280)   
2007         
(N=33110) 
   0.7933   0.7854   0.7793   0.7452 
 
Beyond the Cronbach alpha, other characteristics of the autonomy scale and the 
data that constitute the scale are important. For example, ideally the nonweighted scale 
score would be normally distributed, but as one would expect based on the mean values 
of the underlying variables presented  in table 6 above, the scale skews toward the higher 
values in the range of 6 to 24. It is this skew that created the need to investigate the 
ability of the summative score to represent a continuous measure of a normally 
distributed distribution. The next subsection details how I investigated the 
appropriateness of the scale as outcome variable in two ways. First, I created descriptive 
statistics that confirmed that the summative scale was indeed similar to the construct of 
the outcome variable produced through factor analysis. Second, I produced coefficients 
from 2007–08 data with a multinomial multilevel model that used the categorical 
dependent variable as the outcome variable.   
Factor. Factor analysis is a set of powerful analytical processes that can lead to 
construction of a single variable or measure built from several variables that expresses a 
construct that is not directly measured (i.e., a latent construct). Ideally, factors are 
normally distributed and have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, which is 
important because this normalization permits use of the factor in any number of statistical 
procedures that assume a normal distribution, including ordinary least squares regression 




scales because during factor creation the process weights each constituent element by the 
shared variance it possesses with other variables that make up the factor. This weighting 
is desirable for use in any form of analysis because it suggests less measurement error. 
For example, I constructed a factor based on six categorical variables that in theory 
would have less reliability individually than they would as a composite.  
The factor analysis that I conducted provides important information for this study 
regarding the selection of outcome variable.  Based on factor loadings, both the values 
and the orders, presented in Table A.1, coupled with the Eigenvalues and percentage 
variance explained, both presented in Table A.2, I can deduce the following:  
1. Combined, the six measures indicate that teachers believe that they have broad 
control over aspects of the classroom domain; 
2. The six measures contribute in a statistically meaningful way to the construct; and  
3. The factor loadings indicate that the construct is consistent over time because the 
loadings have a consistent pattern across all years, with one exception in year 
2003–04, between text and discipline. 
Simply put, I interpret the factor to be a reasonable proxy for teacher perception of 
autonomy in the classroom.  
In Table A.3, I present coefficients for a linear multilevel model that has the 
standardized z-score as the outcome variable, and a multinomial, multilevel model that 
has the categorical variable as the outcome variable. Both models use the same variables 
and the same 2007–08 data. The multinomial models indicate the odds of teachers 
belonging to the high autonomy group vs. the low group, and to the moderate autonomy 




level of significance between the continuous multilevel model results and the 
multinomial, multilevel model results for the “high” category, I was able to confirm 
congruence between the model results. Thus, I argue the scale is robust to the underlying 
skew and is suitable as the outcome variable in this study. 
Indicator and control variables. Indicator and control variables control for 
countervailing explanations of an outcome. The primary relationship of interest in the 
2007–08 multilevel regression models in this dissertation is the relationship between 
teacher perception of autonomy in the classroom and school-level AYP status. The 
models are able to examine this relationship because in 2007–08, principals reported 
whether their school made AYP status at the end of the 2006–07 school year. Further, if 
the school did not make AYP, principals answered a follow-up question asking whether 
the school was in “in need of improvement” status based on at least two consecutive 
years of AYP failure in the same content area. Discussed previously, the distinction 
between years 1 and 2 of AYP failure is important because year 2 triggers NCLB-
required sanctions.  
To account for influences on teacher-perceived autonomy and isolate my 
hypothesized relationship between AYP status and teacher autonomy, I include indicator 
and control variables in the models based on the body of research reviewed in Chapter 2. 
At the teacher level, I include a variable to indicate that a teacher’s main assignment 
primarily addressed tested or not-tested content, as determined by NCLB testing 
requirements, and the grade-level of students. I have categorized this variable into four 
categories determined by elementary or secondary teaching and tested or not-tested main 




perception of school leadership (see Table A.4 for details on factor score) and two 
measures of experience level. The first experience measure is an indicator of novice 
status; the second is a continuous measure of years as a teacher. As teacher-level control 
variables, I include demographic variables (gender and race). School-level indicator 
variables include AYP status for 2006–07, Needs Improvement status for 2007–08, and 
school-wide Title I status. School-level control variables include a three-category school-
level indicator and continuous measures of total enrollment, percentage of minority 
students, and percentage of students approved for free- and reduced-price lunch.  
I account for state-level sanction policies that are a response to federal 
accountability with two additional variables: sanction and non-sanction. I created these 
variables based on the state-level policy to either apply sanctions to any school that does 
not make AYP or to apply sanctions only to those schools that receive Title I funding. 
Rather than use these variables as indicators in the teacher- or school-level models, I use 
them to split the full sample into a sanction subsample and a non-sanction subsample. 
This approach maintains the integrity of the state-level variable and permits me to 
contrast the school and teacher characteristics that fall within the subsamples. Table A.5 
identifies the states for each group. 
Weighting variables. In addition to modeled variables, SASS data sets include 
replicate- and final-weight variables to adjust for the complex sample design, 
probabilities of sample selection, and subgroup nonresponse. The final teacher weight 
adjusts for the probability of selection at both the teacher and school levels.  Specifically, 
the teacher-final weight is “the product of (Initial Basic Weight) and (School Sampling 




Within-School Nonresponse Adjustment Factor) and (First-Stage Ratio-Adjustment 
Factor) and (Teacher Adjustment Factor)” (Tourkin et al., 2010, pp. 191-192). The HLM 
analyses use the final teacher weight variable
24
 to permit generalizability of findings to 
the U.S. population of public school elementary and secondary teachers. To interpret 
coefficients as effect sizes and to model fixed and random effects appropriately in the 
multilevel models, all measures in the statistical analyses are standardized z-scores, 
grand-mean centered, or group-mean centered. Specifically, all continuous measures are 
standardized z-scores. Further, all categorical variables except novice status are grand-
mean centered to reflect the average proportion of each characteristic across the sample 
(i.e., overall average). Novice and quality of leadership (z-scored continuous variable) are 
group-mean centered to reflect the average across the group (i.e., school-level average). 
Table 7 lists all variables and their respective descriptions.  
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Table 7  
 
Description of Variables Used 
Type Name Description 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
Scale Teacher perception of  
autonomy in the classroom 
Standardized scale calculated from six  teacher-level 
measures (perception of control over: selecting class 
materials, selecting class content, selecting teaching 
technique, evaluating students, deciding discipline, 
assigning homework) 
Tertile Teacher perception of  
autonomy in the classroom 
Categorical variable to indicate high/moderate/low levels 
of perceived autonomy created from the factor derived 
from the same six teacher-level measures listed above; 




Perception of leadership 
quality [LEADER] 
Continuous variable aggregated from factor of three 
Likert scaled variables (1 – strongly agree; 4 strongly 
disagree) teacher level variables: Administration is 
supportive, Principal enforces school rules and supports 
teachers enforcement, Principal communicates with staff,  
Years of experience [EXP] Continuous variable measuring total years of teaching 
experience 
Novice status – less than or 
equal to 3 years experience 
[NOVICE] 
Categorical variable where 0 = Novice; 1 = Non-novice 
Elementary – tested 
[GRADE_TEST] 
Categorical variable where 0 = teaching level is 
elementary and main teaching assignment is general 
elementary, mathematics, natural sciences, 
English/language arts, or special education 
Elementary – not tested 
[GRADE_TEST] 
Categorical variable where 1 = teaching level is 
elementary and main teaching assignment is other than 
those included in GRADE_TEST=0 
Secondary – tested 
[GRADE_TEST] 
Categorical variable where 2 = teaching level is 
secondary and main teaching assignment is mathematics, 
natural sciences, English/language arts, or special 
education  
Secondary – not tested 
[GRADE_TEST] 
Categorical variable where 3= teaching level is 
secondary and main teaching assignment is other than 








Description of Variables Used (continue) 
Type Name Description 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
School level 
AYP status – Year 1 Failure 
[S_FAIL] 
Dichotomous variable where 0=Yes and 1=No 
AYP status – Years 2 or 
beyond failure [NDIMP] 
Dichotomous variable where 0=Yes and 1=No 
Title I status [TI_SW] Dichotomous variable where 0 = Title I school; 
1 = not Title I 
State applies sanctions to all 
schools that fail AYP 
[SANCTION] 
Dichotomous variable where 1=Yes and 0=No 
(Source: NCES) 
State applies sanctions to Title 
I schools only 
[NO_SANCTION] 




Sex [FEMALE] Categorical variable where 0 = female; 1=male 
Race [RACE] Categorical variable where 0 = non-white; 
1=white 
School level 
School enrollment [ENROLL] Continuous variable measuring total enrollment 
School % Minority Students 
[MINENR] 
Continuous variable measuring the percentage 
of minority students  
School % Students FRPL 
[FARMS] 
Continuous variable measuring the percentage 
of students approved for free- and reduced-
price lunch 
School level[LEVEL] Categorical variable where 0 = Elementary 
school (grades k-6); 1 = Combined school 









Statistical Procedures   
In this dissertation I utilize descriptive and multilevel analysis techniques. The 
analyses have two perspectives. The descriptive analysis of the autonomy scale takes a 
broad perspective of change from 1993 to 2007, whereas the HLM analyses yield a 
specific portrait of school and teacher characteristics that associate with teachers’ 
perceptions of autonomy in the classroom for 2007–08.  
Analyses of variation. To answer the over-time component in research question 
1a, I offer three statistical measures of the autonomy scale for each year of data: means, 
coefficients of variation (CV), and intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC). The 
arithmetic mean is a measure of central tendency that is influenced by the metric of the 
underlying included variables. The inconsistent metrics of the constituent measures limit 
my ability to compare mean values over time. However, the mean is an important starting 
point for the discussion on teacher-perceived autonomy because it orients the findings to 
the average level of autonomy perceived by teachers in a given year. In contrast to mean 
values, the CV is a statistic that indicates variation around the mean. The CV is useful to 
compare values between data sets that have different units or metrics and is calculated as 
the standard deviation divided by the absolute value of the mean: 
Formula 4.1         
 
Because the CV indicates total variation around the mean, it does not distinguish between 
variance attributable to teacher characteristics and variance attributable to school 
characteristics. Thus, I develop a fully unconditional model for each wave of data to 
identify the proportion of the total variation in my dependent measure that may be 




models do not have any indicator or control variables. They produce measures of 
variation in the teacher perception of autonomy (level-1) that is attributable to schools 
(level-2). The teacher-level model is  
 
Formula 4.2           Yij =β0j + r0j 
    
where Yij  is teacher perception of autonomy for teacher i in school j, β0j is the mean 
teacher perception of autonomy in school j, and r0j is the random teacher effect or error 
term, which I assume to be normally distributed. Similarly, the unconditional model at 
the school level is 
 
Formula 4.3   β0j = γ00 +u0j                                                                                                                                   
where γ00  is the grand mean of teacher perception of autonomy for all schools, and μ0j is a 
random effect associated with unit j. I assume the school variation in teacher perception 
of autonomy has a normal distribution. The combination of the models for the two levels 
results in the fully unconditional model: 
 
Formula 4.4   Yij = γ00 +u0j + r0j 
 
The fully unconditional model partitions the total variance in the dependent 
variable into teacher- and school-level estimates. The equation for the ICC is 
Formula 4.5   ICC = τ00/ (σ
2
+ τ00)      
where  τ00 is the estimated between-school variance, and σ
2 
is the estimated within-school 
variance for teacher perception of autonomy. This partition is integral to the over-time 
analyses because it indicates whether schools have become more integral over time to 




schools matter to teacher perceptions of autonomy. An examination of the ICCs over time 
can indicate whether the importance of schools to teacher-perceived autonomy increases 
or decreases over time. For, example, an increasing ICC from survey year to survey year 
would indicate that teachers in a particular school have become more similar to one 
another in their perceptions of autonomy. That is, their school grouping influences their 
perceptions when compared to teachers in another school. It may be that teachers in the 
same school react differently to the policy (e.g., teachers in NCLB-tested subjects vs. 
subjects not tested), or it may be that average differences between teachers in some 
schools are vastly more pronounced than those in another school (e.g., Title I schools 
compared to others); or it may be some combination of these and other school factors.  
 ICC comparisons. ICCs are dependent on the data sample from which they are 
drawn. Thus, to compare one ICC to another requires an estimate of the bias and standard 
error of the ICCs for each time period. In this dissertation, I used jackknifing to produce 
standard errors and confidence intervals for the ICC in each year. Jackknifing is a 
common procedure to measure accuracy of statistical estimates, particularly with non-
normally distributed data (Barker, 2005).  Essentially, jackknifing involves drawing a 
large number of random subsamples from the larger dataset to replicate the HLM 
analyses that yield the ICC.  The more replications, the more accurate the reliability 
estimates produced from the jackknifed datasets. To compare estimates from two or more 
datasets, I completed the jackknife procedure for each year of data.  
For this study, I created jackknife samples from the analytic dataset by randomly 
removing eight schools (approximately 1/1000
th
 of the base school-level sample) from 




each year, I ran fully unconditional models and calculated 1000 ICC estimates. Based on 
these 1,000 ICC estimates, I was able to calculate confidence intervals and standard error 
estimates for the ICC. Therefore, for each year of data in this study, I have ICC 
confidence intervals from 1,000 jackknife samples, which I can then compare from one 
dataset (or year) to another. 
Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) analysis.  To answer the point-in-time 
components of my  research questions and to investigate the effect of teacher and school-
level measures, specifically AYP status, on teacher-perceived autonomy in 2007–08, I 
create a multilevel model based on Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) HLM approach. For 
2007–08 data, in addition to the unconditional model, I develop a within-school model 
(level 1) and a between-school model (level 2), and use indicator and control variables to 
model the perception of autonomy for teacher i in school j. For the level-one or teacher 
level model, I examine perceived autonomy as a function of teacher assignment, 
experience level, gender, race, and perception of leadership quality. The level 1 model is 
 
Formula 4.6  Yij = β0j + β1j(GRADE_TESTED) + β2j(NOVICE) + β3j(EXP) +  
β4j(FEMALE) + β5j (RACE) + β6j(LEADER) + r0j 
 
where β0j is the school mean of teacher perception of autonomy in school j; β1j is the 
mean difference between teachers based on assignment, categorized as those who teach 
elementary or secondary students in tested or non-tested subjects, respectively; β2j is the 
mean difference between teachers who have less than or equal to three years of 
experience and those who have more than three years of experience;  β3j is the mean 
difference between non-novice teachers based on years of experience;  β4j is the mean 




teachers and teachers of all other race/ethnicity categories; β6j  is the difference between 
teachers based on their perception of school leadership quality; and r0j is the residual or 
error term for teacher i in school j.  
 I also model the associations between school characteristics and teacher-perceived 
autonomy at the school level. The level 2 or school-level model is  
 
Formula 4.7  β0j= γ00 + γ01 (AYP)+ γ02 (NDIMP) + γ03 (T1)+γ04 (LEVEL)+γ05 
(ENROLL)+ γ06(FARMS%)+ γ07 (FRPL%)+ γ08 (MINENR%)+ γ09 
(AGGLDR)+u0j                                                    
 
where γ00 is the school average of teacher perception of autonomy; γ01 is the average 
difference between teacher perception of autonomy in schools that made AYP and in 
schools that did not make AYP for the first year; γ02 is the average difference between 
teacher perception of autonomy in schools that made AYP and in schools that did not 
make AYP for two consecutive years; γ03 is the average difference in teachers’ perception 
of autonomy associated with schoolwide Title I status; γ04 is the average difference in 
teachers’ perceptions of autonomy between elementary, combined, and secondary 
schools; γ05 is the average difference in teachers’ perceptions of autonomy based on total 
enrollment ; γ06 is the average difference in the perception of autonomy for teachers 
associated with a percentage change in the average school-level population of students 
eligible for free- and reduced-price lunch; γ07 is the average difference in the teacher 
perception of autonomy associated with a percent difference in the average school-level 
minority student population; γ08 is the average difference in teacher perception of 
autonomy based on the average perception of school-level leadership quality; u0j is the 




My goal is to disentangle the teacher and school characteristics that comprise the 
variance in teacher-perceived autonomy. I have grand-mean centered all variables except 
novice status and teacher-level perception of school leadership quality. I model these 
variables with random effects and group-mean center both variables. I have also added an 
interaction term between novice status and school level to investigate whether the 
association between novice status and perceived autonomy varies by elementary, 
combined, and secondary school levels.  
In addition to the models for the overall analytic sample, I divide the sample into 
two subsamples to examine teachers in states that apply sanctions to all failed AYP 
schools apart from teachers in states that follow NCLB and apply sanctions only to 
schools that receive Title I funding. This split sample permits me to compare teachers 
based on state policies on sanctions and to compare each of the split samples with the 
overall sample. Thus, I am able to capture school-level and teacher-level effects on 
teacher perceptions of degree and scope of autonomy within specific state contexts 
related to SBA reforms.  
Limitations of the Study 
This dissertation provides valuable insight into teacher-perceived autonomy in an 
SBA reform context. However, the study has six limitations of data and interpretation 
that merit the reader’s attention. First, the analyses presented here do not include data 
collected through qualitative investigation techniques. The teacher “voices” that inform 
the study are confined to categorical responses that may or may not capture the full 
meaning of teachers’ beliefs about autonomy in the classroom. To overcome this 




findings that span time periods and education settings from scholars who produced 
mixed-methods studies and qualitative research. Second, although not unique to this 
study, a noteworthy limitation is that researchers cannot directly measure teacher 
autonomy (Allensworth et al., 2009; Ingersoll, 1996; Ingersoll & May, 2010, 2011). The 
construct of teacher autonomy is a proxy measure of a nuanced notion rather than a direct 
measure of an observable characteristic. Further, the scope of the construct is quite 
narrow as it specifies teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom domain, rather than a 
more robust measure that might capture the scope of autonomy across curricula, budgets, 
and staffing; or that might capture additional domains of autonomy, such as districts, 
schools, and classrooms.  
The third limitation is that the study contains limited AYP status data. 
Specifically, SASS data provides AYP status only in the 2007–08 data. Although 2003–
04 data collection was post-NCLB implementation, NCES did not introduce AYP status 
into the surveys until 2007–08. Therefore, the 1993–94, 1999–2000, and 2003–04 data 
offer an assessment of teacher-perceived autonomy under SBA reform prior to NCLB, 
and the 2007–08 data serve an examination of teacher-perceived autonomy under the 
federal SBA reform, aka NCLB, roughly five years after the Act’s implementation. It 
may have served the study to have had two years of SBA reform prior to NCLB and two 
years post-NCLB for a stronger pre- and post-picture specific to NCLB. However, as it 
is, the study offers compelling findings regarding SBA reform. Fourth, although several 
scholars (notably Ingersoll) use SASS data for over-time comparisons, NCES does not 
specifically intend scholars to use the data for longitudinal comparisons. There is no 




data collection period. Further, as demonstrated by this study, the changes in Likert scales 
for those questions that do carry over from survey year to survey year complicate the 
ability to make direct comparisons over time. However, descriptive statistical analyses 
reveal consistency between the autonomy construct from year to year and reveal a pattern 
of change in teacher-perceived over time. Thus, this study does not attempt to use SASS 
beyond its capabilities.  
The fifth limitation is that SASS is a self-administered, pencil and paper data 
collection process. Although school administrators and principals have detailed 
instructions to aid in survey completion, self-reported data are always subject to 
misinterpretation and misinformation (Boyd, et al., 2011; Ingersoll & May, 2011). The 
sixth and final limitation is that SASS data are not experimental data. Hence, the 
relationships discussed cannot be determined to be casual relationships. The statistical 
models do not capture all intervening effects on the outcome measure because quasi-
experimental research does not offer the same level of control of treatment groups or 
random assignment as would an experimental design. Thus, readers should interpret the 





Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter consists of three sections organized according to the research 
questions presented in Chapter 1. The first section offers descriptive results from the 
over-time analyses that address question 1a: From 1993 to 2007, how has degree of 
teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom changed? The second section presents 
descriptive statistics and HLM findings that address question 1b: For 2007–08, what 
school and teacher characteristics are associated with differences in teacher-perceived 
autonomy?; question 2a: How do teachers who work in schools that made AYP perceive 
their autonomy compared to those who work in schools that did not make AYP?; and 
question 2b: How do teachers who work in schools in the first year of failed AYP status 
differ from those who work schools in the second year or later of failed AYP status. 
Section three concludes this chapter by extending analyses that address research question 
1b to consider state-level policy regarding AYP sanctions and Title I status. In total, these 
three sections provide insight into answering the motivating question of this study: How 
do teachers perceive their own autonomy in the classroom within the policy context of 
SBA reforms, specifically NCLB? The chapter closes with a summary of the results.  
Over-Time Analyses: 1993–94, 1999–2000, 2003–04 and 2007–08 
To examine changes in teacher-perceived autonomy over the last two decades, I 
used the four data points of SASS data between 1993–94 and 2007–08. As described in 
chapter 3, I transformed the six Likert-scaled variables contained in the final autonomy 
measure such that each of the six variables ranged from a low score of 1 to a high score 
of 4. However, I kept the number of data points of the Likert scale for each year (e.g., 




the highest of 4). Specifically, 1993–94 has 6 points, 1999 has 5 points, and each of the 
two later years have 4 points.
25
 The advantage of this approach is that each year has the 
same range of values that correspond at the low and high values. The disadvantage is that 
the underlying scales continue to present a challenge for direct comparison of means of 
the autonomy measure from year to year.   
To illustrate, Figure 4 presents the weighted mean values for the autonomy scale 
across all teachers in the sample for the specified year. 
 
 
Figure 4. Autonomy scale mean values across teachers: 1993–94, 1999–00, 2003–04, 
2007–08 
 
The weighted mean values for the autonomy scale ranged from 19.6 to 20.3. Due to the 
properties of the scale, which differ between 1993–94, 1999–2000, and 2003–04, it is 
difficult to make conclusive comparisons between the mean values of autonomy across 
                                                 
25
 1993–04 scale is 1.0, 1.6, 2.2. 2.8, 3.4, 4.0; 1999–2000 scale is 1.0, 1.75, 2.5, 3.25; 2003–04 and 2007–
08 are 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0. 
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these three years. Indeed, the change from the first 2 data points and 2003–04 contradicts 
a pattern suggested by the change between 1993–94 and 1999–2000. While inconclusive, 
it is reasonable to postulate that the change that NCES made to the underlying Likert 
scale in 2003–04 that decreased the response values from 5 to 4 may partially explain the 
2003–04 change. The change in 2003-04 may also relate to local conditions or an influx 
of resources; however, during the review of literature for this study, no evidence emerged 
as a systematic, national influence that would boost teacher responses to the SASS items 
for the 2003–04 academic year as opposed to any other year.  
Given that the maximum value on the scale for each year was 24, the fact that the 
average in each year hovers near 20 suggests that teachers perceived a high average level 
of autonomy at each of the time points. In contrast to prior years, the shared underlying 
metric of the autonomy scale for 2003–04 and 2007–08 permits direct comparisons 
across these two waves. An independent t test reveals that the weighted average scores 
for each year (20.3 for 2003–04 and 19.7 for 2007–08) are statistically different from one 
another. Although still relatively high, the average level of autonomy in 2007–08 is lower 
than the average level in 2003–04, by about one-tenth of a standard deviation, which 
suggests a slight decrease in the teacher-perceived autonomy.  
While differences underlying the metric of the autonomy scale across years create 
complications for comparison of absolute statistics like the mean or standard deviations, 
an alternative statistic, such as the coefficient of variation (CV), is more robust to these 
shortcomings in the data.  To that end, Figure 5 depicts the amount of variation in the 
average autonomy score from one wave of data to the next.
26
 The CV analysis indicates 
an upward trend in variation across the 4 years (from 1.06 in 1993 to 1.53 in 2007). 
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Taken in combination with the relatively high mean values on the autonomy scale, the 
larger CVs suggest that although teachers in general continue to perceive high levels of 
autonomy in the classroom, there is growing variability around that perception. 
 
 
Figure 5. Coefficients of variation: 1993–94, 1999–2000, 2003–04, 2007–08. 
 
Figure 6 shows the ICC values for each year.
27
 Like the CV, the ICC is a measure 
of variability but it differs from the CV because it is a multilevel statistic. The ICC 
partitions the variance in a measure within and between groups. An ICC value of 1 
indicates that all of the variability in a measure is between groups. An ICC value of zero 
indicates that none of the variability is between groups. The ICC analysis is important in 
the current study because it dissects the source of change in teacher-perceived autonomy 
between teachers and schools. In other words, the larger an ICC, the more teachers’ 
perceptions of autonomy differ between schools, which hints at a single or multiple 
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school-level characteristic that influences teacher perceptions The ICCs reveal that school 
context has an increasing and measureable role in teacher-perceived autonomy. To 
compare ICCs statistically across years, I calculated confidence intervals for each ICC, 
and compared the values from each wave of data to determine if the confidence intervals 
overlapped.
28
 Based on the confidence intervals, I was able to determine that the ICCs 
from each wave of data were statistically different from one another. ICCs used in this 
dissertation and their corresponding confidence intervals are located in Table A.6. 
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 Figure 6. ICC over time: 1999–93, 1999–00, 2003–04, 2007–08. 
 
Results from this analysis indicate that from 1993–94 to 2007–08, the import of 
school context on teacher-perceived autonomy increased substantially. Specifically, in 
1993–94, about 12 percent of the variation in teacher-perceived autonomy was 
attributable to the school level. Over time, the school level portion of overall variation 
increased steadily such that in 2007–08, it reached nearly 21 percent.  Effectively, the 
role of school context on teacher-perceived autonomy increased substantially over the 
time period by about 72 percent. 
  Given the ICC findings across the entire sample, I investigated the change in 
teacher-perceived autonomy for two subsamples of interest:  teachers who work in Title I 
schools and teachers who do not work in Title I schools. As part of the investigation into 
the hypotheses regarding different teachers perceiving changes in autonomy differently, I 
examined whether there was more between-school variation in Title I schools compared  
1993 1999 2003 2007





Figure 7. ICC over time by Title I status: 1993–94, 1999–00, 2003–04, 2007–08. 
 
to non-Title I schools. Figure 7 illustrates the school-level variance of teacher-perceived 
autonomy by Title I status for each of the four waves of data. As with the overall ICCs, I 
generated confidence intervals for the Title I and non-Title I ICCs to compare the values 
over time and between groupings.
29
 These comparisons afford three important 
observations that lead to the next set of analyses in this study. First, for each year the ICC 
for teachers at Title I schools is statistically different from the ICC for teachers at non-
Title I schools. For example, in 1999 a greater portion of the total variation in teacher-
perceived autonomy among teachers who worked in Title I schools was due to their 
school context (0.1482) compared to teachers in non-Title schools (0.1272). In other 
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Title I 0.1244 0.1482 0.1701 0.2268




words, compared to teachers in non-Title I schools, there was greater variability in 
teacher perceptions of autonomy between Title I schools.  
Second, for both Title I and non-Title I schools for each succeeding wave of data, 
the ICC is statistically higher than the one before. Most notably, the 2007 ICC is 
statistically higher than the 1993 ICC. Thus, by 2007 the role of school context in 
teacher-perceived autonomy had increased for teachers in Title I schools, as it had for 
teachers overall. Specifically, from 1999 to 2007, for teachers in Title I schools the 
proportion of total variation in teacher-perceived autonomy attributable to their school 
context nearly doubled (82 percent increase). For teachers in non-Title I schools, in 1993 
school-level characteristics explained 11.6 percent of the variation in average teacher-
perceived autonomy; whereas in 2007, school-level characteristics explained 18.0 percent 
of the variation. This is an increase of 54 percent for teachers in non-Title I schools. In 
sum, the school context has come to matter more in teacher perceptions of autonomy 
overall; however, the effect is more pronounced for teachers in Title I schools 
The third observation is that the spread in ICC values between teachers in non-
Title I schools (0.1799) and those in Title I schools (0.2268) is largest in 2007–08. Thus, 
the school context for teachers in Title I schools appears to have gained importance over 
time in shaping teacher-perceived autonomy and is strongest in 2007–08, the year with 
the largest percentage of schools failing to make AYP (Usher, 2011). Taken together, the 
findings support a fuller investigation into the possible effects of SBA reforms, and more 
specifically NCLB, on teacher-perceived autonomy. The change in variability between 
Title I schools in average teacher-perceived autonomy, particularly between 2003-04 and 




understanding teacher-perceived autonomy. The full sample analyses section below 
addresses whether teachers in Title I schools perceive lower or higher average levels of 
autonomy compared to their colleagues in non-Title schools.  
As a whole, the descriptive analyses in this section indicate recent changes in the 
average levels of teacher-perceived autonomy, as well as increases in the variation 
around the average. Specifically, although teachers reported generally high levels in 
2007–08, the average level of autonomy in 2007–08 was lower than that in 2003–04. 
Moreover, the amount of variation about the means has increased over time. Further, 
school-level factors or context appear to explain more of the total variation in autonomy 
over time, which indicates that school-level characteristics, practices, policies, or 
combination thereof may have more of a role influencing teacher-perceived autonomy in 
2007–08 than in the 15 years prior.  
The remaining sections present findings for the analyses of the 2007–08 data to 
offer evidence of change in teacher-perceived autonomy based on specific teacher and 
school characteristics. There are six subsections in the succeeding section. The first four 
subsections present results for the full analytic sample, and the subsequent two 
subsections present results for two subsamples of the 2007-08 data. I split the data into 
“sanction” states and “non-sanction” states based on state-level treatment of the federal 
requirement to apply sanctions to Title I schools that fail to make AYP. 
Full Sample Analyses: 2007–08 
 Results from the descriptive analyses that examined teacher-perceived autonomy 
over the last two decades are important because they establish that teacher-perceived 




variability of teacher-perceived autonomy has increased over time and that the variation 
is increasingly between schools. However, these findings provide only a baseline 
description of changes and do not permit a more in-depth assessment of specific teacher-
level or school-level characteristics that may account for differences in perceived 
autonomy.  Such an analysis requires a more precise statistical method, like multilevel 
modeling. Although several characteristics are of interest in this study, of particular 
interest are the two indicators of AYP status: first-year failure and second-year or beyond 
failure. These indicators were not available prior to the 2007–08 SASS data file. Hence, 
the multilevel analyses are limited to the 2007–08 data.  
Descriptive statistics. To ground the HLM findings, Table 8 presents the mean, 
standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for the variables in the multilevel 
models. The weighted data represent a nationwide population of over 3 million teachers 
and nearly 91,000 schools. Just over 70 percent of the teachers in the weighted analytic 
sample teach “tested subjects” (e.g., English language arts, mathematics, and science), 44 
percent of whom teach elementary students and 26 percent of whom teach secondary 
students. The average years of teaching experience in the sample is 14 years, with 17 
percent of teachers who are novice teaches with only one, two, or three years of 
experience. Nearly 84 percent of teachers are white and 76 percent are female.  
At the school level, 24 percent of schools failed to make AYP for at least one year 
and 12 percent failed to make AYP for a second consecutive year or more. Thirty-three 
percent of schools have school-wide Title I status; 72 percent are elementary schools, 6 







Descriptive Statistics for the Analytic Sample: School Year 2007–08 
(Weighted statistics; unweighted sample sizes: Teacher N = 33,110; School N = 6,580) 





SD Min. Max. 
Assignment     
    Elementary – tested 44.25 - 0 1 
    Elementary – not tested 7.55 - 0 1 
    Secondary  - tested 26.16 - 0 1 
    Secondary - not tested 22.04 - 0 1 
Experience     
    Novice (less than or equal to 3 years) 16.74 - 0 1 
    More than 3 years 83.26 - 0 1 
Sex     
    Male 23.79 - 0 1 
    Female 76.21 - 0 1 
Race     
    All other races 16.12 - 0 1 
    White, non-Hispanic 83.88 - 0 1 
Perception of leadership quality (factor score) 0.05 0.91 -3.17 0.93 
Years of experience 13.66 10.46 1 52 
School characteristics     
AYP Status – Year 1 failure  24.12 - 0 1 
Needs Improvement Status – Year 2 failure 11.87 - 0 1 
Title I status 33.37 - 0 1 
School level     
    Elementary 71.59 - 0 1 
    Combined 5.73 - 0 1 
    Secondary 22.68 - 0 1 
Enrollment (number of students) 564.02 543.61 75 5000 
Minority student population 38.71 32.16 0 100 
Free- and reduced-price lunch population 45.55 26.30 0 100 
1Percentage unless otherwise stated. 
 
schools, and 23 percent are secondary schools. The average total school enrollment size 
for the sample is 564 students. The average proportion of minority and free- and reduced- 
priced lunch eligible students in a school are 39 percent and 46 percent, respectively. In 
addition to descriptive statistics for each variable, given the prominence of Title I and 




failure overlap in the data. Table 9 reports the intersection of these two statuses.  The 
results indicate that 30 percent of Title I schools failed to make AYP as did 21 percent of 
non-Title I schools.  
 
Table 9 
Title I Status by AYP Status: School Year 2007–08 
 
 
The descriptive statistics are important because they situate the analytic sample. 
For example, the overwhelming majorities of teachers are white, female, teach tested 
subjects and work in elementary schools. To move beyond descriptive statistics and 
toward statistical relationships one must use regression. As discussed in chapter 3, given 
the nested nature of teachers and schools and the desire to tease out school effects from 
teacher effects, the appropriate type of regression is multilevel regression. The 
paragraphs that follow discuss results from one teacher-level model and four multilevel 
models, including two models that I developed from split samples based on state sanction 
policies for AYP status.  
Multilevel model results. Table 10 presents three of five HLM models built with 
2007–08 data that answer the remaining research questions: For 2007–08, what school 
and teacher characteristics are associated with differences in teacher-perceived 
autonomy?; How do teachers who work in schools that made AYP perceive their 
autonomy compared to those who work in schools that did not make AYP?; and How do 










work in a school in the second year or later of failed AYP status? As a brief review, the 
conceptual underpinnings of the study include Dahl’s (1984) constructs of degree, scope, 
and domain. Degree reflects the extent to which one party may influence another in the 
power relationship; scope defines the issue or content over which an individual, group, or 
entity may have power; and domain indicates over whom or over what systems actors 





Table 10  






Intercept 0.28 *** 0.40 *** 0.40 ***
Teacher characteristics
Elementary_Tested subjects -0.69 *** -0.56 *** -0.56 ***
Elementary_Non-tested subjects 0.05 0.18 *** 0.18 ***
Secondary_Tested -0.39 *** -0.36 *** -0.36 ***
Female 0.00 0.01 0.01
Non-white -0.10 *** 0.00 0.00
Perception of leadership
b
0.26 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 ***
Novice (le 3 years) -0.04 * -0.07 ** -0.14 ***
Experience (years) 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 ***
School characteristics
Fail AYP -0.07 * -0.07 *
Needs Improvement -0.01 -0.01
Schl level - Elementary -0.31 *** -0.31 ***
Schl level - Combined 0.12 ** 0.12 **
Schoolwide Title 1 -0.06 * -0.07 *
Enrollment -0.08 *** -0.08 ***
% FRPL 0.00 0.00
% Minority -0.13 *** -0.13 ***
Ave schl perception of leader
b
0.19 *** 0.19 ***
Interaction Terms 
Novice * level (Elem) 0.14 **
Novice * level (Combined) -0.04
Random Effects
Intercept 0.20 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 ***
Perception of leadership 0.18 *** 0.18 ***
Novice 0.32 *** 0.32 ***
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
*p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .001; ***p ≤ .0001
a Coefficients reported in effect sizes. All continuous measures were standardized across the 
entire sample (M=0; SD=1).
b The perception of leadership measure is a factor score based on four categorical measures. The 





I discuss the findings for each of the three models in turn below. To parallel the structure 
of the research questions, I discuss the findings related to AYP separately from the 
findings of the other teacher and school characteristics.  
Teacher and school characteristics. Model 1 is the teacher-level model. This 
model indicates that without consideration of school characteristics, several teacher-level 
characteristics associate with teacher-perceived autonomy.
30
  
Model 1. On average, teachers that teach tested subjects perceive lower autonomy 
than those who teach non-tested subjects. Specifically, compared to teachers who teach 
secondary students in non-tested subjects (the reference group in the model), teachers 
who teach elementary students in tested subjects have a perception of autonomy that is 
lower by 69 percent of a standard deviation, and teachers who teach secondary students 
in tested subjects have a perception of autonomy that is lower by 39 percent of a standard 
deviation. In contrast, there is no significant difference in the perception of autonomy 
between teachers who teacher elementary or secondary students in non-tested subjects. 
Simply put, testing matters to teacher-perceived autonomy, and it matters more for 
elementary teachers than it does for secondary teachers.  
Also significant but smaller in magnitude are differences by race, perception of 
leadership, and experience levels. Compared to White teachers, non-White teachers 
perceive lower levels of autonomy in the classroom (by 10 percent of a standard 
deviation). As teacher perceptions of quality in their school leaders increase, so does their 
perception of autonomy (26 percent of a standard deviation). The more individual 
teachers perceive their principals as supportive, the more autonomy they perceive in the 
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classroom. Meanwhile, teachers who have a standard deviation above the average years 
of experience (13.66 years) perceive higher levels of autonomy (by 6 percent of a 
standard deviation). In general, the more experience teachers have, the higher their 
perceptions of autonomy. However, there is a unique effect of being a novice teacher (a 
teacher with 3 years or fewer of experience).  Novice teachers perceive lower autonomy 
than their non-novice peers by 4 percent of a standard deviation. This novice effect is 
over and above the experience effect.  In other words, teachers with less experience have 
a lower perception of autonomy, but if the teacher is also a novice teacher, the difference 
is even greater.  
As a whole, the teacher-level model indicates that testing and school leaders have 
substantive effects on teacher perceptions of autonomy in the classroom, and that 
experience and race play smaller but still statistically significant roles. I discuss novice 
findings in more detail in models 2 and 3 below, but the important takeaway from model 
1 is that the effect on autonomy for novice teachers includes two components: an 
experience differential between non-novice and novice status; as well as an effect from 
novice status itself. 
Model 2. The second model incorporates school-level variables into the analysis. 
Several school-level characteristics relate to teacher-perceived autonomy.
31
 On average 
and compared to secondary schools, teachers in elementary schools perceive 31 percent 
of a standard deviation less autonomy, and teachers in combined schools experience 12 
percent of a standard deviation more autonomy. Teachers who work in Title I schools 
perceive 6 percent of a standard deviation lower autonomy compared to teachers who 
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work in lower-poverty schools.  Teachers in schools with above-average total enrollment 
and above-average proportions of minority students perceive lower autonomy compared 
to those who teach in schools with average total and minority enrollment (by 8 percent 
and 13 percent of a standard deviation, respectively).  Meanwhile, positive effects 
associated with school-level variables exist for teaching in combined schools (compared 
to teaching in secondary schools) and in schools with an above-average schoolwide 
perception of leadership. In fact, even after controlling for the teacher-level perception of 
school leadership, teachers who work in a school with a collective perception of high-
quality leadership experience a substantive and statistically significant increase in their 
perceived autonomy (19 percent of a standard deviation). 
Compared to model 1, the school characteristics in model 2 alter several 
significance levels and the magnitudes for all but two
32
 teacher-level coefficients.  The 
race category loses significance; the category of teachers who teach elementary students 
in non-tested subjects becomes significant; and the novice category changes significance 
to the 0.001 alpha level. Regarding coefficients, although tested subjects at both grade 
levels continue to have large negative coefficients, the magnitudes for elementary has 
fallen by 0.13SD, while that for elementary non-tested has increased by 0.13SD. 
Essentially, by controlling for the elementary school level, the negative 0.56SD 
coefficient is the effect what remains for teachers of elementary students in tested 
subjects and the positive 0.18SD is what remains for teachers of elementary students in 
non-tested subjects. Thus, of teachers who teach elementary students, those who teach in 
tested subjects perceive lower autonomy on average compared to teachers who teach any 
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grade level in non-tested subjects by nearly 75 percent of a standard deviation.
33
 
Similarly, by 36 percent of a standard deviation, teachers of secondary students in tested 
subjects perceive lower autonomy compared to those who teach secondary students in 
non-tested subjects.  
On its own the coefficient for novice teachers in model 2 equates to lower 
autonomy by 7 percent of a standard deviation compared to non-novice teachers, and 
experience remains at 6 percent of a standard deviation. The experience measure 
represents average years expressed in standard deviations of experience across the 
sample. This standardized measure for experience complicates interpretation of the 
novice effect because any standardized measure has a mean of zero. For the experience 
measure, the zero value corresponds to teachers who have 13.66 years of experience (the 
weighted average across the sample). To be clear, one can interpret the estimated 
regression coefficient for experience as 6 percent of a standard deviation increase in 
perceived autonomy for each standard deviation increase in teaching experience. 
However, this finding applies to teachers of average experience. By definition, novice 
teachers (teachers with only one, two, or three years of experience) are well below the 
average, which means they are below the zero mean of the standardized experience 
variable and have less than the 0.06SD effect size for experience. To get to the standard 
deviation value of experience for novice teachers requires identification of the mean 
values associated with each year of novice status.  
Table 11 details how I arrived at the net effect of novice status for model 2 given 
the presence of a standardized experience measure in the model. A novice teacher with 
one year of experience would have a negative 1.23 standardized value for experience. 
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The negative 1.23SD value converts the experience effect for first-year novice teachers 
















coefficient = Net effect  
1 -1.23 0.06 -0.08   -0.07   -0.15 
2 -1.14 0.06 -0.07   -0.07   -0.14 
3 -1.04 0.06 -0.06   -0.07   -0.13 
4 -0.95 0.06 -0.06   0.00   -0.06 
14 0.00 0.06 0.00   0.00   0.00 
25 1.06 0.06 0.07   0.00   0.07 
 
To arrive at a net effect of experience and novice status of -0.15SD, the first-year 
teacher carries the -0.07SD effect from the novice coefficient in addition to the -0.08SD 
for experience. In other words compared to a non-novice teacher with average 
experience, a first-year teacher perceives lower autonomy by 15 percent of a standard 
deviation. Alternatively, a teacher who is one year past the novice stage (with four years 
of experience) still has a negative experience effect similar to that of novice teachers, but 
does not have an additional effect associated with novice status; however, a teacher who 
has 25 year experience is well above the average experience effect and has a positive 
experience effect of 7 percent of a standard deviation. 
In addition to the fixed effects discussed above, model 2 includes random effects 
for novice status and perception of leadership. Both measures significantly vary across 
school settings. The random variation signifies that novice teachers’ experience level 
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affects teacher-perceived autonomy differently in different schools, as do teachers’ 
perceptions of their school leaders. In sum, model 2 echoes the model 1 finding that 
teachers in tested subjects perceive lower autonomy compared to those who teach non-
tested subjects and teachers with less experience, particularly novice teachers, perceive 
lower levels of autonomy compared to those with more experience. The random effects 
highlight a series of possible school-level effects (which I  discuss later), including grade 
structure, school size, student enrollment characteristics, Title I and AYP statuses, and 
extend the positive teacher-level leadership effect to include an additional schoolwide 
leadership effect.  
Model 3. The third model includes all measures from model 2 as well as an 
interaction term for novice by school level (novice by elementary and novice by 
combined) that attempts to account for some of the variability detected in the random 
effect for novice teachers.
35
 The interaction term enables the model to separate the novice 
effect for teachers in elementary and combined schools from those in secondary schools. 
Coefficients in model 3 do not change from those in model 2 with the exception of the 
novice main effect (-0.07 SD to -0.14 SD) and the significant coefficient for the 
interaction of novice status and elementary level. Just as the experience measure in model 
2 complicates the interpretation of the novice effect, the interaction in model 3 requires 
careful dissection to understand the overall effect for novice teachers by school level.  
Without an interaction term, the novice main effect from model 3 would indicate 
that compared to teachers with average experience, novice teachers perceive lower 
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Unfortunately, the models in this study do not capture the characteristic(s) that are the source of school-
level variation. Nonetheless, the presence of the leadership measure in the random effects statement makes 




autonomy by 14 percent of a standard deviation. Likewise, the school-level main effects 
would indicate that, regardless of experience, teachers who work in elementary schools 
perceive lower autonomy by 31 percent of a standard deviation compared to teachers who 
work in secondary schools, whereas those who work in combined schools perceive higher 
autonomy by 12 percent of a standard deviation. However, the addition of the interaction 
terms changes the interpretation of these main effects for novice and for school level. 
Effectively, the interaction term indicates that novice teachers who teach in elementary 
schools perceive autonomy no differently than do their more experienced peers. Thus, the 
novice effect occurs only for teachers who teach at the secondary level.  
Table 12 details the novice effect for secondary teachers. To calculate the effect 
of novice teachers in secondary schools one must include the experience effect, the 
novice main effect, and the novice interaction effect. The first three columns of the table 
correspond to the experience effect for novice teachers and mimic Table 11 values.  
 
Table 12  















1 -1.24 0.06 -0.08 1 -0.14 -0.21
2 -1.14 0.06 -0.07 1 -0.14 -0.21
3 -1.04 0.06 -0.06 1 -0.14 -0.20
4 -0.95 0.06 -0.06 0 -0.14 -0.06
14 0.00 0.06 0.00 0 -0.14 0.00




The addition of the interaction term in model 3 increases the novice effect from negative 
0.07SD to negative 0.14SD. However as the interaction term shows, this is neither a 
uniform effect for novice teachers, nor is it the final effect given the experience measure 
in the model. The experience effect for a first-year secondary teacher is -0.08SD and the 
main effect for novice status is -0.14SD. Combined, these effects indicate that, on 
average, a first-year novice teacher who works in a secondary school perceives lower 
autonomy by 21 percent of a standard deviation compared to secondary school teacher 
with average experience. 
AYP status. Research question 2 asks how SBA reform, represented by a schools 
NCLB AYP status in 2007-08, associates with teacher-perceived autonomy in the 
classroom domain, and its sub-questions ask about the relationship specific to teacher-
perceived autonomy and AYP status. In addition to the teacher and school characteristics 
discussed in the previous section, models 2 and 3 also include school-level variables for 
AYP failure in year one (Fail) and AYP failure for two consecutive years or more (Needs 
Improvement). As discussed earlier, two consecutive years of AYP failure trigger 
sanctions, which include the label of Needs Improvement for the school after the second 
year of failed AYP status.  For both multilevel models, AYP status negatively relates to 
teacher-perceived autonomy. All else being equal, on average teachers who work in 
schools during the first year of AYP failure perceive lower autonomy by 7 percent of a 
standard deviation compared to those in schools that made AYP. In contrast, the 
perceived autonomy of teachers working in Needs Improvement schools was not 
statistically significantly different from the perceived autonomy of teachers in schools 




teachers in schools that face sanctions due to at least two consecutive years of failure do 
not have different perceptions of autonomy compared to teachers in schools that made 
AYP.  
Subsample analyses: 2007–08 
To capture the AYP status and sanction relationship outlined in the empirical 
framework for the 2007-08 data and to incorporate state-level treatment of AYP 
sanctions, I split the sample according state-level treatment of NCLB-required sanctions 
for schools that fail to make AYP (“sanction sample” and “non-sanction sample”). 
Thirty-two states
36
 apply sanctions to all schools that fail to make AYP regardless of Title 
I status, which equates to a sanction sample of 78 percent of teachers nationwide; but 
only 19 states (22 percent of teachers nationwide) apply sanctions just to Title I schools 
that fail to make AYP. In the subsequent two sections I present descriptive statistics of 
the two subsamples, results from the multilevel regression model for each sample, and a 
discussion of how the regression results by state sanction policy differ from the full 
model and from one another. 
Descriptive results. Table 13 lists the descriptive statistics for each subsample.  
Considering that the subsample for teachers in the sanction sample is more than three-
quarters of the full sample, it is not surprising that few statistically significant 
differences
37
 exist between the composition of the full analytic data and the sanction 
subsample. At the teacher level, the sanction subsample has slightly fewer White teachers 
and has teachers with slightly lower average experience compared to the analytic sample. 
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Descriptive Statistics for Subsamples by State Sanction Policies:  
School Year 2007–08 






          Sanction 







Assignment   
    Elementary – tested 44.50 43.35 
    Elementary – not tested 7.02 9.44 
    Secondary  - tested 26.53 24.81 
    Secondary - not tested 21.95 22.40 
Experience   
    Novice (less than or equal to 3 years) 17.21 15.06 
    More than 3 years 82.79 84.94 
Sex   
    Male 23.64 24.32 
    Female 76.36 75.68 
Race   
    All other races 18.82 6.36 
    White, non-Hispanic 81.18 93.64 
Perception of leadership quality (factor score) 0.05 0.02 
Years of experience
5, 6
 13.46 14.39 
School characteristics   
AYP Status – Year 1 failure  25.06 21.00 
Needs Improvement Status – Year 2 failure 12.40 10.14 
Title I status 37.00 21.40 
School level   
    Elementary 72.23 69.50 
    Combined 5.15 7.64 
    Secondary 22.62 22.87 
Enrollment (number of students)
 7
 589.95 478.61 
Minority student population 42.78 25.32 
Free- and reduced-price lunch population 47.60 38.80 
1
Percentage unless otherwise stated.  
2
Minimum and maximum values equal full sample unless otherwise stated. 
3
Sanction: weighted statistics; unweighted sample sizes: teacher N=20,940; school N=4,250 
4
Sanction Title I Only: weighted statistics; unweighted sample sizes: teacher N=12,170; school N=2,330 
5
 Sanction all: Minimum=1, Maximum=51 
6
 Sanction Title I only: Minimum=1, Maximum=52
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In contrast, numerous differences exist between the full sample and the non-
sanction subsample, particularly at the school level. The non-sanction subsample contains 
slightly more teachers of elementary students in non-tested subjects, nearly 12 percent 
more White teachers, and teachers with slightly higher average years of experience. 
Compared to the analytic sample at the school level, the non-sanction sample contains 
smaller proportions of Title I schools and higher proportions of combined schools, as 
well as schools with lower average total, minority, and free- and reduced-price lunch 
enrollments. In sum, compared to the full sample, both subsamples differ by types of 
schools and by types of teachers, particularly by minority enrollment and the race of the 
teachers.  
The two samples differ from one another along three teacher-level and all school-
level characteristics. The non-sanction subsample has more teachers who teach 
elementary non-tested subjects, who are White, and who have, on average, an additional 
year of experience. But aside from a higher proportion of combined schools, all school-
level characteristics are measurably lower for the non-sanction sample. Specifically, the 
non-sanction sample has smaller proportions of schools that do not make AYP, that are in 
Needs Improvement status, that are elementary schools, and that have lower average 
total, minority, and free- and reduced-price lunch enrollments. Simply put, on average, 
the non-sanction subsample has more high-performing schools with less diverse student 
populations taught by more White and more experienced teachers. 
Multilevel model results. Table 14 presents the results of the multilevel model 
analysis for the full sample (model 3 from Table 10) and for each of the two subsamples. 




the full model (model 3).
 38,39 
Considering the general lack of descriptive differences 
between the full sample and the sanctions subsample, one would expect similarities 
between the two models. In fact, the only statistical difference between the full sample 
and the subsample for non-sanction states is the intercept. Essentially, the difference 
between the two intercepts indicates that compared to the full sample, the baseline value 
of teacher-perceived autonomy in the non-sanction sample is higher after controlling for 
all teacher and school characteristics in the model. Simply put, teachers in the non-
sanction sample have higher average perceived autonomy than do those in the full 
sample. 
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Table 14  
 
Multilevel Models for Scope and Degree of Teacher-Perceived Autonomy in the 




Intercept 0.40 *** 0.33 *** 0.53 ***
Teacher characteristics
Elementary_Tested subjects -0.56 *** -0.56 *** -0.59 ***
Elementary_Non-tested subjects 0.18 *** 0.20 *** 0.09
Secondary_Tested -0.36 *** -0.37 *** -0.35 ***
Female 0.01 0.03 -0.04
Non-white 0.00 0.00 -0.05
Perception of leadership
b
0.26 *** 0.27 *** 0.21 ***
Novice (le 3 years) -0.14 *** -0.15 *** -0.11
Experience (years) 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 0.09 ***
School characteristics
Fail AYP -0.07 * -0.05 -0.09 *
Needs Improvement -0.01 0.00 -0.04
Schl level - Elementary -0.31 *** -0.30 *** -0.34 ***
Schl level - Combined 0.12 ** 0.06 0.17 **
Schoolwide Title 1 -0.07 * -0.03 -0.14 **
Enrollment -0.08 *** -0.06 *** -0.10 ***
% FRPL 0.00 -0.01 0.03
% Minority -0.13 *** -0.10 *** -0.16 ***
Ave schl perception of leader
b
0.19 *** 0.22 *** 0.13 ***
Interaction Terms 
Novice * level (Elem) 0.14 ** 0.13 * 0.16 *
Novice * level (Combined) -0.04 0.01 -0.07
Random Effects
Intercept 0.18 *** 0.18 *** 0.15 ***
Perception of leadership 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.12 ***
Novice 0.32 *** 0.32 *** 0.28 ***






*p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .001; ***p ≤ .0001
a Coefficients reported in effect sizes. All continuous measures were standardized across the 
entire sample (M=0; SD=1).
b The perception of leadership measure is a factor score based on four categorical measures. The 





In contrast to the comparisons between the subsamples and the full sample, 
several differences exist between coefficients from the split models. Specifically, 
although estimates for teachers of elementary students in non-tested subjects and for 
novice teachers are not statistically significant in the non-sanction model, AYP status, 
combined schools, and schools with schoolwide Title I status are statistically significant. 
Thus, in the non-sanction subsample, on average teachers of elementary students in non-
tested subjects do not differ from those who teach secondary students in non-tested 
subjects, and novice teachers do not differ from those who have average levels of 
experience. Further, on average teachers in schools that failed to make AYP perceive 9 
percent of a standard deviation lower autonomy compared to those who work in schools 
that made AYP, and teachers in Title I schools perceive 14 percent of a standard 
deviation lower autonomy compared to those in non-Title I schools. Teachers in 
combined schools, on average perceive 17 percent of a standard deviation higher 
autonomy compared to those in secondary schools. 
For those characteristics that maintained their statistical significance in both 
models, the magnitude of several point-estimates changed. In particular, teacher-level 
point-estimate differences include experience (increase from 0.05 SD to 0.09 SD) and 
perception of leadership (decrease from 0.27 SD to 0.21 SD). Differences in magnitude 
for school-level point-estimates include average total enrollment (absolute increase from 
-0.06 SD to -0.10 SD), average minority enrollment (absolute increase from -0.10 SD to  
-0.16 SD), and average school perception of leadership quality (decrease from 0.22 SD to 
0.13 SD). Although the statistical significance of these differentials is not conclusive, the 




in schools that operate in sanction states, as experience increases teachers in schools in 
states that sanction only Title I schools perceive higher autonomy; and as average total 
and average minority enrollments increase, these teachers perceive lower autonomy. 
Further, teacher perception of school leaders at both the individual and school levels 
remains positive but has a reduced effect on perceived autonomy.  
Summary of results  
The findings detailed above encompass the teacher-level and school-level 
characteristics that affect teachers’ perceptions of autonomy. At the teacher level, these 
characteristics include teaching assignment (tested versus non-tested), experience level 
(both novice status and years of experience), and perception of school leadership quality; 
at the school level, the characteristics that influence autonomy include the level taught 
(elementary, combined, and secondary), total and minority enrollment, perception of 
leadership quality, Title I status and AYP status.  
Specific to the teacher level, across the full and subsample models, on average 
teachers who teach elementary students in tested subjects perceive nearly 60 percent of a 
standard deviation lower autonomy than do those who teach secondary students in non-
tested subjects. The pattern contrasts sharply for elementary teachers of non-tested 
subjects. On average, teachers of elementary students in non-tested subjects perceive 
higher autonomy compared to secondary teachers in non-tested subjects; however, this 
relationship does not hold in the non-sanction subsample, where there is no difference for 
teachers in non-tested subjects by level. Across all three models, on average teachers who 
teach secondary students in tested subjects perceive about 36 percent of a standard 




Meanwhile, novice teachers in elementary schools do not perceive autonomy differently 
than do those with between 3 and 14 years of experience, but novice and non-novice 
teachers alike perceive autonomy differently from non-novice teachers in secondary 
schools. The findings related to leadership, at the teacher and school levels, emphasize 
that school leaders have a moderate to large effect on teacher-perceived autonomy in the 
classroom. Teachers perceive higher autonomy in the classroom in schools where they 
perceive that the leaders are of high quality. Across all models, teacher-perceived 
autonomy is lower in schools with above average total school enrollment and percentage 
of minority enrollment. 
Regarding AYP status and Title I status, key differences exist between the full 
and non-sanction models and the sanction model. Specifically, the full and non-sanction 
models indicate that teachers who work in schools that do not make AYP perceive lower 
autonomy compared to those who work in schools that did make AYP, while the sanction 
model indicates no difference on teacher-perceived autonomy based on AYP status. 
Similarly, compared to teachers who teach in lower-poverty schools, those who work in 
Title I schools perceive lower autonomy in both the full model and non-sanction models; 
whereas, teachers in Title I schools from the sanction model perceived no difference in 
autonomy from those who work in non-Title I schools.  
The next and final chapter of this dissertation offers reflections on key findings 
for this study. Specifically, I discuss how these findings support or contradict prior 
research, what future researchers might learn from this study and advance in their own 





Chapter 5: Discussion  
This dissertation investigated hypotheses related to SBA reform and changes in 
teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom. Specifically, I hypothesized that teacher-
perceived autonomy had changed over time and that for teachers in 2007-08, certain 
teacher and school characteristics related to lower levels of autonomy. The research 
questions reflected these hypotheses. In this chapter, I discuss the overarching findings 
from the study and how the findings corroborate or contradict existing research. In 
general, I discuss the findings from the full sample and then findings from the subsample 
models. However, where findings hold across all models, I discuss the findings 
concurrently. I follow the findings discussion with implications for future research. 
Discussion of the over-time hypothesis 
The first question addresses the hypothesis that teacher-perceived autonomy has 
changed since the introduction of SBA reform policies in public schools and includes 
over-time and point-in-time perspectives. To address the over-time analysis, I use data 
from four waves of SASS (1993–94, 1999–2000, 2003–04, and 2007–08). I find that on 
average teachers perceive high levels of autonomy in the classroom. In fact, on a 
summative scale for each year that ranges from 6 to 24, most teachers fall near the 20 
mark in each of the four data points. Although the averages offer a consistent pattern 
across time, they may be misleading for two reasons. First, one cannot directly compare 
the means across all data points because although the underlying psychometric properties 
are consistent across SASS administrations the scales are not equivalent between years. 
Second, just as NCLB brought to the fore the notion that average achievement values can 




values of teacher-perceived autonomy can mask variation across teacher types and school 
contexts.  
To overcome the concerns regarding the average values, I employed CV and ICC 
statistics to determine whether the variation in teacher-perceived autonomy had changed 
over time. Indeed it had. Total variation in teacher-perceived autonomy increased from 
1993 to 2008, as did variation due to school characteristics. In 1993-94, 12 percent of the 
variation in teacher-perceived autonomy was due to school context; whereas in 2007–08 
nearly 21 percent was attributable to school context. Simply, over 15 years, school 
context has more influence on teachers’ perceptions of their autonomy.  
 The finding that school context had a significantly increased role in 2007–08, 
compared to each of the three prior academic years may not be surprising. SBA reform is 
a top-down approach to standardize the education delivery system (Boyd, Lankford, 
Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005; Manna, 2006b). By definition, the policymakers and 
organizations at the top would influence the policy recipients at the bottom. Further, the 
finding is consistent with Ingersoll’s (2003) finding that schools influenced teacher 
autonomy through bureaucratic controls and mechanisms of teacher accountability.  
Indeed, if SBA implementation creates the desired outcomes, even in part, Dahl’s power-
influence constructs of scope, degree, and domain help us unpack how the organization 
(i.e., schools) increases influence over the individual (i.e., teacher) as policy 
implementation progresses. School-level curricular and accountability changes would 
widen the school-level scope of influence over the classroom domain and reduce the 




included areas historically left to teachers, such as student grading and evaluation or the 
teaching techniques employed. 
 Although I am able to offer empirical and conceptual evidence that associate the 
changes in teacher-perceived autonomy with SBA reform initiatives, the evidence for this 
association is circumstantial. The ICC models are not causal and do not control for other 
possible explanations of change. Thus, I cannot definitively state that SBA reforms led to 
the change in teacher-perceived autonomy during the time points between 1993 and 
2008. Nonetheless, I can state the following: first, that between 2003-04 and 2007-08, the 
average perception of teacher autonomy fell slightly (based on mean values); second, that 
over time teachers increasingly varied from one another regarding perceptions of 
autonomy (based on the CV results); third, that school context increased in import from 
1993-94 to 2007-08 related to teacher-perceived autonomy to indicate that forces other 
than teacher characteristics were involved in shaping teacher perceptions of their own 
autonomy (based on ICC results); and fourth, that the variability in teacher-perceived 
autonomy in Title I schools increased more so than it did compared to non-Title I schools 
(based on Title I ICC results).  These four findings suggest a systemic change in public 
schools and one that may not be uniform in its implementation. 
Discussion of the differential hypotheses  
Specific to NCLB and 2007-08, I hypothesized that changes in teacher-perceived 
autonomy differed based on teacher and school characteristics, such as teacher 
experience, teacher assignment, school-level poverty, and school-level academic 
achievement. To complete these analyses, I used HLM to tease out specific school- and 




isolate the influence of school-level effects on teacher characteristics. While I examined 
several teacher and school characteristics, I discuss the more salient topics in turn below. 
Tested subjects and teacher-perceived autonomy. The findings in the full 
model, the sanction subsample model, and the non-sanction subsample model (models 3, 
4 and 5, respectively) suggest that teacher-perceived autonomy differs substantially based 
on whether one teaches a tested subject. Again, examples of tested subjects are English 
and mathematics; examples of non-tested are arts and physical education. The difference 
made by teaching a tested subject is both the largest effect in the study and the most 
telling of what SBA reform has brought to schools. These models reveal large (from one-
third to two-thirds of a standard deviation) and systemic differences between teacher-
perceived autonomy based on teaching assignments. The finding that testing has an 
inverse relationship to teacher autonomy is congruent with prior scholarship that cites 
teachers’ negative perceptions of the testing element of SBA (Abrams et al., 2003; 
Crocco & Costigan, 2007; Deniston and Gerrity, 2010; Luna and Turner, 2001; Mathison 
and Freeman, 2003); however, the magnitude of the finding is a contribution of this 
study. 
In part, I interpret the large tested-subjects effect in this study as an indicator of 
curriculum effects, particularly in districts where schools leaders cooperate fully with 
external mandates (Hamilton, 2003; Valli, et al., 2008). That is, part of the large effect 
size for tested subjects may reflect the overall curricular changes that result from the 
contents and demands of the standardized test regimen. To illustrate, a district mandates a 
standardized curriculum in all tested subjects. In this district an arts teacher (non-tested 




as a teacher in a tested subject such as science or math. While an arts teacher may 
perceive general changes at the school, a science teacher—whose students are tested— 
may experience direct effects of SBA reform. Rather than offering teachers suggested 
instructional lessons in science, the district SBA-inspired curriculum may prescribe 
curricular content and instructional methods for the science teacher. In this district, and 
based on the definition of scope of power in this study,
40
 the tested-subject effect would 
reflect  narrowed scope of power over the classroom domain for teachers of tested 
subjects in the areas of textbook selection; teaching technique selection; and content, 
topics, and skills selection at the very least.  For the science teacher, a diminished scope 
of power over these areas would decrease his or her perception of autonomy in the 
classroom domain in ways that might not affect the arts teacher. 
I contend that the tested-subject effect also demonstrates a circumstance of 
inequity in the SBA reforms, as adopted and applied in NCLB. Given the stark 
differential effect on perceived autonomy between teachers in non-tested subjects and 
those in tested subjects, the tested-subject effect exposes a disproportionate application of 
accountability such that teachers who opt to teach core subjects (as defined by NCLB) 
perceive declines in classroom autonomy where teachers who do not teach core subjects 
do not perceive a decline in classroom autonomy. The condition where some teachers 
perceive lower autonomy based on assignment seems not only unsustainable from a labor 
market perspective, but also counterproductive for the standards movement. Akin to 
earlier federal education policies, NCLB does target specific student populations (e.g., 
high-poverty). However, it seems that the perception of lower autonomy in the classroom 
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by specific types of teachers based on assignment should not be part of the targeted effort 
encapsulated in NCLB. If SBA reforms aspire to ensure consistent content and 
performance standards for students, difficulty may arise if the delivery of that 
standardized education disproportionately affects teachers based on assignment. 
Experience levels and teacher-perceived autonomy. A second teacher-level 
finding regarding the differential hypotheses relates to novice status and experience in 
general. Similar to findings from studies reviewed in chapter 2,  findings for novice 
teachers in the full and sanction models in this study indicate that novice teachers 
perceive lower autonomy than their non-novice colleagues based not only on novice 
teachers’ inexperience, but also on the level of the school in which they teach. Novice 
teachers in secondary schools perceive lower autonomy compared to their non-novice 
peers, while all elementary school teachers perceive lower autonomy compared to non-
novice secondary school teachers. The experience effect, which holds across all models, 
complements the novice findings because for teachers with average experience (13.66 
years), as their experience increases so does their perceived autonomy.  The findings 
regarding levels of experience and grade level are congruent with prior studies in which 
newer teachers and elementary school teachers perceive lower autonomy than their 
colleagues with more experience or their peers who teach in secondary schools 
(Allensworth, E., Ponisciak, S., & Mazzeo, C; Perrow; and Pearson, 1995). I suggest that 
the findings related to novice status and average experience may be more a function of 
overall levels of experience than of SBA reform, particularly since the larger effect of 
inexperience is at the secondary level where SBA reform policies tend to be less intensive 




In contrast, the finding that elementary school teachers perceive lower autonomy 
compared to those who teach in secondary schools aligns with the testing effect because 
NCLB requires annualized standardized tests in third through eighth grade but makes 
fewer testing demands in higher grades. Further, the finding at the elementary level is 
consistent across the three models. That is, on average teachers in elementary schools 
perceive lower autonomy than those in secondary schools. The effect of the elementary 
school level on teachers substantiates the findings from the ICC analyses that school 
context plays an important role in teacher-perceived autonomy. The power-influence 
framework helps explain the elementary school finding. If schools widen their scope and 
augment their degree of power over the classroom domain to implement NCLB while 
teachers concomitantly experience a decrease in their perceived autonomy, then one 
might explain the perception of decreased autonomy as a diminished scope and 
diminished degree of power over the classroom domain due to competitive claims on 
school goals (Leiter, 1981).  
School leadership and teacher-perceived autonomy. A third salient teacher-
level finding is the large effect for teacher perception of school leadership. The 
magnitude of the leadership effect is noteworthy. Consistently, the models indicate that as 
teachers’ favorable perception of their leader increases, so does their perceived 
autonomy. This finding aligns with what one would expect given prior studies. 
Specifically, prior research has documented that principals can protect teachers from 
external influences that may alter teachers’ scope of influence. Conversely, principals can 




deem intrusive because of realized or potential narrowed teacher scope over the 
classroom domain (Allensworth et al., 2009; Hanson, 2006; Leiter, 1981).  
The school-level leadership effect bolsters the teacher-level leadership effect 
because even after controlling for individual teacher perceptions of leadership, in each 
model the collective school-average perception of leadership influences teacher-
perceived autonomy. As average school-level favorable perceptions of the school leader 
increase, so does perceived autonomy. During the NCLB implementation process, it is 
reasonable to suggest that principals have become even more central as arbiters of 
external policy. The positive association of both individual and collective school 
leadership to teacher-perceived autonomy can play out in at least two scenarios: one, in 
which teachers support the changes that principals enact; two, in which teachers value 
their principals who, for good or for ill, avoid and buffer external intervention where 
possible.  
Although the leadership effect remains positive, differences between the sanction 
and non-sanction models may reflect back to the tested-subject effect discussed above. It 
is noteworthy that in the non-sanction model the leadership effect at both the teacher and 
school level is lower than it is in the sanction model, while the tested-subject effect 
remains at nearly 60 percent of a standard deviation.
41
 Effectively, school leadership has 
less influence on teacher-perceived autonomy in non-sanction states but the tested-subject 
effect holds its large and negative relationship with teacher-perceived autonomy for both 
subsamples. It is possible that teachers who work in schools in non-sanction states either 
do not feel as protected from external demands, such as adoption of district curriculum; 
or that teachers in these schools perceive a disorganized or ineffectual response from 
                                                 
41




their school leaders. Thus, while still important to teachers, leadership is not as influential 
to teacher-perceived autonomy in these schools as it is in the sanction sample.  
This study does not tease out the motivation behind the relationship between 
leadership and teacher-perceived autonomy.  However, it documents the extension of the 
leadership effect using the nationally representative 2007-08 data to corroborate existing 
evidence that suggests that principals matter a great deal to teacher autonomy. In sum, 
teachers perceive higher levels of autonomy in schools where they perceive high-quality 
leaders.    
Title I status and teacher-perceived autonomy. Title I findings provide 
compelling school-level findings regarding the notion that teachers in different types of 
schools experience autonomy differently, particularly when one examines the ICC and 
HLM findings in tandem. Figure 7 shows the ICC for Title I schools as 23 percent in 
2007-08, which was higher than prior years and higher than non-Title I schools. Model 3 
(the full sample) in Table 14 lists a negative effect (-.07SD) for teacher-perceived 
autonomy for teachers who work in Title I schools. The effect is even stronger for those 
who work in Title I schools in states that sanction only Title I schools (-.14SD). Taken 
together, these findings indicate that the increase in variance between Title I schools in 
2007-08 corresponds with a lower average teacher perception of autonomy in Title I 
schools that operate in states that sanction only Title I schools. Simply, in states that do 
not apply accountability measures (i.e., sanctions) more broadly across all schools, 
teachers in Title I schools perceive lower autonomy.   
 The effect of Title I status is important from a policy standpoint because, like the 




result in a system of accountability that targets certain teachers and schools to the 
exclusion of others. While accountability and standardization are goals of SBA in general 
and NCLB specifically, the privileging or targeting of some subjects or school settings 
over others may have real effects on teacher-perceived autonomy and, in turn, on teacher 
job satisfaction and turnover. Further evidence that an inequitable application of 
accountability may be at play is evidenced by the lack of difference in teacher-perceived 
autonomy between teachers in Title I schools and non-Title schools in those states that 
sanction all schools regardless of Title I status. Effectively, these states have balanced the 
accountability equation. Policymakers may want to consider the findings related to Title I 
(and AYP discussed in detail below) between the sanction and non-sanction models as 
they work toward ESEA reauthorization. 
AYP Status and teacher-perceived autonomy. Both parts of the second 
research question concern AYP status, the direct measure of SBA reform in NCLB. At 
the start of this study, I anticipated a moderate to large AYP effect on teacher-perceived 
autonomy. Further, I hypothesized that the AYP effect would hold, if not increase, for 
schools in need of improvement (i.e., in the sanction phase of NCLB). To the contrary, 
the AYP effect is small and inconsistent and the Needs Improvement effect is 
nonexistent. Although on average, AYP has an inverse relationship with teacher-
perceived autonomy for the full sample, given the results from the subsample analyses it 
appears that the inverse relationship is in part due to the variance between teachers in 
sanction states and those in non-sanction states. Specifically, teachers in sanction states 
who work in schools that fail to make AYP perceive autonomy no differently from those 




work in schools that failed AYP perceive slightly less autonomy than those who work in 
schools that met AYP. 
 Both the pattern of the AYP effect and the relatively small magnitude (less than 
10 percent of a standard deviation in both models) of the effect are surprising. The 
sanction subsample contains all states that have decided to apply NCLB sanctions to 
schools that fail AYP regardless of Title I status. Hence, the null finding regarding Title I 
status in this subsample makes sense. However, I expected teachers in these states to 
perceive lower autonomy from AYP given that the threat of sanctions applies to all 
schools. Compared to prior renditions of ESEA, NCLB brings more intense federal focus 
to accountability through sanctions. The power-influence constructs might indicate that 
federal actors have widened their scope of power over schools by using the sanction 
lever. Again, the model did register an effect (although not causal) for AYP status and 
teacher-perceived autonomy in the full sample, but given the state policy regarding 
sanctions, the findings in the two subsample models are counter-intuitive.  Before I 
explore the possible explanations for the AYP effects (or lack thereof), I will discuss the 
Needs Improvement results because it is reasonable that the explanations for these two 
sets of AYP findings relate to one another.  
Findings regarding to the Needs Improvement AYP status were surprising based 
on my hypothesis that teachers who worked in schools that failed to make AYP would 
perceive lower autonomy compared to those who worked in schools that did not fail to 
make AYP. After controlling for teacher- and school-level characteristics, as well as AYP 
status in the first year, teachers who worked in schools that failed to meet AYP for two or 




worked in schools that met AYP. Simply, AYP made a small difference to teacher 
perceptions in a specific setting but only in the first year of failure. I offer three 
suggestive scenarios grounded in the reviewed literature and theoretical framework of 
this study to explain the AYP and Needs Improvement findings.  
First, I suggest the low effect, or lack thereof, for AYP and Needs Improvement 
might be a signal of capacity. Elmore (2002) explains that the result of historic state and 
local control over education is that respective resources, activities, and efforts did not 
build a cohesive institutional capacity to “monitor and improve teaching and learning,” 
(p. 35). In other words, states, districts, and schools separately built the capacity needed 
to either deliver education, assess education, or some combination thereof, but the local 
level capacity building may have impeded a coherent system wide ability to improve 
education. Thus, no capacity that spans state, local, and school levels exists to translate 
assessment into improvement for teachers or students. For example, states focused on 
instructional delivery through monitoring of teacher education programs; districts 
focused on professional development programs, staffing, and curricula. School staff 
worked to master instruction, whether through adoption and delivery of curricula or 
through strategies that would lead to strong tests scores. In states that opted to sanction 
any school that failed AYP, it is reasonable to consider that where they had high levels of 
failure (such as Kentucky and California), the SEA was not able to muster enough 
resources to follow through on the enforcement of sanctions in all schools that failed 
AYP.  
System-wide capacity issues may influence teacher-perceived autonomy such that 




with minimal disruption to the workplace, teachers do not perceive diminished autonomy 
in the classroom because their scope and degree of autonomy remains as it had been. The 
realization at the local level that the state level lacked capacity quite possibly squelches 
the sting of the failed AYP status. Similarly, if teachers work to avoid AYP failure but 
despite their best efforts the school did not make AYP, teachers may perceive that the 
district, the state, or the combination thereof did not have the organizational capacity to 
raise scores. Teachers may externalize the failure. For example, teachers may perceive 
school failure as the district lacking capacity to offer training and supports that teachers 
might need; and that the SEA did not have the financial resources, instructional expertise, 
or qualified personnel to target at these schools. Thus, teachers would not internalize 
continued failure because the fault may lie with issues beyond their purview. In this case, 
teachers would conduct their classes with the same levels of perceived autonomy as they 
had prior to the Needs Improvement phase of AYP.   
  A second scenario involves the position that states take regarding NCLB 
implementation. Since the first year of NCLB, states have sought waivers to opt out of or 
transform aspects of the Act related to definitions and assessment of AYP status.
42
 I 
hypothesize that regardless of the outcome of the waiver request, the availability of said 
process evokes the Cuban (1990) perspective of education reform in which state, district, 
and school staff recognize that the education reforms, including NCLB, are not resolute 
because of the decoupled nature of the education system. Further, like many reforms that 
came before, the more contested notions of NCLB (i.e., AYP sanctions) will either 
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change to fit prior practice or will dissolve altogether due to the lack of state-level 
compliance that federal actors need to legitimize and implement the Act.  
 The final scenario, and perhaps the most likely, is that the sanctions most 
commonly implemented for AYP failure do not influence teacher perceptions of 
autonomy. Detailed in Table 1, the first year sanction is school choice for students in the 
failed school; the second year sanction adds supplemental education services.
43
 The 
school transfer sanction is a district- and school-level sanction that would not necessarily 
register with an autonomy construct confined to classroom activities like textbook 
selection and homework assignment. Similarly, the supplemental services sanction is at 
the school level in that school leaders must find providers to deliver the services which 
take place outside of classroom hours. Thus, quite possibly teachers do not perceive any 
change to their autonomy in the classroom domain due specifically to NCLB sanctions 
that schools enact outside of that domain. 
Concluding remarks.  
Taken together, the findings in this study indicate that SBA reform does indeed 
influence teacher-perceived autonomy. The theory of action of SBA is that systemic 
reform which aligns standards, content, and assessment will lead to measurable 
improvement in student achievement. Testing is an integral part of SBA reform, be it 
low- or high-stakes, federal or state sponsored. Considering SBA’s focus on 
standardization, curricular alignment, and accountability, the findings from this study, 
such as those for teaching in tested subjects and Title I schools, indicate that SBA 
reforms, and NCLB specifically, have influences on public education that include 
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changes to teacher-perceived autonomy in the classroom. However, the study found a 
differential effect of SBA’s influence on teacher-perceived autonomy that may be an 
unintended consequence due to the structure of NCLB.  
Specifically, NCLB targets low-performing schools and has a particular emphasis 
on Title I schools. Thus, in these schools lower perceptions of teacher autonomy would 
be not only expected but also necessary according to the policy. However, the findings 
here suggest that NCLB influences teacher-perceived autonomy in all schools based on 
grade and subject matter taught. For example, the large tested-subject effect contrasted 
with the relatively small and null findings related to AYP status and Needs Improvement 
status may indicate that the more immediate curricular and testing requirements result in 
lower perceptions of autonomy in the classroom, rather than the possibility of NCLB 
sanctions. However, NCLB’s disparate approach to subject matter and teaching 
assignments, in addition to Title I school context, offer a compelling example of how 
SBA in general and NCLB in particular continue the tension between autonomy and 





Implications for Future Research 
Given the findings of and limitations to the current study, several opportunities 
for future research exist. In this section I offer four ideas for future research.  
First, considering the testing effect in this study, future researchers may want to 
use multiple waves of SASS data, including the soon-to-be released 2011-12 data, to 
create multilevel models that include the testing indicators to investigate whether the 
2007–08 finding is the culmination of an over-time trend, is specific to post NCLB waves 
(2003–04 and 2007–08), or is unique to this study. Based on the ICC growth over time, it 
is likely that an over-time HLM analysis would produce intriguing results. Further, 
researchers should consider combining the SASS data with the retention date available 
through the Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS) in SASS. A study that married the 
autonomy construct with the mobility data available in TFS may be able to determine 
what effect, if any, a change in teacher-perceived autonomy has on retention.  
The second idea responds to the single method approach in this study. That is, 
using SASS or some other reliable teacher data as a baseline to identify characteristics 
that influence teacher autonomy, researchers should consider turning to qualitative 
methods to capture teacher voices and impressions. Of particular interest might be the 
definition that teachers would offer for autonomy. Do teachers interpret autonomy in 
broad or narrow terms, and how do individual teacher definitions vary across teachers’ 
characteristics and school contexts in which they work? Do teachers put different value 
on autonomy related to what is taught or to how to teach? These key questions that 
capture tension between the SBA theory of action and the teacher autonomy would 




autonomy that separates the what  from the how  and that would be a valuable construct 
for future research on the intersection of school reform and teaching.  
 The findings related to principals offer a third avenue of research. A mixed-
methods study of principals could investigate principal beliefs, practices, and attitudes 
about their roles as instructional leaders, as staff managers, and as community leaders. 
This type of study would provide deep insight into how and why principals are so 
important to teacher-perceived autonomy. Again, using SASS or similar data one could 
ground the study and extend it through case study methods that permit in-depth analysis 
and understanding of principals. Given their role as intermediaries and negotiators 
between federal, state, and district policies and teacher practices, a study that examines 
whether principals perceive any differential effects in their construct of autonomy over 
schools based on SBA reform would be a robust extension of the current study.   
Fourth, I suggest a study that would seek to identify the conditions under which 
the public school system should foster teacher autonomy and when the system should 
restrict teacher autonomy. The data in this study would not support a qualitative 
investigation of teacher autonomy (e.g., Should teachers have power over the classroom? 
And if so, how much), but researchers can collect data from actors across levels of the 
system to ascertain information across the spectrum of teacher autonomy. For example, 
researchers might ask teachers under what circumstances teachers respond to 
requirements to follow curricula guides, disciplinary protocol, or district-wide textbook 
adoptions. Researchers might ask teachers under what circumstances principals should 
dictate classroom activity. Similarly, researchers might ask principals and district 




regarding instructional practices and delivery; and under what circumstances local and 





Table A. 1  
Factor Loadings 
  
1993               
(N=44040)   
1999               
(N=38740)   
2003         
(N=40280)   
2007         
(N=33110)   
Factor variables                 
select text 0.5640   0.5022   0.4990   0.5295   
select content to be 
taught 0.6619   0.6093   0.6003   0.6001   
teaching technique 0.7495   0.7609   0.7428   0.6954   
evaluate/grade students 0.6760   0.7236   0.7129   0.6713   
decide discipline 0.5211   0.4990   0.5114   0.4193   
assign homework 0.5753   0.6047   0.5945   0.5442   
                 
  Order of factor loadings 
1 Teach 1 Teach 1 Teach 1 Teach  
2 Evaluate 2 Evaluate 2 Evaluate 2 Evaluate  
3 Content 3 Content 3 Content 3 Content  
4 Homework 4 Homework 4 Homework 4 Homework  
5 Text 5 Text 6 Discipline 5 Text  
6 Discipline 6 Discipline 5 Text 6 Discipline  








Table A. 2  
Eigenvalues and Percentage of Variance Explained  
 
1993               
(N=44040)   
1999               
(N=38740)   
2003         
(N=40280)   
2007         
(N=33110) 
Eigenvalues 3.4939  3.3051  3.2889  2.6457 






Table A. 3 
Results from Scale and Tertile Factor Outcome Variables 
 
Intercept 0.42 *** -0.14 *** 0.80 ***
Teacher characteristics
Elementary_Tested subjects -0.56 *** -2.05 *** -0.94 ***
Elementary_Non-tested subjects 0.18 *** 0.12 -0.06
Secondary_Tested -0.37 *** -1.20 *** -0.35 ***
Novice (le 3 years) -0.05 ** -0.16 0.07
Experience (years) 0.06 *** 0.19 *** 0.02
Female 0.01 -0.07 -0.03
Non-white -0.01 -0.19 0.12
Perception of leadership 0.26 *** 0.68 *** 0.42 ***
School characteristics
Fail AYP -0.07 ** -0.19 -0.04
Schl level - Elementary -0.32 *** -0.83 *** -0.45 ***
Schl level - Combined -0.09 * 0.24 0.06
Title 1 status -0.05 * -0.11 -0.14
Enrollment -0.07 *** -0.25 *** -0.07 *
% FRPL 0.00 0.01 0.03
% Minority -0.13 *** -0.36 *** -0.20 ***
Ave schl perception of leader -0.07 *** -0.22 * -0.08
Random Effects






*p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .001; ***p ≤ .0001
a Coefficients for the two factor models are odds ratios. The HIGH model coefficients can be 
interpreted as the cumulative odds of belonging to the high autonomy group (1 =high) vs. 
belonging to moderate or low autonomy groups (moderate=2, low=3). The MODERATE model 
coefficients can be interpreted as the cumulative odds of belonging to the low autonomy group. 
Positive coefficients increase the probability of being in the modeled group; negative 
coefficients decrease the odds. For example, the odds of being in the HIGH autonomy group for 
teachers who teach elementary students in tested subjects is two times less likely than those who 
teach secondary students in non-tested subjects. Coefficients for the zscale model can be 
interpreted as effect sizes. All continuous measures were standardized (M=0; SD=1).





Table A. 4 
 
Perception of Leadership Factor Pattern, Eigenvalue, and Variance Explained 
 













Table A. 5 
Sanction Policies by State   
  
Sanctions for all 
schools that fail 
AYP 
Sanctions for only 
Title I schools that 
fail AYP 
Alabama x  
Alaska  x 
Arizona x  
Arkansas x  
California x  
Colorado x  
Connecticut  x 
Delaware x  
District of Columbia  x 
Florida x  
Georgia x  
Hawaii x  
Idaho x  
Illinois x  
Indiana x  
Iowa  x 
Kansas  x 
Kentucky x  
Louisiana x  
Maine  x 
Maryland x  
Massachusetts x  
Michigan x  
Minnesota  x 
Mississippi x  
Missouri  x 
Montana  x 
Nebraska  x 
Nevada  x 
New Hampshire  x 
New Jersey  x 
New Mexico x  
New York x  
North Carolina x  




   
   
Table A. 5: Sanction policies by state (cont.)   
Ohio x  
Oklahoma x  
Oregon  x 
Pennsylvania x  
Rhode Island x  
South Carolina x  
South Dakota  x 
Tennessee x  
Texas x  
Utah  x 
Vermont x  
Virginia x  
Washington  x 
West Virginia x  
Wisconsin  x 
Wyoming x   





Table A.6  
Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (95% Confidence Intervals), 1993–2007 
 
1993 
 (n = 44040) 
1999  
(n = 38740) 
2003  
(n = 40280) 
2007 
 (n = 33110) 
Total sample 0.1209 (0.1206, 0.1211) 0.1393 (0.1389, 0.1396) 0.1712 (0.1709, 0.1716) 0.2078 (0.2074, 0.2083) 
Title I  0.1244 (0.1239, 0.1247) 0.1482 (0.1476, 0.1487) 0.1603 (0.1598, 0.1607) 0.2303 (0.2297, 0.2310) 





Table A.7  
 













         
Mean (wgt) 20.251 19.610 20.314 19.740 
Std Dev (wgt) 21.429 25.373 26.815 30.205 
CV 1.0582 1.2939 1.3200 1.5301 
     
Intercept (Tau) 0.934 1.187 1.4952 1.9466 
Residual (Sigma sq) 6.793 7.337 7.2397 7.5030 






Table A. 8  
 













- Title I Only         
Intercept (Tau) 0.986 1.347 1.5972 2.3872 
Residual (Sigma sq) 6.937 7.743 7.7939 8.1382 
ICC 0.1244 0.1482 0.1701 0.2268 
Autonomy scale - Non-Title I Only       
Intercept (Tau) 0.874 1.027 1.3169 1.5480 
Residual (Sigma sq) 6.645 7.044 6.9008 7.0994 
ICC 0.1163 0.1272 0.1603 0.1799 
1
Unstandardized 
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